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 This study contributes to scholarship on the question of Augustine and rhetoric by 
considering Augustine’s use and understanding of rhetoric in De ordine, one of his early 
philosophical dialogues composed during his transition from a life in rhetoric to a life in 
philosophy. The author studies the text through consideration of Augustine’s rhetoric in 
relationship to three major rhetorical authorities of the time, particularly their cultural 
applications: sophistic rhetoric, Ciceronian rhetoric, and Christian rhetoric. Through study of 
these relationships, one perceives Augustine’s ingenuity at work as he integrates diverse 
authorities into his rhetoric of order (ordo) and its corresponding philosophical culture, an 
approach Augustine grounds on the first principle of the unity of all things. Augustine 
demonstrates the authority and reasonability of Christian teaching on this principle, namely that 
one God creates and orders all things. In response to this principle, Augustine seeks to cultivate a 
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moral and intellectual means by which one may recognize the divine order in all of creation, and, 
through the dialogue, he seeks to persuade others to follow this order of teaching. Augustine’s 
rhetoric of order particularly invites reconsideration of the significance of the liberal arts in the 
discovery and expression of divine order. Consequently, Augustine reorders the art of rhetoric 
(rhetorica) to teach, delight and move one’s soul and the souls of one’s audience toward the 





















































St. Augustine and the Rhetoric of De ordine 
In addition to Saint Augustine’s intellectual contribution to a variety of disciplines, he has 
also left an enduring impression on the subject of rhetoric as the study of the artful means and 
practices of persuasion. Although interest in Augustine’s understanding of rhetoric has been 
steady since his own historical moment, scholars have recently renewed their attention to 
Augustine’s contribution to the discipline with particular respect to the relationship between 
rhetoric and religion, and with predominant attention to the first of Augustine’s works to be 
printed, Book IV of De doctrina Christiana (Hermanson, Loewe, et al. 2). The aim of this 
project is to inform the line of inquiry on Augustine’s religious rhetoric by examining rhetorical 
categories present within a text that has been mostly unexamined by rhetorical scholars, namely 
De ordine,1 one of Augustine’s early philosophical dialogues. Understanding Augustine’s use 
and treatment of rhetoric within this text as one discursive liberal art among others, all ordered 
toward the fullness of Christian happiness, may help to illuminate some of Augustine’s 
discussions about rhetoric in two of his major post-conversion works related to the subject,  
De doctrina Christiana and Confessiones.  
Three major metaphors offer guideposts for this study: rhetoric as responsive, 
metarhetoric and order. To describe Augustine’s rhetoric as responsive proposes the primacy of 
approaching Augustine’s understanding of the subject as deeply embedded within the 
complexities of his historical moment, particularly tensions among diverse rhetorical authorities. 
Addressing this responsive character permits one to consider how his discussion of rhetoric 
reflects a distinct ability to mediate historical and cultural constraints in a way that consequently 
allows him to appropriate existing rhetorical sources for new, emerging purposes. This metaphor 
                                                 
1 The author is using the Latin title of Augustine’s text throughout the project. The English 
translation consulted is Russell’s Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil (1942).  
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also permits us to review much of the existing literature on Augustine and rhetoric. Metarhetoric, 
as defined by rhetorical scholar James J. Murphy, is a term used throughout this project to 
describe and discuss first principles that fundamentally shape Augustine’s developing 
understanding of Christian rhetoric (“Metarhetoric” 201). The final metaphor, order, is a 
metarhetorical term used by Augustine that enables a specific transition, or reordering, of 
rhetoric in Augustine’s thought from the secular rhetoric of his early education and teaching 
career to the religious rhetoric of De ordine. Augustine’s metarhetoric of order thus acts as a 
source of appropriation for his developing understanding of a Christian rhetoric designed to meet 
the demands of Christian discourse within his historical moment.  
This proposal details each metaphor in light of Augustine’s developing understanding of 
the significance of rhetoric, from his childhood education in sophistic rhetoric to his post-
conversion trans-philosophical rhetoric. The project then proceeds to look at the rhetoric of De 
ordine as a significant source informing the transition in Augustine’s thought from secular to 
religious rhetoric. Augustine develops a metarhetoric of order that in turn permits him to propose 
a rhetoric that is appropriate for use in Christian education and discourse, both of which ought to 
be directed toward the final end of Christian life, the fullness of happiness found in the 
enjoyment of God. Studying Augustine’s metarhetoric of order from this early period of his life, 
between his final conversion and formal resignation of his secular teaching position in rhetoric, 
may also shed light on his later writings on rhetoric, including Book IV of De doctrina 
Christiana and Confessiones.   
Augustine’s Rhetoric as Responsive 
 Since the inception of the discipline, teachers of rhetoric have acknowledged that for 
practices of rhetoric to be persuasive, i.e., to be rhetorical, they must in some way be responsive 
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to the circumstances within which they are used (Jost and Hyde xv; Silver 165; Pernot 202). This 
quality of “receptivity,” whether termed kairos, decorum, or sprezzaturra, is essential to 
rhetorical competence, to the ability of a rhetor to find and express arguments appropriate to the 
complexities of a given moment. This talent may be intuitive to the rhetor or learned as a 
principle within rhetorical education. The responsive character of rhetoric is thus typical for the 
subject as orators put it into service according to the demands of a particular society (Vickers, 
“Medieval” 214). This rhetorical process, however, is one of opportunity and one of constraint, 
for as rhetors meet the kairotic needs of the moment, they must attend to both emerging and 
traditional elements of a historically situated rhetoric, in theory and in practice (Leff 246). 
Effective rhetors must therefore learn and apply latent as well as new rhetorical categories to 
topics in a way that gives appropriate credence to both.   
St. Augustine’s prominent position within the history of rhetoric is held with particular 
reference to two of his major texts, De doctrina Christiana (begun in AD 396; completed in AD 
426) and Confessiones (AD 397–401), each of which represents responsive elements of his use 
and understanding of rhetoric. Each text also contributes to the history of rhetoric in a distinct 
way, the first presenting in Book IV Augustine’s rationale for Christian eloquence (Murphy, 
“Debate” 217) and the second detailing Augustine’s critique of rhetorical abuses as well as 
proper use of the subject in relation to divine wisdom (Sutherland 142–43; Troup 28–32; Tell 
392–396). Utilizing these two works, scholars study Augustine’s explicit discussions of rhetoric 
and rhetoric-related categories in addition to the historical, cultural and personal contexts that 
inform his use of eloquence. Indeed, the political, religious and educational environment in 
which Augustine’s writing emerges is central to considering the fullness of his understanding of 
the significance of rhetoric (Leff 236; Murphy, “Debate” 206; Baldwin 188). Scholars can more 
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fully appreciate the depth of Augustine’s contribution to the history of rhetoric against the 
backdrop of his fourth century life. This is the case for study of his rhetorical practices as well as 
study of his discourse on the role of rhetoric for culture and within education, as especially 
exemplified in De ordine.  
Augustine’s use and understanding of rhetoric is particularly responsive to tensions 
among rhetorical authorities and their underlying assumptions. He demonstrates this 
responsiveness in multiple ways, but one means to consider it is through his use of diverse terms 
in reference to the subject. In De ordine, De doctrina Christiana, and Confessiones, he uses a 
number of terms in addition to the Latin rhetorica to discuss traditional rhetorical categories and 
topics, e.g., eloquentia, sermonem, disertus, locutio, etc. While scholars have argued for the 
importance of contextual elements to inform Augustine’s understanding of a given term 
(Sutherland 141–142; Press, “Subject” 112–118; Fortin 225–228; Cavadini 165), no major study 
considers Augustine’s use of such terms across the breadth of his work.2 Based predominantly on 
readings of De doctrina Christiana and Confessiones, scholars generally seem to use 
“eloquence” to describe Augustine’s post-conversion understanding of the subject and “rhetoric” 
for that which he left behind. Others use these terms more interchangeably.   
Eloquentia (“eloquence) and ars dicendi (“art of speaking”) were the preferred Latin 
terms for rhetoric (Pernot 102), and it would seem that Augustine’s use of the term eloquentia in 
De doctrina Christiana and Confessiones reflects Cicero’s understanding of the term, 
particularly its interdependence with sapientia (“wisdom”). Augustine, however, also uses 
rhetorica (“rules of rhetoric”) and artem rhetoricam (“art of rhetoric”) to denote the rhetoric that 
                                                 
2 Drobner notes the importance of looking at Augustine’s work collectively to frame his 
understandings of a given idea, particularly due to Augustine’s use of polemical language in 
making rhetorical arguments of doctrinal importance (19–20). See also Topping (Happiness 66). 
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he learned and taught. Of particular interest to this study is the fact that Augustine uses rhetorica 
within his list of prescribed liberal arts for Christian study in De ordine even while using the 
same term to later criticize certain sophistic rhetorical practices.3 Although it would seem that 
Augustine’s choice of words frequently depends on the purpose of his argument as well as his 
audience, thorough analysis of Augustine’s terminological use would inform discussion of the 
differentiation between these terms and the nuance of Augustine’s responsive writing.  
Scholars have repeatedly acknowledged this responsive quality of Augustine’s use and 
understanding of rhetoric in reference to the rhetorical authorities of his time, particularly as they 
consider Augustine’s arguments in De doctrina Christiana (henceforth DDC). Prominent among 
this scholarship is the 1930 translation and commentary of Book IV of DDC by Sister Thérèse 
Sullivan, which provides thorough analysis of the classical basis of the text as well as 
Augustine’s Christian adaptation of rhetorical precepts (“Appendix” 330–363). In her summary, 
Sullivan describes the value of Book IV in three points. According to her evaluation, the text 
contributes to the history of rhetoric by repudiating sophistic abuses of rhetoric, re-introducing 
Ciceronian standards for the subject, and presenting a distinctly Christian ideal of those classical 
standards (362–63). As a mature bishop, Augustine sat down to add final thoughts to the 
doctrinal text that he had begun many years earlier, and to do so he still utilized many classical 
rhetorical categories even as he added Christian content to his understanding of eloquence and its 
usefulness.  
Sullivan’s summary reflects the responsive character of Augustine’s rhetoric in DDC 
Book IV by highlighting Augustine’s engagement with major rhetorical authorities of his time. 
                                                 
3 According to Riley’s analysis of Augustine’s educational curricula, Augustine uses the term 
“rhetoric” in De ordine and Retractions, “eloquence” in De quantitate animae, and the “art of 
speaking” in Confessiones (132).  
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Rather than discarding one for another or rejecting the study of rhetoric in toto, as had some of 
his contemporaries (Murphy, “Debate” 206–213), Augustine employed sophistic, Ciceronian and 
Christian elements to articulate an understanding of eloquence especially for Christian speech 
while utilizing latent rhetorical authorities of his time. These three categories thus not only 
demonstrate the historical significance of Book IV but also provide imperative categories for 
scholars as they approach the broader question of Augustine and rhetoric. By examining 
sophistic, Ciceronian and Christian aspects of Augustine’s rhetoric, scholars situate Augustine’s 
work more deeply within the intellectual complexities of his time. All three rhetorical authorities 
– sophistic, Ciceronian and Christian –valuably contribute to the character of Augustine’s 
rhetoric, but not without imperative distinctions. Let us then consider more closely the 
significance of each rhetorical authority for Augustine’s understanding of the subject.  
Augustine’s Response to Sophistic Rhetoric  
Many studies of Book IV of DDC and early chapters of Confessiones highlight 
Augustine’s arguments against practices of sophistic rhetoric that were prevalent during his time, 
particularly as present within the Roman education system. These scholars situate Augustine’s 
use of the term rhetorica (“rhetoric”) within the historical period known as the Second Sophistic, 
a period generally known for ornamentally excessive forms of speech taught in rhetoric schools 
and practiced by orators (Baldwin 187–190; Murphy “Christianization” 25–29; Sutherland 140–
142). Such studies demonstrate how Augustine’s negative use of the term “rhetoric” ought not 
assume his rejection of all rhetorical topics (Sutherland 142) but rather specific forms of 
rhetorical practice that Augustine eventually considered defective.  
Similar to Plato’s critique in the Gorgias (Pernot 47), Augustine rejects sophistic rhetoric 
on both intellectual and moral grounds. For while the rhetorical pedagogy of Augustine’s early 
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education likely included well-established theoretical and moral elements from Cicero 
(especially De Inventione, De Oratore, and Orator) and the Rhetorica Ad Herennium (Troup 18; 
Farrell 270), greater focus of the time was given to content and forms of speech that simply led 
students to worldly success within the Imperial system, teaching what Dodaro has termed a 
“rhetoric of glory” designed to maintain an empire (83). Philosophy and rhetoric were opposed 
in the Roman schools rather than conjoined (Troup 16–17), the former assumed to be 
inapplicable to public pursuits. While this tension between the disciplines had existed since 
Greek antiquity, some thinkers within the Hellenistic Age, such as Cicero’s teacher, Philo of 
Larissa, had sought to integrate the two (Pernot 69). The marriage between philosophy and 
rhetoric promoted even by the great Cicero was, however, predominantly ignored during the 
Imperial Age, and as a result the goal of rhetorical education for most students was solely 
political and legal achievement. Education did not include the search for a comprehensive and 
unified set of knowledge, as classical philosopher-orators, like Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and 
Quintilian, had long insisted (Murphy, “End” 230). This rhetoric thus diminished most 
theoretical and philosophical thought and instead centered predominantly on imitation of 
rhetorical formulas as a means to acquire power (Farrell 270; Dodaro 81–82; Pernot 190–191).  
While critiques of this rhetorical form (often pejoratively termed “sophistic”) are familiar to 
students of the history of rhetoric, Augustine also has concerns about sophistic rhetoric that are 
representative of his own emerging thought and personal experiences.   
Pivotal to Augustine’s critique of certain sophistic practices is the misapplication of 
rhetoric primarily for worldly success (Farrell 269). By the time Augustine writes Confessiones, 
he has found an outlet he considers more fitting for his rhetorical skills. Rather than using his 
talent for a profession that loves vanity and seeks after lying (conf. IX.4.9), Augustine speaks 
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and writes to serve the truth (I.15.24). He redirects rhetoric toward an end that will serve all 
people as it expresses reality through a Christian lens. Thus in his evaluation Augustine describes 
not only the misappropriation of rhetoric solely for material and political gain but also the 
inadequacies of a rhetorical pedagogy that support such application, such as the teaching of 
immoral (pagan) content and the practice of rudely competitive speaking tournaments (conf. 
I.16.26; I.18.28–29). As Augustine is critical of the study of rhetoric isolated from theory and 
philosophy, he is equally perturbed by its misappropriated use for social and political display 
isolated from a conception of the common good (Dodaro 123, note 44). In DDC, Augustine 
therefore warns against “sophisms,” or captious conclusions of the reasoning process as well as 
“sophistical” discourse, which exceeds the rhetorical needs of a given moment by being 
ornamentally excessive and inordinately focused on expression (DDC II.31.48). The issues that 
Augustine thus takes with sophistic pedagogy and practice revolve around the misuse and 
misconception of philosophical rhetoric, specific abuses of “rhetorical activity” (Pernot 189), 
rather than the discipline of rhetoric itself.  
Acknowledging these substantial ways that Augustine rejects sophistic practice, he does, 
however, find particular precepts of sophistic rhetoric valid for his new rhetorical purposes. He 
accepts the traditionally sophistic emphasis on the function of the orator, imitation as the primary 
means of learning rhetorical skill, and certain sophistic elements of style (Kennedy, Classical 
181–182). Augustine seems willing to retain such aspects of his early rhetorical education as 
long as he can situate them within a Christian understanding of eloquence. Within these 
constraints, some sophistic principles may be useful to the communication of Christianity. This 
assessment would seem all the more accurate if we acknowledge Kennedy’s argument that, 
historically, “the devices of sophistic rhetoric had become the cues to which [Christian] 
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audiences responded and by which [a Christian orator’s] purposes could be best accomplished” 
(Classical 166). Still, while Augustine may have found some sophistic elements acceptable for 
Christian speech, his tolerance of such devices seems remarkably limited compared to the 
common rhetorical practices of his time.  
Common although it was, sophistic rhetoric as it was practiced in the Late Roman Empire 
was not the only available authority for rhetoric students (Farrell 271). Close at hand was the 
established work of Cicero, who, although acknowledged more for his political style than 
theoretical substance (Kennedy, “Attitudes” 68), was readily accessible to the young Augustine. 
Although Augustine had already been exposed to rhetorical concepts of Cicero in his formal 
studies (Troup 18–19), the Roman senator took a much more prominent position in Augustine’s 
thought on his reading of the Hortensius at age 19. As Augustine describes the impact of this text 
on his youthful mind in the Confessiones, he writes, “This book changed my affections. It turned 
my prayers to you, Lord, and caused me to have different purposes and desires” (conf. III.4.7). 
Cicero’s exhortation to the philosophical life in the Hortensius turned Augustine away from 
“vain hopes” and toward a desire, a love, for “undying wisdom.” While Augustine was 
accustomed to appreciating and evaluating such a text on the basis of its eloquence alone, this 
text impressed itself on Augustine’s heart not predominantly “by its way of speaking but rather 
by what it spoke.” A closer look reveals Cicero’s work as a significant step in Augustine’s 
cultural formation and in the direction of his conversion to Christianity.  
Augustine’s Response to Ciceronian Rhetoric  
 Augustine’s reflection on this encounter with Cicero’s philosophy conveys the pivotal 
nature of the event. For him, it is a move away from worldly standards of success toward an 
inherently valuable search for wisdom and truth. Although Augustine does not find within 
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Cicero’s writing the object of his seeking (for as a skeptic, Cicero sought truth without indicating 
if it could in fact be found), he is enflamed at this time with the desire, the motivation in his heart 
to pursue what he considers to be a higher purpose (Riley 92). Although this event is sometimes 
referred to as Augustine’s conversion from rhetoric to philosophy (125), such a description is 
misleading. For contrary to what might be assumed, Cicero’s philosophy brought more to bear 
on Augustine’s understanding of the significance of eloquentia, not less. As he eventually came 
to reject elements of sophistic rhetoric, the work of Cicero presented a different set of standards 
for the subject, perhaps most importantly the interdependence of philosophy and rhetoric toward 
wisdom within a more general (liberal) method of study.  
A notable breach occurred between philosophy and rhetoric at least as far back as Greek 
antiquity, foremost in the work of Plato, who, in criticizing the moral relativism of some 
rhetoricians of the time, claimed study of the truth for philosophy alone (Vickers, “Territorial 
Disputes” 249–251). Such “territorial disputes” have a long tradition within the history of 
rhetoric, typically stemming from binary oppositions, e.g., episteme (“knowledge”) versus doxa 
(“opinion”) (259, 263). Distinct from this line of thinking, however, Cicero claimed in De 
Oratore that the ideal orator must master both subjects. In his exposition of the Latin term 
ornatus Cicero argued for the interdependence “of wisdom and eloquence, of the tongue and the 
heart, of education in thinking and in speaking, of the life of activity and of leisure” (DiLorenzo, 
“Ciceronianism” 173). He understood wisdom to be “knowledge embodied in speech,” thus 
maintaining the integrity of both philosophical speculation and rhetorical action in pursuit of the 
happy life (“Critique” 258). On Augustine’s reading of the Hortensius, he discovers this 
inseparability of wisdom and eloquence, of matter (res) and words (verba) (“Ciceroniamism” 
174–75). Furthermore, he accepts Cicero’s method by which wisdom may be sought, namely that 
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of philosophy and the liberal arts (Troup 23; Topping, Happiness 80–83). Thus in Confessiones 
III.4.8, Augustine writes, “I was delighted with the exhortation only because by its argument I 
was stirred up and enkindled and set aflame to love, and pursue, and attain and catch hold of, and 
strongly embrace not this or that sect, but wisdom itself, whatsoever it might be.” From this point 
on, Cicero’s recommended method of general education in search of wisdom informs 
Augustine’s understanding of culture. 
Augustine’s association with Cicero lasts throughout his career, and he often consults 
Cicero’s thought on major questions (Troup 21). Yet this association occurs with many nuances 
as Augustine embraces, rejects, revises or expands on Cicero’s thought for his own purposes. 
Indeed, Augustine has a great talent for reformulating the ideas of his predecessors (25), and he 
often demonstrates the originality of his thought through such examples of rhetorical ingenuity. 
Thus while Augustine retains important elements from Cicero on the nature and practices of the 
rhetorical art (including the integrity of philosophy and rhetoric), his move toward Christian first 
principles also leads to certain divergences. Two critical points must be noted. First, on his 
conversion Augustine rejects the skeptical nature of Cicero’s philosophy (Fortin 226), arguing in 
Contra Academicos that such a position is not only epistemologically erroneous but that it 
ultimately leads adherents to serious moral and educational deficiencies (Topping, Happiness 
96–97). In contrast, the truthful character of Christian revelation penetrates epistemological 
categories of authority and reason while providing wisdom as “wholesome food” for the 
salvation of all souls (conf. V.6.10). In a Christian context, the sweetness of eloquence 
accompanies wisdom to serve a transcendent truth rather than a merely plausible one.  
 Secondly, the nature of Christian content is such that it provides its own examples for 
imitation as well as its own distinct kind of eloquence (doc. Christ. IV.20–21;IV.6.9). While 
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speech was driven toward the socio-political persuasion of elites in Cicero’s rhetorical project, 
Christian eloquence prioritizes clarity for purposes of teaching truth to a universal audience 
(IV.9.23; IV.12.28). Clarity of thought and expression is of the utmost importance, although 
Augustine also acknowledges that Christian orators may appropriately exercise all three 
rhetorical styles (subdued, moderate and grand) to inspire their audiences to action, as 
demonstrated by Church leaders like Paul, Cyprian and Ambrose (IV.22.51). Just as Christian 
eloquence is given distinct qualities, so Christian wisdom is also given a “radical reorientation” 
(Troup 26). Divine wisdom as reflected in the order of creation, in the mysteries of the Church, 
and in the teachings of Sacred Scripture becomes the primary source shaping Christian thought 
and speech, providing new topics and new forms of argument for rhetorical uses (Tracy 274). As 
a result, Augustine’s post-conversion rhetoric and his Christian educational project are modeled 
not only on rhetorical and philosophical terms but also on distinctly theological ones.  
 Between his reading of the Hortensius and his final conversion, Augustine perseveres in 
his search for wisdom and eloquence. Throughout this period, Augustine’s life seems to continue 
to be at least partially defined by rhetorical signs, as evidenced by his initial dismissal of 
Scripture due to its lack of artistry (conf. III.5.9) and his dissatisfaction with the Manichaean 
Faustus, who lacked a certain fullness of cultural excellence (conf. V.6–7). At this point, 
Augustine is also teaching in the rhetoric schools of North Africa. For several years, Augustine 
professes sophistic rhetoric and is eventually promoted to a rhetoric chair in Milan. There in a 
Milanese church, however, Augustine discovers Ambrose, the Christian bishop who seems not 
only to embody both wisdom and eloquence but who also resolves many of the philosophical 
problems with which Augustine has been struggling in his search for wisdom. The preaching of 
Ambrose, which Augustine at first finds contemptuous, begins to demonstrate certain “coherence 
 
13 
between the exalted matter and the lowly style of Scripture,” and as a result, Augustine gradually 
comes to accept the authority of Christian revelation (DiLorenzo, “Ciceronianism” 175–76). 
Augustine thus finds the Ciceronian ideals that he first encountered in the Hortensius fulfilled in 
Ambrose as well as the final object of his search, that is, true and lasting happiness in God.  
Augustine makes a significant change in his life at this point. He has found the sophistic 
eloquence of his youth to be misdirected toward aims of self-promotion and deception. Inspired 
by Cicero’s call to the philosophical life, he has explored various intellectual communities as he 
searched for a wisdom that would satisfy all the desires of his restless heart. Throughout this 
time Augustine has managed the tensions inherent in his sophistic teaching position and his 
developing understanding and acceptance of Christianity. Augustine describes the growing 
disdain he possessed for his profession between chapters two and five of Confessiones Book IX. 
Reflecting the cries of the Book of Psalms, he writes, “How long will you be dull of heart? Why 
do you love vanity and seek after lying?” (conf. IX.4.9). Experiencing a strange and terrible pain 
in his mouth (IX.4.12), Augustine resolves to resign his teaching position at the same time that 
he makes known his intention to enter into the Christian Church in Milan. His heart’s search for 
happiness has found its final object.  
Augustine’s Response to Christian Rhetoric  
While Cicero instigates Augustine’s desire for the happy life, its final end is found within 
a Christian understanding of happiness that not only seeks wisdom but also promises to possess 
it (Gilson 8). As Mallard describes, Cicero’s philosophy “[illumines] what clearheaded 
Christianity truly [affirms],” that eternal truth alone endures and provides a happiness that cannot 
be lost (44). Augustine’s developing understanding of Christian doctrine leads him both to 
theorize about the significance of discourse in the divine destiny of humanity (e.g., De ordine, 
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De magistro, Confessiones, De catechizandis rudibus) and to make practical use of his rhetorical 
talents for Christian purposes as opportunities emerge. Therefore, although Augustine resigns 
from his sophistic rhetoric profession, continuity remains in his use of rhetoric for teaching, 
writing and speaking within the new circumstances of his life, such as within his spiritual 
community, his priesthood and his eventual bishopric. 
Augustine’s understanding of rhetoric also develops through his conversion. Central to 
his maturing theology of discourse is his understanding of the incarnation as the Word of God. 
As Troup states, although “this speaking Word functions theologically…[it also] resonates 
rhetorically, meeting and exceeding the standard of embodied speech required for Cicero’s ideal 
orator” (2). As a result of his understanding of the incarnation, Augustine eventually grounds his 
post-conversion rhetoric within his deepening understanding of divine speech. The “sweetness” 
communicated through Christ becomes for Augustine the only true eloquence that can lead 
humanity to the fullness of happiness available in this life and the next (Cavadini 165–66). As 
his theology develops, Augustine regards Christ as “the condition, the author and the method of 
all his thinking,” such that he could ask, “How can we think or talk about anything in heaven or 
on earth apart from Christ?” (Drobner 29). By the time Augustine provides his rationale for use 
of the rhetorical art in Book IV of DDC as well as in Book IX of Confessiones, he has already 
reinvented the subject of rhetoric in profound ways by imbuing it with Christian significance and 
directing its proper use toward eternal happiness.  
Augustine’s theological thought also eventually shapes his understanding of the 
limitations of language. The reality of human sin is for Augustine a pivotal roadblock to 
humanity’s possession of the fullness of divine truth, and one’s ability to effectively 
communicate this truth is always susceptible to error and misinterpretation. Yet neither human 
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sin nor the ineffability of God distracts Augustine from the urgency of expressing what he knows 
(Colish 22), for the incarnation also “guarantees the efficacy of divine communication” (Dodaro 
108) and moves Augustine to both teach and preach the word of God. Thus Augustine responds 
to the contemporary debate over whether or not rhetoric ought to have a place in the emerging 
Christian order with a resounding “yes,” and as Murphy notes, the historical debate ends with his 
articulation of Book IV of DDC (“Debate” 218). In Confessiones, Augustine not only 
demonstrates his own mastery of rhetorical narrative but also advances a Christian understanding 
of “confession” as a premier form of Christian speech (Farrell 283–84; DiLorenzo, “Divine 
Eloquence” 76), one that decenters the speaker and invites the topic of humility into the public 
forum (Dodaro 92, 94). Furthermore, within Augustine’s proposed curricula for Christian 
education (De ordine, De quantitate animae, Retractions, Confessiones) (Riley 132), rhetorica 
retains a place of importance among the arts as they are directed toward the ultimate purpose of 
human life, possession of the eternal wisdom that confers happiness. Augustine is therefore able 
to offer a genuine Christian alternative to the deficient sophistic pedagogy of his early life and to 
suggest a means by which important elements of classical thought might be reordered for 
appropriate Christian use. 
In summary, Augustine’s ingenious response to these three major rhetorical authorities of 
his time likely influenced the persuasive success of his own projects. According to Cameron, 
such apprehending and appropriation of diverse cultural authorities into the emerging, Christian 
worldview greatly contributed to the eventual dominance of Christian discourse over its classical 
counterpart (Christianity 5). Such appropriation of non-Christian thought was acceptable, argued 
Augustine, for this intellectual “gold and silver” was not instituted by the pagans themselves but 
was actually dug up from mines of divine Providence, which were “everywhere infused” (DDC 
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II.40.60). And “when the Christian separates himself in spirit from their miserable [pagan] 
society, he should take this treasure with him for the just use of teaching the gospel.” Augustine 
thus contributes to a distinct Christian rhetoric for public orators, teachers and preachers of his 
time. He utilizes sophistic and Ciceronian elements of rhetoric as “an authoritative platform” on 
which he can cultivate eloquence for Christian significance and culture (Conley 63). In light of 
such receptivity, one may suggest that Augustine is simply practicing good rhetoric as he offers 
acceptance, critique and revision of certain sophistic, Ciceronian and Christian rhetorical 
elements that were coexisting and competing within the rhetorical instabilities of his historical 
moment. In Book IV of DDC, he responds to all three traditions as he appropriates each within 
his understanding of Christian discourse.  
While Sullivan’s study of DDC Book IV particularly demonstrates Augustine’s 
responsiveness to these predominant rhetorical authorities of his time, additional categories 
inform scholarly understanding of the depths of his distinctly Christian rhetoric. As Fortin 
suggests, one must look at the subtleties of Augustine’s post-conversion rhetoric to appreciate 
the fullness of his contribution to the history of rhetorical thought (220). While his assimilation 
of classical rhetorical principles demonstrates their potential within his Christian worldview, they 
were significantly insufficient in and of themselves (Murphy, “Forward” xi). Augustine’s 
Christian understanding of wisdom and eloquence demands more of rhetoric than its strictly 
secular account can provide.  
Central to the study of Augustine and rhetoric then is the fact that although all three 
rhetorical authorities continue to inform his rhetorical theory in DDC, they are all subjected to a 
distinctly Christian account of terms. Each has its appropriate place within Augustine’s rhetorical 
perspective, and each has specific limitations. The highest authority is given to a distinctly 
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Christian rhetoric that is informed by Christian topics and sources, but scholars have yet to 
address precisely how the authority of Christian rhetoric comes to the fore in Augustine’s 
thought. We have already acknowledged that Augustine does not resign from his teaching 
position just to leave rhetoric behind after his conversion. Neither does he simply give Christian 
arguments for the adoption of Ciceronian precepts. Rather, as Troup notes, Augustine utilizes a 
philosophically eclectic approach to “remodel and invest [classical rhetoric] with a Christian 
sense” (26). If Augustine’s more original contribution to rhetoric lies in his “Christianization” of 
the subject (Murphy, “Christianization” 24), a closer look can consider how this process occurs 
in the development of his thought.  
Cameron’s book Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian 
Discourse makes several arguments concerning the gradual Christianization of the Roman world. 
Rather than a simple process of conversion, Cameron suggests the complex transformation 
involved not only the impact of Christian discourse on society but also “how [Christian 
discourse] was itself transformed and shaped in the endeavor” (Christianity 4). Christian writers, 
such as Augustine, utilized existing literary devices and techniques to create a distinctly 
Christian “intellectual and imaginative universe” that was responsive to both theological 
categories and changing intellectual and cultural trends of the time (Christianity 6). In studying 
the process of Christianization, Cameron stresses the importance of theological content and 
forms, both established and emerging, as a source of insight concerning the stages of the 
formation of the Christian worldview (Christianity 8). Perhaps then, one can better understand 
Augustine’s own contribution to the Christianization of discourse, specifically Christian 
discourse about rhetoric, by more closely considering the theological categories shaping 
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Augustine’s rhetoric of Christian eloquence, or in other words, his theological practice and 
theorizing of the discipline of rhetoric.  
As argued above, Augustine provided a persuasive response to the question of the status 
of rhetoric within his historical moment. Although many of his Christian contemporaries were 
reluctant to acknowledge the value of rhetoric due to its pagan past (Murphy, “Debate” 213), 
Augustine found a means to reconcile the classical art with a Christian understanding of 
communication. Within the scholarship on Augustine and rhetoric, some scholars have 
specifically considered the influence of theological categories on his “redeemed rhetoric.” Three 
examples include Sutherland’s “Love as Rhetorical Principle: The Relationship between Content 
and Style in the Rhetoric of St. Augustine”, Tracy’s “Charity, Obscurity, Clarity: Augustine’s 
Search for a True Rhetoric” and Troup’s Temporality, Eternity and Wisdom: The Rhetoric of 
Augustine’s Confessions. In each of these works, the author addresses the relationship between 
Augustine’s theological thought and his rhetorical assumptions. Tell’s study “Augustine and the 
‘Chair of Lies’: Rhetoric in The Confessions” also offers an example of both philosophical and 
theological categories inherent to Augustine’s rhetoric. In discussing such categories as central to 
Augustine’s understanding of eloquence, all of these works highlight the interdisciplinary unity 
of theological, philosophical and rhetorical elements in Augustine’s thought and, as this study 
suggests, potentially point in the direction of a metarhetorical framework.  
Although none of these authors specifically describes Augustine’s Christian eloquence as 
“metarhetorical,” their conclusions may be said to fall within the boundaries of this term. For 
metarhetoric, according to Murphy, consist of “first principles, either stated or left implicit, on 
which a rhetorician bases his whole activity” (“Metarhetoric” 202). In other words, metarhetoric 
inquires into those topics that a rhetorician needs to know in order to be a rhetorician. For 
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Augustine, good speakers ought to have fitting rhetorical skills, but more fundamentally, they 
must first have an understanding of what “the good” is itself (Topping, Happiness 28–29). 
Augustine’s Christian understanding of the significance of rhetoric thus depends on additional 
terms that situate and order the subject for his new purposes as well as elucidate his criticisms of 
earlier classical rhetorical forms, i.e., sophistry and Ciceronianism. 
In his 1971 article, Murphy proposes Augustine as a metarhetorician and argues that his 
sign (signa) theory is one particular avenue for consideration of his metarhetoric (“Metarhetoric” 
205–209).4 The four works mentioned above (Sutherland, Tracy, Troup and Tell) address the 
centrality of such additional terms as caritas, “self,” and “wisdom,” each of which invites 
consideration of a kind of metarhetoric within Augustine’s work. Without using the term 
“metarhetoric,” these authors suggest that an understanding of such concepts, each expressing 
some element of Christian reality, is essential to the study of Augustine’s rhetoric. This proposal 
suggests that such metarhetorical terms, many of which are interconnected in Augustine’s 
thought, directly inform his use and understanding of rhetoric and are central to appreciating his 
contribution to rhetorical history.  
Augustine’s Response as Metarhetorical  
These authors’ understanding of such terms as “love,” “self” or “wisdom” points to a 
kind of metarhetoric that grounds Augustine’s reinvention of rhetoric for Christian use. In other 
words, they act as a metarhetoric within which Augustine may criticize the immorality of 
sophistic rhetoric, question the validity yet incompleteness of Ciceronian rhetoric, and still 
articulate a distinctly Christian understanding of rhetoric ordered toward eternal happiness. 
Although each of these terms has, in the broadest sense, a historically situated “rhetoric” of its 
                                                 
4 Augustine’s use of the term signa in De ordine would further inform Murphy’s assumption (see 
for example ord. I.8.25). 
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own, or a history of discourse concerning its use and meaning, metarhetoric suggests that a given 
set of rhetorical assumptions may be informed by discourse from a variety of disciplines rather 
than only within the boundaries of a given historical understanding of rhetoric. Such an approach 
seems particularly relevant to Augustine’s cultural milieu, when conditions for Christian truth 
were assumed to be found outside of the rhetorical discipline (Cameron, Christianity 35) and 
classical reliance on the pragmatic and relative had moved toward the contemplative and 
absolute (Leff 236). Although this particular point has led some scholars to critique Augustine’s 
contribution to rhetorical history, such as Walker’s accusation that Augustine strips rhetoric of its 
inventive power and reduces it to the art of correct dialectical reasoning (314), such a claim fails 
to consider the full grounding and possible originality of Augustine’s rhetorical approach. Such 
an accusation also denies the responsive character of the discipline of rhetoric itself and opts to 
project classical expectations for the subject on a distinctly different time and place. 
Furthermore, to discuss Augustine’s metarhetoric as informative to his developing understanding 
of the significance of rhetoric is not to suggest that metarhetoric is a subject standing “above” 
rhetoric qua rhetoric (“Metarhetoric: An Editorial Foreword”), but rather that this term permits 
us to explore the tensions that persist between, in and through Augustine’s use of theological, 
philosophical and rhetorical topics as situated within the context of Late Roman thought.  
As Cameron argues, the process of Christianization entailed a complex matrix of 
philosophical, rhetorical and theological discourses that were frequently put into service for one 
another (Christianity 9). Augustine’s intricate approach to the intellectual and cultural problems 
of his time can escape our notice if we presume to think only within the current constraints of a 
given discipline. In rising to meet the demand for “a philosophical reconsideration of rhetorical 
theory” (Leff 236), Augustine utilized categories that are rhetorical as well as traditionally 
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philosophical and theological. Through an approach that Johnson describes as “mysticism” 
(229), Augustine puts them all to use in his understanding of a universal Christian discourse. 
Metarhetorical terms may thus help scholars to consider more seriously the role of 
Christian categories within Augustine’s understanding of rhetoric as well as his original 
contributions to rhetorical history. As Murphy suggests, the study of metarhetoric invites 
scholars to examine questions that are essential to the enterprise of rhetoric as a whole 
(“Metarhetoric” 213). Even if we disagree with the given assumptions of a particular 
metarhetoric, the approach at least clarifies the purposes and ideals of a given, historically 
situated understanding of rhetoric (212). The aim of this particular project is to inquire into 
Augustine’s immediate post-conversion thought, specifically his work at Cassiciacum, and to 
consider what metarhetorical categories are represented there and how they might inform 
Augustine’s developing understanding of Christian rhetoric at that time. Addressing this 
transitional period in Augustine’s life, as he was preparing to leave his rhetoric chair and be 
initiated into the Christian Church, may additionally shed light on Augustine’s later rhetorical 
assumptions as articulated in DDC and Confessiones. 
This formative period of Augustine’s life, immediately following his conversion yet prior 
to his formal resignation, has been mostly unexplored by rhetorical scholars. While Augustine 
was preparing his formal letter of resignation in AD 386, he was also composing three 
philosophical dialogues. Of these three works, this project centers on De ordine, a text that, 
although written at an early time of Augustine’s life, “contains the elements of the entire 
Augustinian philosophy” (Russell, “Introduction” iii). Most importantly for our purposes, De 
ordine addresses the use and order of the arts toward eternal happiness, rhetoric among them.  
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In De ordine, Augustine employs sophistic, Ciceronian and Christian elements in his 
rhetoric, but as mentioned above, his assimilation of secular elements is constrained by a 
specifically Christian understanding of certain terms. In DDC Book IV, Augustine argues that 
secular rhetoric can be accepted in so far as it is useful for the expression of Christian truth 
(IV.2.3). Augustine’s rhetoric thus has “theological and ethical meaning” in addition to its more 
technical use (Murphy, “Metarhetoric” 209). While rhetoric as a subject is neutral, “every use of 
it is either in virtue or in vice” (208). The purpose of Augustine’s rhetoric is therefore central to 
his understanding and use of it. While Augustine’s mature reflections on the significance of 
eloquence in Book IV provide a rationale for Christian use, his earlier writings may inform the 
transition in his thought from the rhetoric of his childhood education to the one that he articulates 
in DDC.  
This particular text, De ordine, captures Augustine’s arguments in favor of the liberal 
arts, including rhetoric, as imperative means toward Christian truth and ultimately toward 
happiness. The contemporary debate among Christians over education was inherently tied to the 
question of the primacy of Roman secular rhetoric (Cameron, Later Roman 152), for the 
discussion of education was essential to “defining the intellectual base for a culture which would 
permit the Church to perform its duty of leading men to salvation” (Murphy, “Debate” 207). This 
concern led some of Augustine’s Christian predecessors to reject Roman education entirely and 
to propose alternatives in its place, such as the study of Christian topics alone (207–213). This 
response was particularly fitting for a Christian understanding of knowledge, which assumed 
universal rather than elitist access to an eternal truth that was originally communicated through 
simple stories to fishermen and not highly trained thinkers and speakers.  
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But many of these Christian thinkers, like Augustine, had themselves benefitted from 
classical education and still utilized their rhetorical skills in a number of ways to advance the 
Christian cause, even while emphasizing strong differences between their own Christian 
discourse and their pagan contemporaries (Cameron, Christianity 85). Their writings thus 
demonstrate a definite tension between similarities with pagan writing and their desire to 
disengage from it, or more specifically, the necessity they had for using primary rhetoric while 
rejecting Roman forms of secondary rhetoric (Schaeffer 296). But the Christian debate also 
included those who found some classical education necessary, even while they offered critique of 
the specific use of pagan literature (Murphy, “Debate” 210). Although this latter position 
promoted classical education as propaedeutical to Christian truth, it also acknowledged distinct 
qualities of Christian knowledge compared to the conventional wisdom of the world.  
When Augustine sat down to write Book IV of DDC, the vitality of Roman culture “had 
already begun to suffer from the questionings of the new Christian element within it” (Murphy, 
“Debate” 214). As Murphy notes, “it was an age of selection, a time to examine the sapientia 
saeculi to extract from a thousand-year-old heritage whatever would aid in the work of the 
Lord.” Augustine’s DDC was a positive response to this historical dilemma, but his discernment 
on the question of Christian education had already begun much earlier. Concurrent with his 
resignation, Augustine’s philosophical dialogues from Cassiciacum, and De ordine in particular, 
are the first source that we have of his thoughts on this pivotal topic, and thus also of his 
engagement with the question of rhetoric. Within this text, Augustine’s metarhetoric of order 
informs his transitioning, or reordering, of the subject from his classical background to its use for 




The Metarhetoric of Order 
Augustine’s metarhetoric in De ordine situates the discipline of rhetoric in a way that 
gives it the highest purpose Augustine can possibly give it from within his developing Christian 
worldview – as one valuable liberal art among others, all directed through reason to the beauty, 
truth and goodness of God. In this text, rhetoric is re-purposed toward the highest Christian end – 
beatitude, the good that confers true happiness. Each of the seven disciplines that Augustine 
explicates is tied to this final end, and only in unified form may the arts lead the willing student 
through reason toward wisdom and happiness (ord. II.16.44). This endeavor is both practical and 
contemplative, moving from the fruits of earthly creation, i.e., nature and reason to divine 
realities, preparing “the way for the enjoyment of God” (Gilson 9). But to proceed on this path, 
the reader must follow a given order, according to Augustine, an order “by which God governs 
all things” (ord. II.1.2). Each art must be ordered toward the highest good and together they must 
be ordered to achieve their shared purpose. Augustine acknowledges the role given to the study 
of rhetoric within this higher form of education, but its use is necessarily (re)ordered to Christian 
ends.  
“Order” then may be considered a significant metarhetorical term that grounds 
Augustine’s understanding of all of the arts, including rhetoric, at this point in his thought. 
Augustine begins De ordine with these words: 
To perceive and to grasp the order of reality proper to each thing, and then to see or to 
explain the order of the entire universe by which this world is truly held together and 
governed…is a very difficult and rare achievement for men…And yet there is nothing 
that the most gifted minds search out more eagerly, nothing that those who, with heads 
uplifted as much as they may, still see the rocks and storms of this life below – there is 
 
25 
nothing that these are more desirous of hearing and learning than how it is that God has a 
care for human affairs…(ord. I.1.1). 
Within this introduction, Augustine directs his thought to the problem of evil in a world 
governed by a good, loving and all-powerful God.5 But in just these few lines we gather two 
important points of Augustine’s project: that there is an order of reality proper to each thing and 
that this modest order is significant within a universal order. Augustine’s metarhetoric of order 
then has two particular implications that draw our attention: the order proper to each individual 
art, i.e., its given place among the arts as well as its distinct contribution to culture and the 
universal order toward which they all ought to be directed. In both cases, the order reflects divine 
purpose and the ultimate good toward which all humanity is striving. The ultimate end is 
wisdom, which is the Augustinian word that describes the knowledge that leads to happiness 
(Gilson 16), and this end is also what Augustine implies in De ordine by philosophia as the love 
of wisdom. The arts are a means to cultivate and order one’s soul toward this end. Each art plays 
a distinct and vital role, yet their unity is what brings about the fullness of reason toward truth 
and happiness. Augustine finds value in both the method of perceiving this order and the drive to 
teach, or explain, it to others.  
Although the order of the arts is not original to Augustine but rather reflects indebtedness 
to his predecessors, particularly Varro (Topping, Happiness 3), Augustine is redefining and 
reordering classical education for Christian purposes, thus demonstrating again his talent for 
rhetorical invention. He assimilates a method of secular learning as he directs it toward Christian 
ends and imbues its content with Christian meaning. As a result, the arts are given the highest 
                                                 
5 While Augustine implies these attributes of God in De ordine (I.7.18; II.7.21; II.7.23;), Ayres 
and Barnes note that it is his understanding of God as “immaterial, infinite and the source of all 
existence” that is particular to Late Roman Christian thought (384).   
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purpose that Augustine can possibly designate – a place within the divine order of providence. 
Augustine is in the process of leaving an educational system that cherishes the rhetorical art for 
worldly, lower-ordered purposes. In De ordine, he argues that the redemption of rhetoric must be 
found within a Christian understanding of its divinely ordered significance.  
 In this chapter, we have discussed how Augustine’s responsive engagement with the 
major rhetorical authorities of his time informs his use and understanding of rhetoric. He engages 
sophistic, Ciceronian, and Christian elements to propose a distinctly Christian rhetoric for 
universal use. This point has been widely acknowledged within the literature on Augustine and 
rhetoric. Augustine, however, also employs a specifically Christian understanding of old and 
new rhetorical terms in his appropriation. The process by which he “Christianizes” rhetoric in his 
developing thought is thus likely to be a significant source of insight concerning his eventual 
conclusions on the subject in his later writings. De ordine is a valuable text for exploring this 
transition, specifically as it discusses the metarhetoric of order and consequently an ordered 
rhetoric. 
Using Murphy’s understanding of metarhetoric, this project proposes the metarhetorical 
term “order” as a means to situate Augustine’s understanding of rhetoric in his immediate post-
conversion thought. At this point in his writing, Augustine seeks to both unify aspects of 
classical education with his developing Christian thought and distinguish immoral and erroneous 
elements from Christian culture. Applying his ingenuity, Augustine finds the inventive means to 
bring elements from his predecessors into his recommended structure of Christian education. He 
utilizes old and new categories of thought from multiple disciplines to do so, providing an order 
of life and study directed toward humanity’s ultimate end, happiness in the enjoyment of God.  
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This project thus proceeds as follows. Each subsequent chapter considers explicit and 
implicit coordinates in De ordine that signify Augustine’s dynamic relationship to one of the 
three major rhetorical authorities discussed above, that is, sophistic rhetoric (Chapter II), 
Ciceronian rhetoric (Chapter III) and Christian rhetoric (Chapter IV).6 Each chapter enters the 
text of De ordine through the texture of a term that corresponds to a particular rhetorical 
authority. Chapter II uses the term schola to demonstrate a nuanced relationship in Augustine’s 
thought between the rhetoric of the Roman sophistic school and the rhetoric of his new “school” 
at Cassiciacum. Laura Holt’s essay “Wisdom’s Teacher: Augustine at Cassiciacum” is insightful 
for the arguments of this chapter. Chapter III focuses on Augustine’s use of the term philosophia 
to demonstrate a complementary relationship between philosophy and rhetoric that he learned 
from his reading of Cicero. The scholarly works of Calvin Troup and Raymond DiLorenzo 
inform the approach of this chapter. Lastly, chapter IV considers Augustine’s treatment of the 
term ordo, which he grounds on the Christian doctrines that he has learned through authoritative 
teaching. This chapter draws on the work of Ryan Topping.  
Having reflected on the significance of these three rhetorical authorities for the text of De 
ordine, Chapter IV concludes with discussion of how Augustine’s rhetoric of order ultimately 
frames a transition of rhetorica in his thought at this pivotal time. As a metarhetorical term, the 
intellectual knowledge and moral exercise of “order” essentially arranges one’s epistemological 
understanding and ethical use of the rhetorical art (rhetorica) toward the fullness of truth and 
beauty and the highest possible rhetorical good, praising God. Through order, one discovers and 
expresses a rhetorica that leads us to know and to serve God. In this way Augustine’s rhetoric of 
order, which includes knowledge from multiple disciplines and authorities, leads one to God 
                                                 
6 Troup notes the significance of considering both explicit and implicit coordinates within a text 
to more broadly inform one’s scholarly reading of a rhetorical discourse (9). See also 55, 60.  
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through an ordered understanding and use of rhetoric. Augustine discusses and demonstrates this 
kind – this quality – of ordered rhetoric throughout De ordine as he both criticizes and creates 
new opportunities to apply existing rhetorical authorities in light of the particular question of 
Christian education. Augustine’s text offers much “wholesome” food for thought to teachers of 
today (conf. V.6.10), if they are willing to make themselves a part of the very order of which he 




















Sophistic Coordinates in the Rhetoric of De ordine 
In De ordine, Augustine is responsive to elements of the Roman sophistic school of 
rhetoric. The sophistic school is the major educational institution of the Roman world and 
provides Augustine with the rhetorical education that he receives and that he later teaches. This 
education includes particular teaching methods, theories, texts, and practices, all directed toward 
popular applications of rhetoric in the Imperial Age. Although Augustine eventually retires from 
his rhetoric chair in AD 386, he continues to find elements of this rhetorical education useful as 
he applies them to his discussion of order in De ordine, thus demonstrating some continuity with 
his sophistic past. Yet, in this same text, Augustine also criticizes particular vices that are 
common to the Roman school and incompatible with his turn toward philosophy, exhibiting 
some severance from the sophistic school and its rhetorical practices. This chapter examines the 
rhetoric of De ordine to study these sophistic coordinates and to consider their significance for 
Augustine’s use and understanding of rhetoric at this pivotal time.   
This study follows Holt in focusing on Augustine’s teaching activity in the text through 
his use of the term schola and considers how these scholastic coordinates inform our 
understanding of the status of the sophistic school in Augustine’s thought at this time. Augustine 
uses the term schola three times in reference to the sophistic school of his past and once in 
reference to the informal school that he is establishing while on retreat at Cassiacum. This 
chapter examines each use of the term as a coordinate: Coordinate One: From the Sophistic 
School, Coordinate Two: Toward a New School, Coordinate Three: Uses of the Sophistic School, 
and Coordinate Four: Abuses of the Sophistic School. Together these coordinates demonstrate 
both continuity and severance with practices of the sophistic school, adding texture to 
Augustinian scholarship that sees his post-conversion thought as a “clean break” from his 
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sophistic past. Since Augustine does not use the term “sophistic” in the text, the first section 
introduces the term and explains its relationship to Augustine’s rhetoric. The final section 
considers the significance of the sophistic coordinates in the text, particularly their rhetorical 
implications. 
In this early dialogue, Augustine finds elements of sophistic rhetoric redeemable to his 
Christian conversion and philosophical life, but he also has strong criticism for vices of the 
sophistic school that are detrimental to his new teaching purposes. His response demonstrates a 
philosophical rhetoric that reconsiders as well as redeploys available rhetorical elements for new 
purposes, in this case for a Christian defense of divine order. This is his rhetorical ingenuity at 
work, a skill from the sophistic rhetoric school that he applies to his Christian teaching at 
Cassiciacum and that exemplifies his dynamic responsiveness to his rhetorical milieu. 
Augustine’s rhetoric thus demonstrates both continuity and change with regard to his early 
rhetorical education. Furthermore, Augustine’s rhetoric invites scholars, including those “on 
retreat” from traditional rhetorical studies, to seriously consider their use and understanding of 
rhetorical categories and practices, particularly for their ethical implications. Even at this 
intensely “philosophical” moment in Augustine’s life, he finds rhetoric to be a fitting means to 
serve the wisdom that brings happiness primarily because he conceptualizes it through an ethical 
lens.  
The Roman “Sophistic” School of Rhetoric 
Rhetorical scholars use the term “sophistic” to describe the school in which Augustine 
learned and taught rhetoric (Baldwin 188; Troup 13–14). This sophistic school was the premier 
institution for Roman education, the pinnacle of which was the political and legal practice of 
oratory (Troup 4). The Imperial Age had brought significant changes to Roman discursive 
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practices, but the educational system continued to value rhetorical skill above all others (Pernot 
145). Across the Empire, teachers trained students to be successful orators through a shared set 
of practices, demonstrating a great “homogeneity of Greek and Roman education during the 
period” (147). As Brown describes, referencing Augustine, “The ideal product of this education 
was the orator, a man that is, who could ‘give pleasure throughout his argument, by his vivacity, 
by the feelings at his command, by the ease with which words came to him, perfectly adapted to 
dress his message in style’ (conf. V.6.11)” (24). This was the education and school of 
Augustine’s young adult life and early teaching career. In De ordine, he refers to it as “that 
school,” schola illa.  
Scholars generally characterize the Roman school of Augustine’s time as “sophistic” due 
to the rhetorical practices and pedagogies that were dominant during the Imperial Age (Murphy, 
Rhetoric 35; Pernot 187; Troup 13–14). By rhetorical practices, scholars often refer to the lavish 
use of verbal ornamentation used by orators in public discourse, sometimes for the sole purpose 
of entertaining audiences (Murphy, Rhetoric 35; Pernot 155). By rhetorical pedagogies, scholars 
refer to the associative teaching practices used by rhetoric instructors to cultivate this focus on 
rhetorical ornamentation, especially through the exercise of declamation (Pernot 151–57). 
Rhetorical theory, with its conceptual and philosophical dimensions, was present and growing 
among sophists throughout the period (157–59), but the majority of Roman teachers often 
minimized it in their instruction, perhaps because of a particular practicality expected by the 
Romans (Brown 24; Troup 15). Widespread use of these practices and pedagogies, however, 
reflected the preeminence of rhetoric for Roman culture and curriculum as sophists deployed 
them for purposes suited to Imperial life.  
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Yet, there is also greater complexity to the term “sophistic” as it appears within antique 
sources. The Greek orator and professor of rhetoric, Philostratos (170–240 AD), coined the term 
“Second Sophistic” to describe a collective movement among orators of his time. In his analysis, 
Philostratos particularly drew out a “logical” connection between contemporary orators, or 
“sophists,” and antique orators of the “First Sophistic,” who discussed the nature and function of 
discourse as well as the relationships between rhetoric and philosophy (Kirby 1932). Although 
the “Second Sophistic” was predominantly a Greek phenomenon, the West experienced the 
acclamation of Greek culture and rhetoric as students and teachers travelled between Rome and 
Athens (Pernot 191). Rhetorical activity was at the core of the sophistic movement, including the 
teaching of rhetoric, public performances, political prestige, and ties to Greek philosophy (189–
191). Orators and teachers throughout the Imperial period followed in these “sophistic” 
traditions.  
Sources within this historical epoch characterized the sophistic movement with strong 
words of praise or criticism. The praise of sophistic claimed a resurgence of “philosophical” 
rhetoric that emanated from the culture of Imperial leadership (Pernot 130). Criticism of 
sophistic argued that a defective, artificial rhetoric had replaced a more substantive, deliberative 
rhetoric in both the political arena and the Roman schools due to Imperial power (129). These 
two “fundamentally opposing theses,” of the “renaissance” or “decline” of rhetoric during the 
Empire (Pernot 131), demonstrate the complexity of changes occurring in the use and 
understanding of rhetoric at this time and into the Christian Era (Cameron, Christianity 83–84). 
In studying this period, some modern scholars adopt an either/or perspective on the discipline in 
the Imperial Age – rhetoric was either undergoing a “decline” or a “renaissance” – but Pernot 
suggests that consideration of all source material demonstrates a “redeployment” of rhetoric in 
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the transition from the Roman Republic to the Empire (Pernot 133). Consequently, “The Empire 
did not provoke a radical mutation [of rhetoric], but a series of transformations, of changes of 
emphasis and innovation that make up a different landscape, even though the elements may not 
all be new.” One example of this transformation of rhetoric is that while theoretical and 
philosophical elements remained in the Roman rhetorical schools across the changing political 
circumstances, opportunities for their application in Late Antique society appear truncated (129), 
or at least “specialized” (Cameron, Later Roman 153), as society and the schools adapted to the 
needs of Imperial culture. Consequently, epideictic rhetoric continued to flourish while practices 
of deliberative and judicial rhetoric were more constrained. 
This argument of “redeployment” is particularly relevant to this study, for Augustine 
seems to be using as well as transforming rhetoric as he transitions at this point from a public 
rhetorical life toward a more discernibly philosophical one. Rhetorical scholars agree that 
Augustine has strong criticism of some rhetorical practices, including some historically 
considered “sophistic” (Baldwin 188; Sutherland 142; Troup 13–14). This is evident in 
Augustine’s explicit critique of rhetorical abuses in De doctrina Christiana (DDC) (II.31.48). 
Yet, in De ordine, one also sees him implicitly using rhetorical practices characteristic of the 
“sophistic” school. Furthermore, his criticism of the sophistic school in this text is specific – 
rather than indicting sophistic rhetoric for its general practices and pedagogies, Augustine 
appears to be most concerned with the inordinate motivations that the school inculcates within its 
students. This vice is a consequence of a rhetoric centered on self-aggrandizement – a love of 
praise directed back upon the self rather than fittingly directed outward, or more specifically 
upward, toward the divine first cause, God. As he does in Confessiones and Book IV of DDC, 
Augustine turns toward a more “philosophical” rhetoric to teach eloquence and wisdom in De 
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ordine. Yet, rather than making a complete severance with the sophistic rhetoric school, 
Augustine appears to reconsider the significance of sophistic rhetoric as he redeploys it for new 
purposes in his immediate post-conversion thought.  
Therefore, although “sophistic” typically describes Augustine’s rhetorical schooling and 
teaching career in a pejorative sense within rhetorical scholarship, the term here has greater 
texture. “Sophistic” does refer to the rhetorical milieu within which Augustine learned and taught 
rhetoric, but Augustine’s redeployment of sophistic rhetoric in De ordine invites a more nuanced 
understanding of how “sophists,” such as he, applied elements from the rhetorical school as they 
responded to the complexities of the transitioning Roman culture. This term, “sophist,” is also 
wrought with complexity (Pernot 187–88; Schiappa 1994–95), but this project follows Murphy 
in considering Augustine a practicing “sophist” as he taught and practiced rhetoric within a 
“sophistic” period of the rhetorical tradition (Murphy, “Christianization” 26). Augustine’s early 
and young adult life was “imbued with the sophistic spirit of the age,” and some of these 
practices and pedagogies continued to be present within his later work. This project thus suggests 
that, for a period, Augustine was a sophist as he followed many of the conventions of the 
sophistic movement of the time, including the teaching of rhetoric, occupation of an imperial 
chair, and the performing of political speeches for the emperor. His exposure to the popularized 
philosophies of the Platonists may have even been a consequence of his sophistic connections 
(Brown 85; Pernot 191), as sophists often drew the disciplines of rhetoric and philosophy 
together.  
Furthermore, Augustine’s rhetoric in De ordine is in some measure representative of the 
sophistic school in his implicit practice of rhetoric in the text as well as in his pedagogical 
approach to the topic of order. Study of De ordine thus informs our understanding of the 
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dynamics between Augustine’s sophistic background and his transition away from the sophistic 
school and toward a new and converted life in philosophy. Rather than moving directly to an 
explicit rejection of all sophistic rhetoric, including its theories, practices and particularly its 
pedagogies, the text of De ordine demonstrates elements of continuity and refined practices. By 
focusing on Augustine’s use of the term schola in the text, one can more closely consider how 
Augustine makes the transition from his rhetorical teaching career to his philosophical 
retirement. Rather than suggesting, as Baldwin does, that Augustine made a “clean break” with 
the pedagogical tradition of the sophists as he responded to the rhetorical needs of his historical 
moment (187–88), one can see in De ordine a gradual refinement of teaching practices as well as 
a more specific critique of the limitations of sophistic education. The point of using the term 
“sophistic” is therefore not primarily to label Augustine but rather to provide a term that situates 
him within his rhetorical milieu. Scholars agree that he is responding to sophistic in his later 
writings on rhetoric, but De ordine permits us to see with greater texture how his response plays 
out in this particular period of his life and thought.  
The Sophistic Schola in De ordine 
Augustine’s use of the term schola is a way to consider sophistic and rhetoric related 
coordinates in De ordine. The term schola, used four times in the text, provides a hermeneutic 
entrance for discussing dynamics of the relationship between Augustine’s past at the sophistic 
rhetoric school and his pedagogical endeavors at Cassiciacum, specifically as he and his 
companions treat the topic of order. The chapter proceeds by chronologically addressing each 
occasion of schola and offering an interpretation of the text with particular attention to rhetorical 
categories. Since Augustine composed the dialogue in a way that invites the reader into the 
discussion as it unfolds between the participants and him (Douglass 40), a chronological 
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engagement seems suited to this study of the text. An introduction precedes each coordinate, 
providing some context for Augustine’s use of the term schola. 
Four coordinates guide the discussion of this term: From the Sophistic School, Toward a 
New School, Uses of the Sophistic School, and Abuses of the Sophistic School. These coordinates 
capture the complex dynamics of Augustine’s use of schola in the text and the inherent 
relationship between Augustine’s rhetorical and philosophical practices at this point in his 
thought. He finds elements of the sophistic rhetoric school useful to his teaching at Cassiciacum 
even while he rejects certain abuses of this school. Putting his ingenuity to work, Augustine finds 
a way to reconcile his treatment of order with his new philosophical life by directing his 
rhetorical efforts toward a new purpose, in this case moving from a lower expression of praise 
toward a higher one.   
Coordinate One: From the Sophistic School 
Augustine dedicates his dialogue to a friend and reputable politician named Zenobius 
with whom he had previously discussed the general question of evil and its relationship to divine 
order. Augustine previously encountered the topic when he was a Manichaean (conf. IV.15.24; 
VII.3.4), but he shapes his discourse in De ordine according to his conversations with Zenobius, 
as the two had lacked adequate time to carefully and completely address “the order of things” 
(ord. I.7.20). Zenobius is “a man of good character” (ingenium), “a gifted mind, enamored with 
beauty in every form without the excesses of lewdness and its defilement” (I.2.4). Nevertheless, 
according to Augustine, his mind lacks proper learning, and needs to be “cleared and cultivated,” 
“for a divine planting.” Augustine dedicates his dialogue to Zenobius for three reasons: “It is due 
to him,” “It is fitting that the present mode of life be made known to a man of such 
benevolence,” and “Because he is second to none in rejoicing over the fair promise (ingenii) of 
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Licentius” (ord. I.17.20). Licentius is the son of a mutual friend, Romanianus (who is also 
Augustine’s benefactor), and one of the young men that accompanies Augustine to Cassiciacum. 
Augustine wishes that Zenobius could be present there (I.9.27), but in his absence, they record 
the discourse for his benefit.  
Within the introduction of his topic, Augustine tells Zenobius,  
As you well know, when pains of the chest (stomachi dolor) had compelled me to give up 
school work (scholam), I was already planning even apart from that emergency, to betake 
myself to philosophy (philosophiam). I then went directly to the villa of our dear friend, 
Verecundus. (ord. I.2.5) 
This first mentioning of the sophistic schola highlights some of the personal transitions that were 
occurring during this time, including an illness that affected Augustine’s ability to teach rhetoric 
and his plan to leave the sophistic school. Augustine had taught rhetoric for twelve years now, 
beginning in his hometown of Thagaste and then moving to Carthage, Rome and finally Milan, 
where he took an Imperial professorship (conf. V.13.23). During his career Augustine “sold a 
skill at speech designed for victories in court,” a description of his profession reflective of the 
predominant use and understanding of rhetoric at the time as connected to political and legal 
success (IV.2.2). Augustine’s position in Milan was particularly prestigious as he not only taught 
rhetoric to his students but also composed and performed speeches for the emperor (VI.6.9). 
Augustine taught in Milan until late summer of AD 386, when he decided to leave his post. 
 According to Confessiones, Augustine had recently experienced his final conversion to 
Christianity, which meant, “That [he] would seek neither wife nor ambition in this world,” but 
rather become “a servant [of the Lord]” (VIII.12.30, IX.1.1). When Augustine decided to leave 
his job, he waited until the upcoming summer months to avoid “a great deal of talking” among 
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his colleagues as to his intentions (conf. IX.2.3). Augustine writes, “In your sight [my Lord 
God], I resolved not to make a boisterous break, but gently to withdraw the service of my tongue 
from the language marts” (IX.2.2). Additionally in these summer months, Augustine became ill, 
“because of too much literary work” (IX.2.4). Thus, he refers above to his “pains of the chest.” 
Indeed, teaching rhetoric was a physically demanding profession. Particularly since imitation 
was the central method of teaching at the sophistic school, physical wellness, including good 
voice, strong lungs, and endurance, was required (Clark 14). Augustine’s ill health may have 
compromised his natural talent for teaching rhetoric.  
Yet, Augustine was also thankful for this public “excuse” (conf. IX.2.4), because as he 
states above, he already had in mind to leave the sophistic school for a life of greater leisure 
(otium). Augustine first encountered the concept of otium at age 19, when at school he read 
Cicero’s exhortation to philosophy in the Hortensius (III.4.7). However, other desires, like 
“honor,” “fame,” (c. Acad. II.2.5) and “profit,” took precedence in his early years (conf. IX.2.4). 
In the introduction to Contra Academicos, Augustine tells his patron, Romanianus, to whom he 
dedicates this text, that his desire for a philosophical life had been with him for some time but 
that he was “held back by the heavy burden of [his] dependents whose life was supported by 
[his] job” (II.2.4). Perhaps despite these circumstances, at the age of 32, Augustine sought a type 
of retirement suited to his Christian conversion. With his affections altered, he renounced the 
worldly comforts of his career, his possible marriage, and all sexual relations (Brown 99). 
Although Augustine’s retirement was in some ways “idiosyncratic” (94), the otium that he 
sought was an option familiar to his colleagues in Milan and the audience of his Cassiciacum 
dialogues (106). Christian and non-Christian intellectuals of the Late Roman Empire shared in 
this long tradition of leisure. Thus, Augustine tells Zenobius that he and his companions are 
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enjoying “a generous leisure” (liberali otio) at the villa of their colleague and friend, Verecundus 
(ord. I.2.4), and Augustine wishes to share the fruits of their experience with others who will 
likely read the dialogue. Augustine publishes De ordine with this  “expectation of attraction” 
(McWilliam 137), as he invites his audience to participate in the process of discovery through the 
narrative.  
Augustine’s relationship to the sophistic school demonstrated his close ties to rhetoric, as 
a teacher and a practitioner. When he decided to leave the school for philosophical retirement, 
exhausted from teaching rhetoric, what effect did this transition have on his relationship to the 
discipline itself, as well as the sophistic school that transmitted it? In his study of Augustine’s 
early dialogues, Topping suggests that Augustine’s retirement demonstrates an incompatibility 
between teaching rhetoric and the Christian faith (Happiness 51). Indeed, his move toward 
philosophy as a manner of life was a move away from his public life in Late Roman rhetorical 
culture. However, rhetorical scholars refine this argument and suggest that Augustine’s conflict 
is not with teaching rhetoric but with the inadequacies of the predominant sophistic rhetoric 
taught and practiced at the time (Baldwin 188; Murphy, Rhetoric 47; Sutherland 142; Troup 16). 
To these scholars, Augustine’s later rhetoric, specifically Book IV of De doctrina Christiana and 
even Confessiones, presents a rhetorical art not only compatible with Christianity but suited to its 
purposes, particularly teaching and preaching.  
Augustine does strongly criticize elements of the sophistic school, as well as the rhetoric 
therein, in Confessiones, but this “marginalization of rhetoric” in Augustine’s narrative has also 
led scholars to neglect possible relationships between Augustine’s “former professional 
discipline” and his post-conversion thought (Farrell 270). For even when one acknowledges 
Augustine’s harsh words in Confessiones for the education and profession of his past, scholars 
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debate the precise nature of his criticism (Tell 385–86). The text of De ordine, written during the 
period between Augustine’s resignation from the rhetoric school and his baptism, is particularly 
insightful to address some of the nuances of the relationship between the sophistic school, and its 
rhetoric, and Augustine’s developing thought at this time. Augustine’s use of the term schola in 
the text provides one means to consider this relationship. To this end, the first coordinate 
highlights key shifts that were occurring in Augustine’s life, particularly his decision to leave the 
sophistic school.  
Coordinate Two: Toward a New School 
The second mentioning of schola also relates to the sophistic school, but as above, 
likewise demonstrates a transition from Augustine’s past toward his life in philosophy. While the 
other three references to schola in the text specifically refer to the sophistic school, Augustine’s 
next use of the term represents “something new” (Holt 48), for he refers to his company at 
Cassiciacum as a kind of school, schola nostra (“our school”). Topping describes this new 
school at Cassiciacum as “a school of philosophy” (Happiness 70), which seems particularly 
appropriate considering Augustine’s focus on philosophia in the text (a topic addressed in the 
following chapter). Indeed, as Topping suggests, it seems clear that Augustine “had encountered 
something [in Cicero’s Hortensius] that would demand more than his teachers of rhetoric 
required,” and this encounter was shaping Augustine’s present decisions (Happiness 39). As Holt 
notes, this new school stands in some contrast to the sophistic school, schola illa (“that school”) 
– an essential point to which we will return. Yet, attention to the activities and pedagogical 
exercises of the group also reveals some continuity with the rhetoric school so familiar to 
Augustine and his students (Holt 48–49). After addressing his move away from his rhetorical 
schoolwork at coordinate one, Augustine demonstrates the sort of work he and his students are 
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doing while at the villa at coordinate two, and this work includes both philosophical and 
rhetorical elements. 
Augustine tells Zenobius that, while on retreat, he and his companions are conducting 
among themselves whatever discussions seem “useful” (utilia) (ord. I.2.5). Some of these useful 
conversations arise because Augustine initiates them as a learning opportunity for “the boys” 
aside from their other studies (I.3.6). By “boys,” Augustine refers to some of his company at the 
villa, including Alypius (Augustine’s close friend), Navigius (Augustine’s brother), Licentius (a 
pupil of Augustine’s and the son of his patron, Romanianus), and Trygetius (also Augustine’s 
pupil). Only Licentius and Trygetius, however, are present in the text when the discussion on 
order begins (I.3.7). Still, Augustine sees an opportunity to address this important topic, and he 
uses the term schola to frame his company and their pedagogical treatment of the subject in the 
dialogue.   
 The topic of ordo arises as follows. Augustine awakes at the villa during the night. He 
hears the sound of fluctuating water near their baths and begins “to ask [himself] what [is] the 
cause” (ord. I.3.6). Such wandering of the mind, which Augustine describes as “love of finding 
the truth,” had become a habit for him while on retreat. However, on this occasion, he realizes 
that Licentius and Trygetius are also awake. The dialogue then recounts, 
Therefore, when I saw that our school (scholam nostram)– as much as was left of it, for 
Alypius and Navigius had gone to the city – was not in slumber even at that hour, the 
running of the waters reminded me to say something on the subject. What, I ask, seems to 
you the reason why this sound varies in that manner? (ord. I.3.7.) 
Augustine poses this issue of cause to his young students, to which Licentius gives a probable 
(probabile) solution, i.e., leaves have accumulated then dislodged to interrupt the water’s flow. 
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Augustine praises the ingenuity (ingenium) of the boy’s answer and then states, “I acknowledge 
that, though I had long sought the reason, I had not found why it was so.” Marveling at the 
broader implications of their particular inquiry, that some things seem “apart from the evident 
order” of causes (I.3.8), Augustine sees an opportunity to treat the general topic of order.  
Augustine refers above to himself and his present company as a kind of school, one in 
which “so important a point” as order can be addressed (ord. I.3.8). Thus, two questions arise 
relevant to our study: What kind of school is it, and how may it stand in relation to the sophistic 
school of Augustine’s past? These questions merit thorough study, including close consideration 
of pedagogical content, methods and practices across all three of Augustine’s Cassiacum 
dialogues, but this project must be limited to drawing attention to a few specific details in De 
ordine that demonstrate aspects of the relationship between Augustine’s schola at Cassiciacum 
and the sophistic school.  
What kind of school is it? Consideration of the pedagogical activities mentioned in the 
dialogue suggests that the common events of schola nostra appear both structured and 
spontaneous, and three particular activities are prominent. Throughout the day, the students are 
studying books, training their minds in quiet contemplation, and engaging in extemporaneous 
disputations (ord. I.3.6). The first activity, which was common in the grammar and rhetoric 
schools, is the treating of classical texts, such as Virgil’s Aeneid (ord. I.4.10; II.12.37; II.20.54). 
Augustine is leading exegetical discussions (tractare) of these texts at Cassiciacum in a way 
typical of a grammar/rhetoric teacher (Topping, Happiness 69; Marrou 279). His response to the 
practice, however, demonstrates nuance, for he encourages his students to “rise far above” these 
texts (ord. I.3.8), even as they seem to serve some purpose within his pedagogy. 
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Augustine also offers some instruction on the second activity, to “train the mind to be at 
home with its own thoughts” (ord. I.3.6). This method of “self-knowledge” includes “a constant 
habit of withdrawing from things of the senses” (I.1.3), which Topping describes as a “familiar 
Plotinian theme” (Happiness 130). The goal of this exercise is to “mark out in solitude the 
impressions of opinion which the course of daily life has made or [to] correct them by means of 
the liberal branches of learning (ord. I.1.3).” The latter approach, which Augustine recommends 
to his students in Book II of De ordine, utilizes the liberal arts as a means to move through “an 
ordered sequence of contemplation,” from material reality to “the eternal and unchanging cause” 
(Topping, Happiness 136, 127). While this kind of philosophical thinking was accessible to 
sophists (Pernot 191–194), it was not typical of Roman rhetorical education.  
The third activity, disputatio, is the one in which Augustine provides the greatest 
instruction (ord. I.3.6). Consequently, disputation is the main activity occurring in the dialogue 
between Augustine and his young students. For example, once Licentius and Trygetius agree to 
the topic of order, Augustine states that he will engage in the debate (disputatione) and attempt 
to defend (defendam) the order of things (I.3.9). Augustine intends for the debate (disputationem) 
to address some of the issues that originally arose in his conversations with Zenobius (I.7.20). 
Augustine also deliberately records the disputation to invite additional debate (disputationes) 
among his audience (I.9.27), and perhaps, through successive discussion (sermonum), to 
eventually influence “the order of teaching” (in ordinem inseret disciplinae).  
The preeminence of disputatio in the text makes it particularly informative to the 
question of what kind of school Augustine has established among his companions. Disputatio 
was certainly not foreign to the sophists (Kennedy, Classical 30; Marrou 51). Yet, Topping 
argues that Augustine’s use of disputatio represents a distinctly “philosophical” quality of schola 
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nostra in contrast to the sophistic rhetoric school (Happiness 70). Indeed, Roman rhetorical 
education had limited its use of philosophical concepts in addition to rhetorical theory due to a 
focus on practical legal and political applications, but the sophistic school still had substance 
(Pernot 157–59). For example, Augustine read the Hortensius while still in school (conf. III.4.7). 
Yet, his assessment of how the school utilized this philosophical text, predominantly for its 
example of style to the neglect of its content, suggests that he was thirsting for something more 
than he was receiving.  
Augustine’s use of disputation in his dialogues may also be more consistent with the 
rhetorical, i.e., Ciceronian tradition than the philosophical, i.e., Platonic one (Auerbach 31; 
O’Meara 30; Brown 110). For example, Augustine uses particular questions (hypotheses) to 
complement use of general ones (theses), an approach common to Cicero’s rhetorical treatment 
of philosophical topics (DiLorenzo, “Non Pie” 126). Additionally, O’Meara notes Augustine’s 
use of set speeches within the dialogues, a rhetorical practice, to further his arguments (30). 
Other factors could certainly inform this line of inquiry, including, as Topping suggests, 
examination of Augustine’s understanding and use of dialectic in the text (Happiness 40, 138–
141). However, it must suffice for the purposes of this project to suggest that it is unclear that the 
form of Augustine’s discourse is at the crux of this contrast with the sophistic school. Study of 
additional terms (rather than solely disputatio) may also be beneficial to understanding the 
purpose of Augustine’s discourse, such as sermo (ord. I.7.20) and laudem (I.9.27). Coordinate 
three addresses Augustine’s use of this latter term.  
Thus, at the very least, the pedagogical practices in De ordine do reveal “traces” from the 
rhetorical school (O’Meara 11). As O’Meara suggests, “We are privileged to see [Augustine’s] 
mind adjusting itself to its new aspirations [in his early dialogues]. It would be surprising indeed, 
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if we see there no trace of his former thoughts also.” Augustine is still teaching at Cassiciacum. 
As Holt suggests, Augustine’s description in the text strongly points to a “new manner” of 
teaching, “but not so much to abandon as to reshape his former profession, and as a way not to 
stop but to keep doing what he has been doing differently” (49). At this coordinate, the reader 
can view Augustine’s teaching activity as a graduated response to the sophistic school of his past 
as well as consider how his new schola relates to the broader educational milieu of Late 
Antiquity (50). Further study is certainly necessary to clarify how this dynamic plays out. The 
next coordinate provides a specific opportunity to consider one such rhetorical trace, and 
therefore informs our second question from above concerning how schola nostra may relate to 
the sophistic school, schola illa.   
Coordinate Three: Uses of the Sophistic School 
Augustine’s next use of schola invites consideration of additional sophistic elements that 
are present in his teaching in De ordine. Augustine seems to find particular teaching practices not 
only useful but also central to his treatment of order, for he approaches ordo in a way that is 
somewhat consistent with “that school” (schola illa), the sophistic school of rhetoric. Although 
Augustine fits these practices to the purposes of his own school (discussed at coordinate four), 
his use of them demonstrates some continuity between his past as a teacher and the teaching that 
occurs in the dialogue.  
The opportunity to treat the topic of order has come about within the daily interaction 
between Augustine and his young students, and on the following morning, Augustine 
commences their conversation with this formality,  
Why do I now, in language full and fair (copiose atque ornate), command order to you  
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(vobis ordinem laudem), as if I were still engaged in that school (schola illa) from which 
I am glad that I have in some measure escaped (unde me quoquo modo evasisse gaudeo)? 
(ord. I.9.27) 
Augustine initiates their discussion on order in this way after acknowledging the importance of 
the subject on the previous day, i.e., as particularly presented within their conversation of the 
cause of fluctuating water and then by their observance of fighting cocks in the front yard 
(I.8.25). Within the dialogue, the group has raised many questions concerning order, most 
especially whether it consists of both good and evil (I.6.15– I.7.19). After hearing their unlearned 
arguments on the matter, Augustine tells his two students that he will now give them “the answer 
that will seem proper” (I.7.20). They will engage in disputation (disputatio) on the subject, and it 
seems that Augustine is even willing to insert common errors of men (which Russell translates as 
“sophistic”) into the discussion to test the erudition, or lack thereof, of his young students. In this 
way, Augustine also engages the arguments of his wider audience, including Zenobius. 
 Augustine’s use of schola here refers to the sophistic school. As noted in coordinate one, 
Augustine has decided to leave the sophistic school for a life in philosophy. As noted in 
coordinate two, Augustine’s move away from schola illa appears to also be a step toward schola 
nostra, his school among his present company at Cassiciacum. Perhaps, however, as noted here 
in coordinate three, Augustine is able to utilize pedagogical practices from the sophistic school to 
approach and treat this important philosophical topic within his new school. To consider this 
possibility, it is helpful to examine Augustine’s choice of words in the above text.     
Three terms from Augustine’s statement focus our study of the text. The terms are: 
copiose, ornate, and laudem. Augustine intends to use copiose and ornate language to praise 
(laudem) the topic of order “as if” he were still in the sophistic school. Russell translates copiose 
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and ornate as “full and fair,” but attention to the contextual significance of these terms 
demonstrates how they are particularly indicative of rhetoric from the sophistic school.  
Copiose is an adjective frequently used by Roman orators, including Cicero and 
Quintilian, to describe a rhetorical characteristic of speech. Such speech exhibits “abundance” or 
“fullness” of rhetorical resources (Bender 505). This quality can apply either to diction, to the 
style or choice of words, or to invention, to the main idea that gives purpose to the discourse. 
Copia, its noun declension, is “hardly distinguishable from eloquence,” except that it is most 
frequently used “pedagogically, in the context of training required to attain eloquence.” In the 
Roman system of education, one acquired copiousness through imitation, by following proven 
models and themes from traditional sources, whether poets, historians, philosophers or orators. 
Thus, according to Quintilian, “the choice of models…[was] critical” (Institutio Oratoria X.1). 
Yet, while use of copia supplied speakers and writers with traditional rhetorical formulas, it also 
provided a means for ingenuity based on common words and ideas. A speaker’s talent for 
copious style could thus demonstrate his ability to add variety and nuance to the connotation of a 
given word or concept by saying something similar to that of a predecessor although in a slightly 
different way. 
Ornate, an adjective related to ornatus, was one of the stylistic virtues of sophistic 
rhetoric. Advocated by Cicero and Quintilian, ornatus as rich “ornamentation” was among the 
four qualities of rhetorical excellence, including correctness, clarity and appropriateness (Pernot 
58). While some sophists tended to use this rhetorical virtue excessively (and were criticized by 
other “sophists” for it), its highest form required complementarity from the other three qualities. 
This optimal balance or harmony of speech included expressing ideas in a way suited to the 
content and context of the speaker, an overall style meeting the requirements of decorum (Beale 
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560). As a moderating term in Cicero’s thought, decorum brought together the aesthetics of 
ornamentation with the strategic and moral purpose of one’s message. Consequently, the 
“proper” use of rhetorical style was compatible with morally right expressions. As Beale 
describes, Cicero associated appropriate ornamentation with harmony and grace, an expression 
of beauty fitted to the reason of man, “just as the beauty of nature is associated with its rational 
design.” Furthermore, “By this logic the good is not only the appropriate but also the attractive 
and the pleasing.” Ornatus was thus a sweetness of expression significant for moral speech, 
including the teaching (docere) of virtue and right action.  
A third term pertaining to the sophistic school presents itself within Augustine’s rubric, 
one that is related to a copious and ornate style, namely, laudem, or “praise.” Augustine chooses 
laudem to describe his approach to “order,” and this term seems to also have some relationship to 
the sophistic school. One way to explore this relationship is to consider the possibility that 
Augustine is addressing the topic of order through the rhetoric of praise, commonly known in 
antique schools as encomiastic or epideictic discourse.  
Rhetoric in antiquity was traditionally categorized into three genres: judicial, deliberative 
and epideictic, all of which were practiced by sophists. Although all three genres were present 
during the Imperial Age, epideictic was the form that flourished (Marrou 195; Pernot 175). 
Augustine learned and taught moral content traditionally associated with the encomium through 
preparation exercises while in the sophistic school. Additionally, Augustine wrote epideictic 
speeches for the Imperial Administration while he was in his Milanese rhetoric chair (conf. 
VI.6.9). In addition to playing an important political and social function by focusing discourse on 




Epideictic was “the art of the lecturer,” and teachers, particularly sophists, used “the 
eloquence of the set speech” to address diverse subjects with their students and in public forums 
(Marrou 195). These demonstrations often had “strong philosophic undertones” (Pernot 178), 
and acted as moral exhortations within circles of influential Romans who shared popular codes 
of thought and behavior (180). Thus, epideictic rhetoric stood close to categories traditionally 
associated with philosophy and, as Cicero suggested, best exhibited “the philosophical concerns 
of the rhetorician” (Duffy 90). Professors and students alike performed these speeches as well as 
published them for wider distribution. 
Concerning its application here, Augustine seems to be pedagogically treating the topic 
of order through an epideictic exercise, as he would have in the sophistic school. Current sources 
do not identify “order” as a typical subject for demonstration, but as Pernot suggests, sophists 
may have treated the topic of divine providence, i.e., “Is the world governed by divine 
providence?” as a general thesis (148). The encomium and the thesis were both preparatory 
exercises common to the sophistic school. While the pedagogical relationship between a 
rhetorical genre, such as epideictic, and a particular exercise, such as thesis, oscillated in antique 
practice, the two were compatible for sophistic instruction (Pepe 376). Augustine may therefore 
be treating the general thesis of order through a rhetoric of praise (encomium), as he would have 
in the sophistic school. To do so he is using the copious and ornate style often associated with 
the epideictic genre. If this is the case, then Augustine is likely addressing his subject within 
some shared argumentative limits as well as within the constraints of “a finely tuned 
sensitivity…to the decorums of public life” (Beale 559). Yet, rather than discount the originality 
of his response to these rhetorical constraints, his epideictic treatment may have carried more 
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weight among his audience as a result of introducing new ideas or approaches to “order” within 
the boundaries of this shared practice. 
Augustine’s claim to be treating his topic “as if” he were still in the sophistic school 
invites consideration of the details above, particularly how his ornate and copious style in praise 
of order may reflect a sophistic pedagogical practice. Rhetorical style in antiquity was “tightly 
bound up” with the thought and the approach to thought within a given discourse (Pernot 167), 
so it seems unlikely that Augustine has utilized these terms independently of their use within the 
rhetorical tradition. Furthermore, these “stylistic qualities” thus likely have some reference to the 
“content” of Augustine’s dialogue (168), whether considered philosophical and/or rhetorical. Of 
course, Augustine was also familiar with the rhetoric of praise through Biblical psalmody 
(DiLorenzo, “Non Pie” 124), but this particular coordinate suggests that this was not his primary 
reference point in this text.  
Another detail is worth noting concerning the pedagogical methods at play here in 
Augustine’s dialogue, and that is his use of dialectical questioning. According to Topping, 
Augustine’s use of dialectic in his early dialogues indicates his commitment to a distinctly 
philosophical program in contrast to the rhetorical school (Happiness 40). Yet DiLorenzo has 
suggested that Augustine’s epideictic rhetoric sometimes utilizes dialectical analysis to serve a 
rhetorical end, as in Confessiones where he uses dialectic “to raise the intelligence and affections 
of [his audience] to God through praise,” or in other words through a contemplative form of 
persuasion (“Non Pie” 125). Indeed, “The sometimes incompletely systematic character of 
Augustine’s dialectical analyses is a sure sign that he does not aim at systematic 
comprehension,” but rather that, “the procedures of dialectical reason are conditioned and 
governed by…an epideictic or demonstrative theology” (DiLorenzo, “Non Pie” 125). This line of 
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thinking – that Augustine’s use of dialectic in the dialogue serves a rhetorical purpose– deserves 
closer study and points to the broader question raised in this coordinate, namely, how does 
Augustine’s approach to order, through a rhetoric of praise, inform the overall discourse of the 
text? For example, with regard to Augustine’s early philosophical dialogues, specifically Contra 
Academicos, Topping has suggested the possibility that Augustine is composing a moral 
declamation (Happiness 70). Such a rhetorical reading helps to explain certain qualities of the 
dialogues, including Augustine’s use of set speeches, fictitious elements of certain details, and 
their “overtly schoolroom” character (McWilliam 135–140). Attention to the epideictic qualities 
of the dialogue such as those discussed above further informs such a study of Augustine’s 
purpose and approach therein.  
For this project, Augustine’s reference to schola at coordinate three demonstrates his use 
of pedagogical practices from the sophistic school in his treatment of order. Augustine’s use of 
schola thus invites consideration of points of continuity between the sophistic school and schola 
nostra at Cassiciacum. Yet Augustine’s statement also suggests that there are limits to this 
interpretation, for he is “glad” to have “in some measure escaped” the rhetoric school (ord. 
I.9.27). In what ways is Augustine glad to have escaped? In what measure is he evading the 
sophistic school at Cassiciacum? As the next coordinate points out, while Augustine may be 
praising order as if he were in the sophistic school, he also reviles abusive practices common to 
“that school” before proceeding in his discussion.   
Coordinate Four: Abuses of the Sophistic School 
 Augustine’s final use of schola continues to refine our understanding of the relationship 
between the sophistic school of his past and his school at Cassiciacum, this time in contrast 
rather than continuity. While some pedagogical practices of the sophistic school may be 
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acceptable to Augustine, such as the encomium, others are not. Specifically, the disordered aim 
of the sophistic school, so focused on the pride of self-aggrandizement, is unacceptable to 
Augustine’s new scholastic project. To demonstrate the significance of this contrast between the 
sophistic school, schola illa, and schola nostra, a slightly longer introduction must precede 
Augustine’s use of the term “schola.”  
Immediately following Augustine’s statement at coordinate three, he proceeds to define 
order as “that which will lead us to God, if we hold to it during life” (ord. I.9.27), a definition 
framed by a distinctly “moral point of view” (Russell, “Appendix” 183, n. 7). He then challenges 
Licentius to provide his own definition. The young man, being divinely inspired, replies, “Order 
is that by which are governed all things that God has constituted” (ord. I.10.28). The 
conversation then moves to discuss whether God himself is governed by order. Licentius argues 
in the affirmative that, “If…God sent us Christ by way of order, and we admit that Christ is God, 
then God not only governs all things, but is Himself governed by order” (I.10.29). Trygetius, 
perplexed, tries to clarify Licentius’s meaning by distinguishing God the Father from Christ. 
“Shall we therefore deny that the Son of God is God?” asks Licentius. Trygetius forces the 
response, “Yes, [Christ] is God; but, properly speaking, we call the Father God.” Tersely, 
Augustine intervenes. “Control yourself better,” he says to his young student, “for the Son is not 
improperly called God.” Then the conversation moves away from order.  
Trygetius, embarrassed by his inappropriate statement, asks for the removal of his words 
from the record. Licentius proudly insists that they remain, demonstrating his propensity to 
debate for “the sole purpose of winning glory” (ord.I.10.29). Perturbed, Augustine rebukes 
Licentius. Witnessing the scolding, Trygetius laughs. At this point, Augustine sees an 
opportunity to address the two young men candidly as their teacher. 
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 Augustine asks, “Is this the way you act (agitis)?” (ord. I.10.29). Do these “perverse 
habits of life” and “obscurities of ignorance” not trouble (movet) you? “O that you could see…in 
what dangers we lie, and what heedlessness of ills this laughing indicates!” Augustine goes on to 
relay his own experience of these bad habits and repeatedly begs, “Do not redouble my 
miseries,” rather, “if you [unhappy boys] understand how much I love you, how highly I esteem 
you, how much the care for your behavior worries me...And if from your hearts you call me 
master – then pay the fee: be good.” Augustine finds this laughing of one student toward another 
fundamentally ill, demented. More than just a rudimentary schoolboy behavior deserving of 
chiding, the gravity of Augustine’s response suggests the seriousness of the act. The behavior of 
both boys at this intersection leads Augustine to make this plea, for them to “pay the fee,” to “be 
good.” Their dispositions toward one another and toward their teacher must change before their 
discussion on order can continue, and perhaps more to the point, before they can ascend toward 
truth and the happy life. 
Augustine is here addressing faults that block the learning process. As he continues in his 
supplication, it becomes evident that these misbehaviors are more specifically indicative of the 
sophistic schola. He states, 
You do not know that I used to be sorely vexed (stomachari) in that school (schola illa) 
because boys were motivated (ducerentur), not by the advantage and beauty of learning 
(utilitate atque decore disciplinarum), but by love of paltriest praise (laudis 
amore)…Both of you…are…trying to introduce and to implant the pest of enfeebling 
jealousy (aemulationis tabificae) and empty boasting (inanis jactantiae)– the lowliest of 
the pests, to be sure; but even more pernicious than all the others – into that philosophy 
which I rejoice to have made my own. (ord. I.10.30) 
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With this point, Augustine ties the misbehaviors of Licentius and Trygetius to their misguided 
motivation, namely a love of self-praise. Rather than seeking after the utility and décor of the 
disciplines, these actions incite the vices (vitia) of jealousy and boasting, and they disable the 
student from being properly disposed toward philosophy. Augustine willingly demonstrates that 
praise has its place, for he uses this complete discourse “to praise” divine order; but the love of 
praise sought by these boys is misguided. Instead, they must learn “to praise” God, who is the 
first source of all things.   
Furthermore, Augustine fears that this “disease of vanity” (vanitate morboque), so 
common to the sophistic school and now present in these two young men, will have additional 
consequences for their schola at Cassiciacum (ord. I.10.30). Specifically, the two students may 
be less eager for the pursuit of learning (doctrinae) without the drive for self-aggrandizement. 
Without vainglory, they may become inactive (congelabitis). Augustine warns that additional 
vices await them unless they desire differently. Rather than requesting the high fees accorded to 
rhetoric teachers with the promise of financial and political success, Augustine asks his students 
to pay him with a change of character so that they might ascend toward “Truth itself” (ord. 
I.4.10). After this, the two students, humiliated by the words and love of their teacher, switch 
positions: Licentius offers to delete the record while Trygetius insists that they remain “so that 
the very same vainglory (fama) which allures us, may, by its own sting, deter us from the love of 
it.” The two have learned their lesson. 
As Holt notes, “the distinguishing characteristic that mars schola illa,” the sophistic 
school of rhetoric, is that it inculcates “love of groundless praise” (55). The students exhibit love 
for this vice and attempt to infect schola nostra. As Tygretius notes, “the merit of exposure” is a 
fitting penance for this immoral act, for the publication of their discussion provides a “sting” 
 
55 
(flagello) to both young men (56). With this public dimension in mind, Augustine’s discourse, 
and the schola nostra exhibited therein, renounces the misguided and ultimately immoral quality 
of the sophistic school, specifically its self-centered aim. As Holt suggests, Augustine’s 
literature, like his school, “is based on a different moral principle than love of self-praise: 
instead, it depicts ‘very evident deeds’ evoking ‘a good and edifying life.’” Even more to the 
point, Augustine seeks to exhibit proper praise through his treatment of divine order. This moral 
dimension of Augustine’s new school is essential to its pedagogy and proper end, and Augustine 
takes care to make this redirection at the beginning of his discussion – within his definition – of 
order. This seems to be at the crux of Augustine’s critique of the sophistic rhetorical education of 
his time in this early dialogue: that study of the disciplines ought to aim at the praise of God, “the 
object of [their] love” (ord, I.8.23), not vanity. This is central to the persuasive message of the 
text. 
Furthermore, at the conclusion of Book I, Augustine notes that after confronting 
Licentius and Trygetius for their vanity, he needs to “spare [his] chest (stomacho),” “for the 
things which…had to be said scoldingly to those youngsters had strained it more than I should 
wish” (ord. I.11.33). Indeed, the pains of Augustine’s past teaching continue to stay with him 
even as he begins this new scholastic endeavor. In both De ordine and Confessiones, Augustine 
describes the illness that coincided with his retirement from the sophistic school. In Book IX of 
Confessiones, he writes, “In that very summer, because of too much literary work, my lungs had 
begun to weaken and it was difficult for me to breath deeply. By pains in my chest they showed 
that they were injured, and it was impossible to make clear or extended use of my voice” 
(IX.2.4). This is the same “pains of the chest” (stomachi dolor) that Augustine referred to at 
coordinate one (ord. I.2.5). The reader can most certainly take Augustine at his word – that a dip 
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in his health due to the demands of teaching required rest. Yet Brown notes a peculiar quality of 
Augustine’s sickness, for this pain struck him “just where he was most implicated in his career as 
a public speaker, and in just that part of the body which he later came to regard as the symbolic 
resting-place of a man’s pride” (102). This particular illness in his chest, which he calls in 
Confessiones “dolor pectoris,” never ails Augustine again once he leaves the sophistic rhetoric 
school. This particular disease of pride and vanity has left him. 
 At the conclusion of Book I, Augustine and his students morally turn toward the good – 
the proper disposition for learning in schola nostra. They also face a new educational aim: 
“praise of pure and genuine love (laude puri et sinceri amoris)” (ord. I.8.24). Only once they 
make this behavioral turn can the discussion on order move forward. The flattery that Augustine 
pays to the sophistic school by his imitation of its rhetoric comes with essential changes, for the 
purposes and motivations of the sophistic school of his time are not suited to the interests and 
desires of schola nostra. Augustine is not opposed to all elements of sophistic rhetoric, but its 
pedagogy needs redirected. This seems to be the quality of Augustine’s response to it in De 
ordine. His reaction to schola illa is tempered and ingenious. He writes the dialogue to persuade 
his audience – his fellow students, academics and sophists – into this new school because he 
knows what is at stake: their souls and their true happiness. 
These sophistic coordinates demonstrate Augustine’s use of the term schola in De ordine. 
Each one informs our understanding of the relationship between Augustine’s past at the Roman 
sophistic school of rhetoric and his new teaching efforts at Cassiciacum. Coordinate One: From 
the Sophistic School describes Augustine’s move away from his work at the sophistic school and 
toward a life in philosophy. Coordinate Two: Toward a New School demonstrates that Augustine 
has set up a kind of school at the villa among his companions. Coordinate Three: Uses of the 
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Sophistic School invites consideration of some pedagogical activities in the dialogue stemming 
from the sophistic school that inform schola nostra. These activities include Augustine’s 
treatment of the topic of order in this dialogue – a rhetorical, epideictic treatment. Coordinate 
Four: Abuses of the Sophistic School points to specific limitations of Augustine’s sophistic 
background, for the education of his past is deficient and needs to be directed toward the proper 
ends of learning. In Book I, Augustine suggests that the liberal arts, including rhetoric, may be 
directed toward truth and the happy life (ord. I.8.24). Coordinates three and four are particularly 
important for refining scholarly understanding of Augustine’s criticism of the sophistic school, 
and by implication, elements of the rhetoric therein, at this point in his life and thought. 
The Significance of the Sophistic Schola 
By applying the term “sophistic” to the study of schola in De ordine, this project invites 
closer attention to the rhetorical details implicit in Augustine’s dialogue, for these coordinates of 
the sophistic school are also rhetorical coordinates. The term “sophistic” is highly textured, and 
so rather than using it here to label Augustine or his work, it hopefully provides yet another 
avenue for exploring the intricacy of his thought. As McWilliam notes, “The dialogues [are] not 
a bare telling of events…but the attempt [by Augustine] to weave a web in which the strands 
were the significant currents and influences in his life to that time” (139). Augustine’s education 
at the sophistic school of rhetoric was one such current available to him at Cassiciacum.  
This chapter has considered how Augustine’s use of the term schola in the text exhibits 
elements of the relationship between the sophistic rhetoric school of his past and his new 
teaching efforts at Cassiciacum. Each of the coordinates in De ordine points to a particular 
significance of Augustine’s rhetorical background and shapes our understanding of his use and 
criticism of sophistic rhetorical elements. Concerning his use of sophistic practices, Augustine 
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implicitly puts epideictic rhetoric into play in the dialogue as he composes a speech in praise of 
divine order for his students and his wider audience. This use of sophistic rhetoric refers not only 
to the style of Augustine’s dialogue but also to its contents, and possibly, its overall treatment. 
Augustine additionally utilizes disputation as a way to guide the arguments of his students 
toward fuller consideration of the subject, an approach also compatible with sophistic rhetoric. 
As Cameron notes, the “showing” and “performance” typical of epideictic rhetoric had become 
“as important as argument” during the Imperial Age (Christianity 79). Praise and argument 
frequently worked in tandem as epideictic speech expressed “qualities of subtlety, intelligence, 
culture and beauty” (Pernot 180). Such rhetorical and pedagogical practices thus demonstrate 
Augustine’s affirmative response to and use of some of the premier educational methods and the 
associated rhetoric of his time.  
Augustine’s criticism of the misguided aim of sophistic rhetoric, however, refines this use 
and appropriates it for a different purpose. For Augustine and his companions are seeking to be, 
“by virtue and temperance, lifted away from the over-growth of vices and uplifted toward [God] 
Himself” (ord. I.8.23). The vices of the sophistic school, particularly exhibited through the desire 
for self-praise, limit the capabilities of students, and Augustine has no hesitation in stripping this 
rhetorical education of its inadequacies. In this, he follows in the tradition of other teachers of 
rhetoric, including Isocrates, Cicero and Quintilian. Furthermore, this tradition of rhetorical 
critique also stems from epideictic, as “blame is the inverse of praise” (Pernot 181). As O’Meara 
notes, Augustine’s criticism of the “worldly ambitions and success” that drive the dominant 
rhetorical education of his time are central to understanding his conversion experience in the 
Cassiacum dialogues (4). This criticism also informs the question of the status of rhetoric in 
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Augustine’s immediate post-conversion thought, for he still finds the discipline useful but in 
need of a new purpose. 
In Confessiones, Augustine condemns rhetorical abuses, including the use of epideictic 
rhetoric for deception, but this does not necessarily do away with the genre for another purpose. 
As Boyle notes, this autobiographical text is itself highly epideictic (25). In De ordine, proper 
praise of ordo is inherently linked to its fitting expression, in the words and actions of Augustine 
and his students. Thus, the link between appropriate rhetorical exercise and conduct is certainly 
present here. As Marrou notes, in antique practice, “Learning to speak properly meant learning to 
think properly, and even to live properly” (196). The virtues were important to this kind of 
rhetorical activity, giving it “an almost sacred character (197). Yet, as ancient sources attest, the 
sophistic schools lost sight of rhetorical breadth as they gave disproportionate attention to social 
successes. Philosophical retirement, a more specialized and at once religious venture, had 
become the outlet for a distinct kind of study and literary activity, including among rhetoricians 
(Brown 108, 112). This current likely moved over and against some popular practices of literary 
men. Thus, as those like Augustine moved away from the sophistic schools into “philosophy,” 
they also moved away from popular elements of Roman culture and education. This move, 
however, was not an abandonment of rhetorical exercise but rather in many cases appears to be a 
refinement. As such rhetors redirected their lives, they found elements from their past useful to 
their new purposes. Sophists, philosophers and rhetors could use rhetorical elements as a bridge 
to criticize and refine cultural practices, to determine what was worthy of imitation and what 
ought to be avoided (Pernot 135–38). This could be the case for a pagan like Cicero or a 
Christian like Augustine.  
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Within the rhetorical tradition, this kind of (sophistic) scholastic activity exemplifies one 
means by which the discipline of rhetoric may be philosophically reconsidered and potentially 
redeployed during times of increased cultural change and conflict. As Kennedy notes, such 
tensions are typical of periods characterized as “sophistic” (Classical 30, 50). Perhaps then it was 
Augustine’s “sophistic” response to demonstrate how a philosophical rhetoric could 
conceptualize available rhetorical elements for different purposes, in his case for a Christian 
culture grounded on the doctrine of divine order. This is Augustine’s rhetorical ingenuity 
(ingenium) at work, his application of a skill that he learned in the sophistic rhetoric school and 
one that enabled his dynamic responsiveness to his rhetorical milieu. Ingenuity was the innate 
mental, moral and physical quality necessary for great oratory (Clark 4). For the most part, 
Augustine still finds this rich rhetorical skill praiseworthy as he notes the ingenious talents of 
Zenobius, Licentius, and his mother Monica along with some of his intellectual colleagues in the 
text (ord. I.2.4; I.3.7; I.7.20; I.9.27; I.11.31; II.1.1).7 Ingenuity represents an ability to bridge the 
old and the new, a natural talent for bringing together complex and different rhetorical concepts 
(Herrick 177). Furthermore, this highly acclaimed aptitude within the rhetorical tradition is 
compatible with philosophy. 
Augustine’s discerning practice of rhetoric also exemplifies the significance for scholars, 
including those “on retreat” from traditional rhetorical studies, to seriously consider rhetorical 
dimensions of their work (for example, see Vickers, “Territorial Disputes” 259–260), or in other 
words, the implicit relationships between rhetoric and other disciplines, e.g., philosophy. Even at 
this intensely “philosophical” moment in Augustine’s life, he finds rhetoric to be a fitting means 
to serve the truth that brings happiness, largely because he was willing to conceptualize it in an 
                                                 
7 Although Augustine would add the essential nuance, that such ingenuity ought not lead to “a 
certain characteristic pride (superbia)” (ord. II.5.16).  
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ethically congruent way. This early philosophical dialogue, with its refined sophistic practices, 
demonstrates one means for raising rhetoric up, or at least thinking the issues “out afresh” 
(Vickers, “Territorial Disputes” 262). As Kennedy suggests, “Sophistry, like rhetoric itself, is not 
necessarily depraved, decadent, or in poor taste,” rather it “is a place within the rhetorical system 
where allowance is made for genius and inspiration” (Classical 50; emphasis added). Within 
rhetorical scholarship, the term “sophistic” permits us to speak broadly of discourses that have 
rhetorical implications (or implicit rhetorical theories) in addition to those that are explicit 
(Schiappa 1998). Particularly rhetorical scholars can see Augustine’s philosophical 
reconsideration as compatible with the sophistic tendency to engage the complex relationships 
between rhetoric and philosophy in any age.  
Consideration of these sophistic elements furthermore invites closer study of rhetoric and 
its status in Augustine’s thought at this time. Sophistic rhetoric was formative to Augustine’s 
education and career. When he retires, what becomes of rhetoric? Study of De ordine adds 
nuance to scholarly consideration of this question in addition to study of Confessiones and De 
doctrina Christiana. Rhetoric is implicitly present in Augustine’s treatment of order in this 
dialogue even though he only explicitly mentions the discipline briefly in Book II. Additional 
study can even investigate whether or not De ordine informs the historical transition toward 
“Christian sophistry” (Kennedy, Classical 49). If it does, this would further demonstrate the 
significance of Augustine’s pivotal role within the rhetorical tradition.  
When Augustine leaves the sophistic school, he moves toward a life in philosophy. As 
Douglass notes, at Cassiacum Augustine seems “frustrated” with certain “imperfections” of the 
pedagogies available to him (51 N.16). Yet, he wishes to continue teaching, for “the distortion is 
located in the modality, not in the hope.” As Augustine brings particular sophistic practices and 
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pedagogies with him throughout this period of educational reform, another rhetorical authority 
comes to the fore, providing aspects of a theoretical framework for his thought and work, namely 
Cicero.  
Cicero tried to move the students of his day away from “the utilitarian idea of rhetoric 
and to enlarge their conception of the ideal orator,” as Isocrates did (Marrou 285). Even more so 
than his predecessor, Cicero insisted upon “the need for a solid philosophical foundation” for the 
orator so that his training would “be based on the widest possible culture.” Indeed, Isocrates, 
Cicero, and Quintilian all advocated a rhetoric–plus program, where philosophy was central to 
the highest work of the rhetor. Augustine’s understanding and use of rhetoric may be described 
as highly “sophistic” because of his Roman education, but he also aquires his refined taste for a 
more “philosophical” Ciceronian rhetoric while he is in school. Augustine’s trust of Cicero’s 
rhetorical precepts is still present much later when he writes Book IV of DDC. Following 
scholarly discussion of the significance of Cicero for Augustine’s philosophical program at 
Cassiciacum, the goal of the next chapter is to study Augustine’s philosophia in De ordine and to 












Ciceronian Coordinates in the Rhetoric of De ordine 
Augustine’s philosophia in De ordine embraces and employs the Ciceronian integration 
of philosophy and rhetoric. Augustine applies this integration through the content and form of his 
dialogue. In terms of content, Augustine finds both “rhetoric” (rhetorica) and rhetorical, i.e., 
literary elements significant for the philosophical quest for wisdom, a position substantiated by 
his reading of Cicero. In terms of form, Augustine expresses the insights of his leisure through a 
Ciceronian dialogue, an eloquent means to persuade his fellow teachers to engage and imitate his 
philosophical culture. De ordine thus represents Augustine’s application of this Ciceronian 
principle – the integrity of philosophy and rhetoric – as he directs both disciplines toward the 
highest purpose that he can find, the eloquent teaching of eternal wisdom. Despite lower uses of 
both of these disciplines as exercised by other authorities at the time, Augustine cultivates them 
through philosophia for the happy life. 
 This chapter studies the text of De ordine through Augustine’s use of the term 
philosophia, which integrates philosophical and rhetorical elements into a culture that Augustine 
describes in and demonstrates through the dialogue. In Coordinate One: In Philosophia, 
Augustine suggests that his philosophia includes both a moral and an intellectual quest for 
wisdom; it is a way of life sought by himself and his companions, and one that stands in contrast 
to the ambitions and vanities of his earlier life as a Roman rhetor. In Coordinate Two: Framing 
Philosophia, Augustine initiates his demonstration of philosophia through a disputation with his 
companions on order as he also argues for and exemplifies the significance of “framing” 
philosophical discourse in light of correct reasoning and eloquent expression. In Coordinate 
Three: Cultivating Philosophia, Augustine integrates literary elements, including poetry and the 
liberal arts, into the philosophia that he cultivates among his companions and proposes to his 
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audience. Augustine describes precisely how to use these elements within a philosophical order 
of teaching, namely, by directing them toward the discovery of wisdom rather than their limited 
use in the sophistic rhetoric schools. Lastly, in Coordinate Four: Discovering Philosophia, 
Augustine substantiates his philosophia with first principles discovered through the intellect by 
treating the topics of self and God. The discipline of philosophy specializes in bringing 
knowledge of the soul, of God and of all creation together, teaching the unity and order of all 
things. For Augustine, the goal of such philosophical knowledge, and ultimately of his 
philosophical culture, is both moral and intellectual, practical and contemplative: to order one’s 
mind and one’s life toward lasting happiness and then to teach this order to others.  
Augustine maintains the Ciceronian integration of philosophy and rhetoric even as he 
deviates from Cicero’s skepticism to assert the philosophical validity and truth of Christianity. 
Augustine’s philosophia embraces and employs these disciplines together to teach his audience 
about the divine order of things. Augustine’s philosophia in De ordine frames and develops this 
process of discovery and expression as he invites his audience to participate in a distinctly 
Christian culture. Unlike the erudition promoted in the sophistic schools, which Augustine 
describes as preoccupied with vanity and personal ambition, Augustine applies Cicero’s 
integration of philosophy and rhetoric to cultivate these disciplines in learning and in practice for 
a new purpose: to discover and express the happy life in the enjoyment of God. De ordine sheds 
light on how Augustine uses and understands rhetorical categories, and rhetorical authorities like 
Cicero, through the content and form of his work. His example invites scholars of all disciplines 




The Significance of Cicero for Augustine’s Philosophical Rhetoric 
Scholars have long acknowledged Augustine’s intellectual relationship to Marcus Tullius 
Cicero, the Roman lawyer, politician and writer of the 1st century BC. From Augustine’s earliest 
writings to his last, this Roman predecessor was a valuable “interlocutor in [Augustine’s] 
consideration of key questions” (Troup 21). The relationship was dynamic, with Augustine 
“occasionally embracing, sometimes rejecting, and often revising or expanding on Cicero’s 
discourse,” but the “scholarly dialogue” between the two remained constant (21, 22). According 
to Troup, central to this relationship was Augustine’s adoption of two key philosophical 
principles: the integration of philosophy and rhetoric and an eclectic approach to philosophy (16, 
24). While Augustine’s reading of Cicero’s Hortensius stands out as a particular moment when 
he drew attention to the significance of these principles (conf. III.4.7), they continued to have 
significance for his use and understanding of rhetoric long after. As this study suggests, both of 
these principles are present in Augustine’s writing immediately after his retirement from the 
sophistic rhetoric school as he composed his philosophical dialogues at Cassiciacum in AD 386.  
As a student in the Roman sophistic schools, Augustine studied Cicero’s rhetorical 
works, including De inventione, De oratore, and Orator (Hagendahl 554; Curley 190). 
Augustine also read some philosophical texts within his course of study, including Cicero’s 
Hortensius, the orator’s exhortation to the philosophical life. While schools like Augustine’s 
utilized such philosophical works the particular way in which fourth century teachers and 
students understood their significance was, however, limited. For some time now the majority of 
Roman intellectuals and orators had failed to appreciate the full breadth of Cicero’s contributions 
to Latin thought, especially his understanding of philosophy (Marrou 285; Troup 16–19). 
Augustine’s description of his reading of the Hortensius from Confessiones captures some of the 
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complexity surrounding use of Cicero’s work at this time. By Augustine’s account, his rhetoric 
teachers sought imitation of Ciceronian style, but they cared less for consideration of the 
philosophical content of his thought (conf. III.4.7). For cultural and political reasons (Leff 236), 
this truncated reading of Cicero had become typical for most Roman teachers and students 
(Foley, “Cicero” 61-62). Consequently, Augustine’s fellow students came to admire Cicero’s 
“tongue…but not his heart” (conf. III.4.7). While Cicero’s original thought unified content and 
form in learning, as it integrated philosophy and rhetoric, Late Roman oratorical practice and 
education tended to separate them and focus on rhetorical style without philosophical substance.  
Augustine’s interest in Cicero, however, went beyond imitation of his predecessor’s style. 
Unlike his classmates, Augustine found that Cicero’s work did not primarily “impress 
(persuaserat) [him] by its way of speaking but rather by what it spoke” (conf. III.4.7). Cicero’s 
exhortation moved Augustine’s heart through its persuasive content, and it inspired him to 
reconsider his intellectual priorities. For years, Augustine had put his mind in pursuit of the goal 
for which his education prepared him, to be a skilled orator in the service of the Imperial 
government, but upon hearing Cicero’s invitation to philosophia, Augustine suddenly felt that all 
of his earlier “vain practices” from the sophistic school were insufficient (I.18.28). The rhetoric 
that he learned there was “directed towards empty human joys,” “for a damnable and inflated 
purpose” (III.4.7). The rhetoric of the Hortensius, however, “set [Augustine] on fire” for 
philosophy (III.4.8). By its delightful discourse, he “was stirred up and enkindled…to love, and 
pursue, and attain and catch hold of, and strongly embrace not this or that sect, but wisdom 
itself.” Unlike the sophistic school and its rhetorical goal of “paltriest praise” (ord. II.10.29–
II.10.30), Cicero’s philosophy directed Augustine’s intellectual efforts and rhetorical talent 
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toward a new end, the discovery and teaching of wisdom, as well as set out a method by which 
such a pursuit could precede. 
Augustine’s exposure to Ciceronian philosophy led him, even if not his classmates, to 
reappraise his earlier understanding of rhetoric and its applications (Troup 16–17). Cicero’s work 
particularly enabled this transition by demonstrating how to supplant rhetoric “from the lore of 
personal triumph [in the sophistic schools] to the ancient idea of moving men to truth” (Baldwin 
187–88). Moreover, at least since his reading of the Hortensius, Cicero’s philosophical 
framework, with its strong rhetorical implications, i.e., the inseparability of wisdom and 
eloquence, provided a means by which Augustine evaluated forthcoming intellectual and moral 
authorities (DiLorenzo, “Ciceronianism” 174–176), including Scripture (conf. III.5.9), Faustus 
the Manichaean (V.5.10–11), Victorinus the philosopher (VIII.2.3), and Ambrose the Bishop 
(V.14.24). Following Cicero’s philosophical eclecticism, Augustine sought wisdom from this 
variety of eloquent sources as he wrestled with complex questions concerning truth, evil and the 
soul. The Hortensius had set Augustine’s heart on fire for wisdom, and he pursued this 
philosophical quest as he continued to teach rhetoric for the next twelve years.  
During this period, Augustine’s professional life followed along the lines of the 
prevailing rhetorical practices of his time as he publically spoke and taught within the Roman 
educational system. Yet, in his personal affairs, he simultaneously pursued resources that were 
both beyond and intertwined within this extensive network of people and practices. As 
DiLorenzo notes, Cicero’s philosophical method continued to play a significant role during these 
working years of Augustine’s early adult life, providing a certain “Ciceronian organization” to 
Augustine’s continued search for wisdom (“Ciceronianism” 172), perhaps in his teaching of 
rhetoric as well as in his personal pursuits. This organization, particularly the relationship 
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between the philosophical substance and eloquent expression of wisdom, significantly framed 
Augustine’s experiences with both the Manichaeans and Neo-Platonists during this time, 
culminating in Augustine’s exposure to the Milanese Bishop, Ambrose (conf. V.13.23). 
Tensions, however, grew between the two modes of life: between Augustine’s profession as a 
public orator, and his growing desire to live “in philosophy” (ord. I.2.4). The stress became so 
great that Augustine became ill.  
When an appropriate time came, Augustine took the opportunity to move his life and 
mind more fully to the ways of wisdom.  While “cultural retirement” was a socially acceptable 
withdrawal from public teaching for an intellectual such as Augustine (Brown 108–09), his 
deepening conversion to Christianity had made the necessity of otium liberale even more urgent 
(conf. IX.2.2). He could no longer tolerate the “vanity and…lying” – the prevailing rhetorical 
abuses of the time – associated with his public profession (conf. IX.4.9). Augustine sought to 
commit himself and his rhetorical talents elsewhere, somewhere better suited to his pursuit of 
wisdom. Retirement was a fitting choice. In late summer, Augustine moved to a country villa 
with some of his family, friends and closely associated pupils as he awaited baptism by Bishop 
Ambrose the following spring. Augustine composed four texts during this period (Contra 
Academicos, De ordine, De beata vita, and Soliliquia), and they are his earliest extant writings. 
Within these texts, Augustine addressed topics important to his own intellectual development, 
but he published them for a more persuasive purpose – to invite those closest to his heart, his 
present company and his friends and colleagues abroad, into his vision of a distinctly 
philosophical culture (ord. I.9.27; McWilliam 138–139). Within these texts, Augustine continued 
to utilize Cicero as a key interlocutor, although with great discernment.  
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Study of these works reveals the nuances of Augustine’s ongoing relationship to his 
respected Roman predecessor. Although most studies of Augustine’s rhetoric and its Ciceronian 
antecedents focus on Book IV of De doctrina Christiana, this chapter attends to such elements in 
the philosophical dialogue De ordine, a work that adds texture to scholarly understanding of this 
relationship from an earlier and pivotal time in Augustine’s life. This study considers how 
Augustine’s philosophical rhetoric exercised in and through the dialogue exhibits the Ciceronian 
integration of philosophy and rhetoric – or what he later describes as the unity of wisdom and 
eloquence (doc. christ. IV.5.7). The interest here, however, is not merely in Augustine’s formal 
imitation of Cicero, which Foley has established (“Cicero” 62), but following the work of 
DiLorenzo and Troup to consider how the substance of Augustine’s philosophical rhetoric 
demonstrates a unity of wisdom and eloquence in theory and practice (DiLorenzo 
“Ciceronianism” 174; Troup 16). The text of De ordine provides new insights to rhetorical 
studies of Augustine’s thought, and particularly the significance of Cicero for Augustine’s 
rhetoric at this time. 
Cicero had determined the nature of rhetoric by its relationship to philosophy, one 
essentially of content and expression, of things and words (Riley 116). While Cicero and 
Augustine both understood rhetoric qua rhetoric as a specific kind of practical knowledge 
(DiLorenzo, “Critique” 248; ord. II.13.38), they both broadly applied principles of eloquence to 
other disciplines, particularly philosophy (Pernot 119). Other Hellenic philosophers and orators 
also followed this practice, including some Neo-Platonists (Pernot 196–97, 119). In these cases, 
rhetoric was “put to the service of philosophy, and vice versa” (201). Therefore, although Cicero 
and Augustine both theoretically distinguished between the disciplines of rhetoric and 
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philosophy, the two were linked in practice. As Augustine moved into his philosophical life, he 
pursued a kind of eloquent wisdom that Cicero had inspired him to seek and to teach.  
While additional terms from the text could inform this study, e.g., eloquentia, modus, 
oratio, Augustine’s use of philosophia invites broad consideration of the substance of his 
philosophical rhetoric in the dialogue. This study suggests that philosophia is both a mode of life 
and a mode of learning that Augustine is promoting and persuading others into as a broad but 
distinctly Christian culture. Augustine’s philosophia embraces and employs Cicero’s integration 
of philosophy and rhetoric to discuss and demonstrate this culture in and through the dialogue of 
De ordine. Elements of this culture are in continuity with the typical rhetorical culture of the 
Late Roman Empire and others are in greater opposition. Augustine’s discernment appears to 
hinge on the ordering of such elements toward lasting happiness, a subject addressed in the 
following chapter. Augustine uses the dialogue form to invite others to participate in this cultural 
conversation for the specific benefit of framing “the order of teaching” (ord. I.9.27). In De 
ordine, Augustine eloquently expresses the order of a philosophical culture to his audience with 
hopes that they will follow a similar path.  
Augustine’s intellectual relationship to Cicero certainly includes major divergences, 
including his refutation of Cicero’s skepticism (Foley, “Cicero” 63–67; Fortin 223). 
Additionally, Augustine’s work presents a significant “reorientation” of Ciceronian terms, 
including “wisdom” and “teaching” (Troup 26; Fortin 227, 221). Yet, elements of Augustine’s 
engagement with Cicero’s philosophical thought and method remained constant, including 
insistence on the “synthesis of wisdom and eloquence” (Troup 26). Furthermore, while the 
“Ciceronian tenor” of the Cassiciacum dialogues has been “widely acknowledged,” the depth of 
this relationship “has yet to be adequately explored” (Foley, “Cicero” 51–52). Study of 
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Augustine’s philosophia in De ordine provides a means to consider not merely Augustine’s 
stylistic imitation of Cicero but the philosophical principles of Cicero, such as the unity of 
philosophy and rhetoric, guiding his thought and practices at this pivotal time.  
Philosophia in De ordine 
Augustine’s philosophia in De ordine discusses and demonstrates a culture that embraces 
and employs the Ciceronian unity of philosophy and rhetoric. This section chronologically 
identifies and discusses four coordinates in the text that reflect this unity in learning and in 
practice. These coordinates are: In Philosophia, Framing Philosophia, Cultivating Philosophia, 
and Discovering Philosophia. In the introduction, Augustine describes his life in philosophia as a 
moral and intellectual conversion toward the happy life (beata vita), a move that stands in 
contrast to the ambitions and vanities of his life as a Roman rhetor. Then, in dialogue with his 
companions, Augustine demonstrates that this moral and intellectual conversion includes both 
correct understanding and eloquent expression of philosophical topics. To cultivate such 
conversion, Augustine proposes contemplative and practical study of the liberal arts to discover 
and express truth. In addition to these traditional arts, however, Augustine argues that the 
discipline of philosophia specializes in treating the topics of self and God. For Augustine, the 
goal of philosophical discovery, and ultimately of his philosophical culture, is both intellectual 
and moral, contemplative and active: to order one’s thoughts and one’s life toward eternal 
happiness. Once this personal discovery is in place, one bears a certain responsibility to teach it 
to others and thus to bring about a broader culture of philosophia. Following Cicero’s example, 
Augustine argues for the integration of the arts – and particularly philosophy and rhetoric – in his 
philosophia. Philosophia in and through the dialogue is a way of life and a way of learning 
directed toward the discovery and expression of truth.   
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Coordinate One: In Philosophia 
 The first coordinate, In Philosophia, discusses how Augustine’s initial uses of the term 
philosophia reflect a transition in his intellectual and moral life from teaching rhetoric at the 
sophistic school to a life “in philosophy.” This transition comes through the practice of otium 
liberale and prompts the composition of Augustine’s philosophical dialogues (Trout 618). Once 
at the villa in Cassiciacum, Augustine leads his companions in leisurely activities that are 
contemplative and practical, philosophical and rhetorical, personal and social. Augustine, 
however, gives all of these activities a common purpose: he orders them toward the 
philosophical life as habits in the “love of wisdom” (ord. I.11.32). Augustine demonstrates and 
discusses the significance of these habits, and ultimately promotes them, through use of the 
Ciceronian dialogue. In doing so, he seeks to cultivate the philosophical life not only among his 
present companions but also among a broader audience. Like Cicero, this is one way that 
Augustine practices the art of rhetoric for a persuasive purpose during his otium, through the 
eloquent expression and teaching of wisdom.  
Within the introduction, Augustine recollects to his friend Zenobius that he left the 
sophistic rhetoric school to take refuge in philosophy (in philosophiam confugere) (ord. I.2.5). 
Augustine had been struggling with an illness in his chest that complicated his teaching of 
rhetoric, and this difficulty coincided with the beginning of summer vacation. Yet, even apart 
from this physical “emergency” and break from teaching, Augustine suggests that he was 
“already planning” to make this transition into philosophy, a move particularly reflected in his 
use of the word schola. Augustine left Milan and went to the villa of his friend and fellow 
professor, Verecundus, as he shifted from the sophistic rhetoric school, schola illa (“that 
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school”), to his philosophical school at Cassiciacum, schola nostra (“our school”). Moreover, 
this physical transition reflected a deeper intellectual and moral one. 
Augustine describes the “manner of life” that he and his companions are “leading” at the 
villa as one of “generous leisure” (liberali otio) (ord. I.2.4). They are following a long tradition 
of “cultured retirement,” a move to a tranquil space detached from public occupations and 
ambitions to consider philosophical matters in “creative” ways (Brown 108). Augustine follows 
Cicero in taking such opportunity not only for philosophical study but also for literary writing 
(Trout 618). Augustine gathers at the villa with an “ill-assorted company,” consisting of family 
members and students from his teaching career (Brown 113). They are an unusual group for 
traditional otium, which was a privilege of intellectual culture, but this distinction appears central 
to the philosophical life that Augustine seeks to cultivate at schola nostra (ord. I.11.31). 
Augustine’s otium includes the activities of treating classical texts, quiet study and prayer, and 
exercises on philosophical questions (I.3.6). The villa provided a suitable ambiance and situation, 
a fitting “place” (loco) (I.8.23), for this kind of leisure.  
While these activities occur in the dialogue only among a small, private group, Augustine 
records them as a means to share the “fruit” of their leisure with Zenobius and others in their 
intellectual circle (ord. I.2.4). To express the insights of this philosophical leisure, Augustine 
uses the Ciceronian dialogue (Foley, “Other” 167–68). This particular form of discourse included 
certain stylistic features but moreover demonstrated an approach to persuading a specific kind of 
audience of philosophical content. As De Giorgio notes, while the form historically included 
disputation (disputatio) between individual personas to engage philosophical arguments, the 
dialogue (sermo) was predominantly a subtle and nonaggressive way for the composer to engage 
in persuasive conversation with a small group of fellow intellectuals (106–07, 114). The 
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discourse of sermo was an eloquent and palatable expression of leisurely conversation (109–10); 
it was a gentle and composed form that invited consideration of philosophical topics.  
Augustine composes De ordine as a sermo (ord. I.7.20). Like Cicero, he finds the 
dialogue an appropriate means to engage his fellow Romans in a certain quality of conversation 
and into a certain quality of life. Since most of Augustine’s audience, including Zenobius, was 
predominantly cultivated in the rhetorical education of the time, they struggled with the obscurity 
(obscurus) of philosophical topics (ord. I.1.2; I.7.20). Augustine’s dialogue seeks to overcome 
the limitations of this “feeble mentality” (ord. I.1.2), and to demonstrate precisely how his 
colleagues can come to a fuller understanding of the order of things through philosophical 
learning.  
According to De Giorgio, the persuasive power of sermo came through “the validation of 
ideas by a circle of friends,” cultivating an “ethics of conciliation” among them rather than strict 
technical demonstration (114). In De ordine, Augustine seems aware of how his sermo may 
influence not only the personal lives of his readers (ord. I.2.3), but also the broader educational 
culture in which they all participate (I.9.27). Like Cicero, Augustine’s leisure contains this social 
dimension (Trout 618), for his philosophical writing is at least partially a response to certain 
cultural concerns of Late Roman society (Foley “Other” 167–68). Through the practice of otium 
and specifically use of sermonic discourse, De ordine presents Augustine’s contribution to a 
broader discussion over scholastic, i.e., educational culture, in light of, not despite, his physical 
distance from the city of Milan. Augustine’s contemplative study at the villa informs his insights 
on issues of practical significance, and he shares them through the text as a way to shape public 
discussion and teaching of such matters.  
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One issue that seems particularly relevant to Augustine’s audience in De ordine is the 
relationship between philosophical life – its habits, culture and intellectual underpinnings – and 
the predominant rhetorical, or literary, life of the Later Roman Empire. As these coordinates 
collectively suggest, Augustine addresses this issue throughout the dialogue, but this first 
coordinate highlights his initial approach to the matter, one that includes the educational 
significance of poetry and skepticism, two elements central to the prevailing rhetorical culture, 
for compatibility with Augustine’s understanding of philosophical life.  
Early in the dialogue, as Augustine attempts to engage his young student Licentius in an 
exercise on the topic of order, the boy claims to prefer his own mode of study, that of poetic 
composition (ord. I.3.8). Augustine is both encouraged by and concerned about this, for 
Licentius’s “extreme” affection for poetry appears to “take him away from philosophy.” “I am 
vexed somewhat” says Augustine, “because…you pursue that verse-making of yours which may 
be erecting between yourself and reality a wall more impenetrable than they are trying to rear 
between your lovers.” He said this in reference to Licentius’s current preoccupation with the love 
story about Pyramus and Thisbe from Ovid’s Metamorphoses. In responds to his teacher’s 
concern, Licentius states, “Why may I…not be admonished by the sound of your voice to study 
philosophy rather than to compose poems?” (I.3.9). “For philosophy,” he asserts, “as I have 
begun to believe you as you prove it day by day, is our true and tranquil abode (habitatio).” 
Through this interaction and prompted by the sound of Augustine’s voice, Licentius’s mind, 
including his passion for poetic composition, turns (conversus) toward philosophia.  
While this interaction seems to subordinate poetry, it also does not dismiss it. Rather, 
Augustine suggests that the “extreme” practice of poetic composition acts as a wall, a blockade, 
to his student’s movement toward truth (veritatem) (I.3.8). Yet, this is why they have come to the 
 
76 
villa – with hope of finding truth (inveniendi veri), or rather “Truth itself” (I.4.10). For this 
purpose, they have left the walls of Milan, to pursue leisure “more lofty” than Apollo. 
Augustine’s comment on poetry demonstrates how their philosophical life at this time stood in 
some opposition to Roman literary culture (Brown 112). Augustine’s concern for Licentius 
presents his attempt to “swim against” the limitless consumption of Roman ways and their 
inherent values while they are on retreat. Yet rather than rejecting all such poetry, Augustine’s 
philosophia brings measure to it. Indeed, their philosophical mode appears to be one of measure 
in many ways (ord. I.8.26; Hochschild 78). As Augustine states at the onset on their discussion, 
he is glad to have escaped the sophistic rhetoric school but only “in some measure” (modo) (ord. 
I.9.27). The sophistic school was the dominant institution for teaching Roman culture and values, 
particularly through poetry and literature, and Augustine demonstrates his ingenuity as he finds 
ways to bridge his new philosophical leisure with the common education and expectations of his 
audience, particularly those who still valued this system and its proverbial compositions.  
 Their leisure at Cassiciacum is, however, more directly opposed to another facet of 
Roman culture, namely academic skepticism. While Augustine’s elaboration of this criticism 
comes predominantly through another dialogue from this period, Contra Academicos, De ordine 
also references the inadequacy that Augustine finds in skepticism. For soon after Licentius 
agrees to debate the topic of order, Augustine invites his other present student, Trygetius, to 
participate. “What is your opinion on this subject [of order]?” asks Augustine (ord. I.4.10). 
Trygetius replies, “I incline very much towards order, but I am not yet fully convinced.” In fact, 
this element of “indecision” (incertus) – a symptom of academic skepticism – still affects them 
all at Cassiciacum. Licentius in particular was only recently a defender of suspended judgment, 
but now he is tired of its distractions. Licentius responds to his fellow student, perhaps to counter 
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Augustine’s criticism above, “Poetry surely cannot turn me away from philosophy as much as 
distrust of finding truth” (inveniendi veri diffidentia). Leaving such distrust behind, this young 
student now seeks “a divine thing,” one he is intent on finding.  
 While poetry in Augustine’s assessment may offer a point of entry from literary life to 
philosophy for those such as Licentius, a point of agreement with Cicero (Foley, “Cicero” 53), 
skepticism as an intellectual assumption seems predominantly discordant. In addition to 
Augustine’s refutation of the epistemological inadequacies of skepticism, Topping argues that 
his primary concern in the Cassiciacum dialogues is “the disastrous educational and moral 
implications” that result from a skeptic’s lack of assent (Happiness 96–97). For as students 
despair of actually finding the truth that they seek, skepticism ultimately “undermines the 
conditions for learning” (97). Practically speaking, such students find their natural motivation for 
pursuing truth derailed because they assume they cannot find it with certainty (112). 
Consequently, skepticism does not fit the mode of life that Augustine seeks to establish at 
Cassiciacum – intellectually, morally, or pedagogically.8 Skepticism undermines their ability to 
confidently abide in their philosophy.  
Augustine uses the dialogue, and the personas reflected within it, as an opportunity to 
engage issues relevant to his transition from rhetorical life to a life in philosophia. The way that 
Augustine discusses poetry and skepticism demonstrates how the status of these intellectual 
habits was relevant to Augustine’s audience, specifically whether or not they were suited to the 
pursuit of wisdom, to life in philosophy. Augustine’s otium provides the context for him to 
address such matters of social import, and his dialogue, his sermo, is a suitable means for him to 
                                                 
8 Although Augustine rejects the philosophical foundations of skepticism and their implications 
here, he seems willing to use a skeptical method of questioning as a means to teach his present 
students and to move them closer to the truth of divine order (ord. I.7.20).  
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converse with his colleagues about how these issues relate to the public “order of teaching” (ord. 
I.9.27). Their conversation includes the evaluation of certain intellectual practices common to the 
predominant rhetorical culture of Late Antiquity, such as study of poetry and presumption of 
skepticism, for usefulness and compatibility with the philosophical life. Augustine discerns these 
elements of the philosophical life explicitly in the dialogue with his companions as he also 
implicitly converses with his broader audience through the dialogue concerning the relationship 
between literary and philosophical life. As the following coordinate shows, another facet of this 
relationship is teaching students how to frame their philosophical expressions.  
Coordinate Two: Framing Philosophia 
 This coordinate, Framing Philosophia, demonstrates how the developing habits of 
Augustine and his companions at the villa include learning philosophical content as well as 
rhetorical expression. Augustine and his students are seeking to get at “the heart of philosophy” 
particularly through their conversations (ord. I.6.16). While Augustine too is still learning 
(I.5.13), he at times proves his “fine pedagogical sense” (Russell, “Introduction” iv) as he seeks 
to “carry along” his students and his broader audience in his love of wisdom by framing their 
philosophical discourse in and through the dialogue (ord. I.5.13–14). As a teacher, Augustine 
offers an eloquent example for imitation in such discourse through his own speeches in the 
dialogue, which not only address philosophical content but also rhetorically frame the content in 
a way fitted to express and teach the truths therein. The collective sum of Augustine’s speeches 
through the dialogue not only shape the expressions of his companions but also provide 
persuasive arguments for shaping the opinions of Augustine’s broader audience, particularly 
other teachers.  
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 In the dialogue, Licentius, Trygetius and Augustine agree to a debate (disputatio) on 
order. After Licentius makes the initial argument that order governs all things, he seeks to 
express his position more clearly (ord. I.4.11). He proceeds to suggest that the trees, the leaves, 
the animals, and their very discussions all confirm “the order of things,” crediting the statement 
that nothing is without order. Augustine then asks a following question. Is this order of things 
“something good or something bad?” (I.6.15). There is “a kind of middle course,” replies 
Licentius, for “order seems to be neither a good thing nor a bad,” but rather “nothing is apart 
from” or “opposed” to order. 
 Augustine responds to the arguments of his young student with great joy, for Licentius 
now proves that he is “coming full force into the very heart of philosophy” (medium venire 
philosophiam) (ord. I.6.16). Augustine is perhaps particularly gratified that Licentius’s statement 
stands against the Manichaean dualism that he himself once ascribed to concerning the order of 
good and evil. Moreover, Augustine is gratified that this “youthful son of [his] dear friend,” 
Romanianus, is grasping the nature of causes (causae), which demonstrates “the integral 
fittingness of things” (I.1.2). Licentius reveals his possession (possessione) of a first principle 
fundamental to their philosophical discipline – belief in a unified order of all things (I.6.16). Yet, 
his ability to reason through and express his understanding of this principle is still incomplete. 
For Trygetius immediately questions his fellow student, “What more impious statement could be 
made than that evil things themselves are comprised in order” (I.7.17). Licentius then attempts to 
extrapolate his argument, suggesting that God harmonizes the universe by a “divine 
arrangement” (divinae dispositionis) of contrasts, an antithesis (antithetis) of good and evil.  
Licentius has more to learn, for he lacks the ability to aptly express the philosophical 
principles that he is discovering. “Oh, if I could say what I want to say,” he cries, “Words, where 
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are you now? I ask. Come to my aid! Both good things and bad are in order. Please take my word 
for it, because I know not how to explain it” (ord. I.6.16). Licentius’s “difficulty of finding 
words” (difficultate verborum) signifies his need for greater cultivation, for even when his 
answer is apparent to his mind he lacks a strong ability to convey it (I.7.18). Augustine notes that 
this young student is “not searching at all for what to answer, but just how to frame the answer” 
(nec omnino quaerens quid responderet, sed quemadmodum quod respondendum). Following 
this, Licentius throws himself on his bed and says, “Will you give me no answer – You who have 
driven me to say these things?” (I.7.19). Licentius expects Augustine, as his teacher, to aid him 
in this matter. At this point in the dialogue, however, Augustine is acting as “a captious 
questioner” (odiosum percontatorem), perhaps posing as a typical academic, skeptical and 
adversarial (I.5.12). This posture eventually shifts, when Augustine appears to move from 
questioner to magister (magistrum) (I.10.29), but here Augustine simply promises to eventually 
become the teacher (doctorem) on the topic of order (I.5.12). Therefore, while Licentius now 
demonstrates much progress in the ways of philosophy, he still needs additional instruction, 
particularly in the expression of the wisdom he is discovering.  
Augustine utilizes his experience and expertise as a teacher to provide this instruction, 
specifically by the example of his own apt and eloquent expressions on the topic. Augustine does 
not give Licentius an explicit lesson on how to frame answers to general philosophical questions. 
Rather, he frames his own answer in the dialogue through a rhetorical exercise of praise (ord. 
I.7.20; I.9.27). Licentius already has some natural ability (ingenii) in speaking, but it needs to be 
cultivated for philosophy (I.7.20). Following Cicero and others within the rhetorical tradition 
(Pernot 219), Augustine demonstrates that the best way for Licentius to learn clarity and 
eloquence of expression is through “imitation” of a cultivated orator (Kennedy, Classical 182), 
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in this case, through imitation of Augustine’s epideictic speech on order in the dialogue. While 
Augustine elaborates on this principle of eloquence – that a student learns it more effectively 
through imitation than through study of rhetorical rules – in De doctrina Christiana (IV.3.4–5), 
he applies it here throughout De ordine in what he says and how it says it. Augustine responds to 
an audience through the questions and arguments raised by his present company as well as those 
arguments that he assumes among his colleagues abroad, e.g., Zenobius. He frames the dialogue 
to address these issues as well as one of broader cultural concern – the question of how to order a 
distinctly Christian education in the Late Roman Empire. As he eloquently teaches his students 
in the dialogue, he also seeks to persuasively move his broader audience through it.  
Perhaps for this reason, Augustine recognizes a certain significance of the typical Roman 
way of teaching at this point in the dialogue, even as he subordinates it to Christian doctrine 
(ord. I.5.13). For although he criticizes failures of the sophistic rhetoric school, predominantly its 
deprived purpose in De ordine, he also seems to acknowledge how the predominant literary 
education can play some role in preparing young minds for philosophia. He states that while 
most teachers are “quite remote from such [philosophical] pursuits,” they do “teach something 
when, by certain ties of questioning, they are drawn to the fellowship of those engaged in 
discussions.” Augustine does not specify who this group of teachers is (perhaps other rhetoric 
professors), but he argues that they do “teach something…and that something is not nothing.” 
Augustine suggests that a certain quality of intellectual discourse occurs among this group of 
teachers and their students, and this discourse informs the order of teaching (I.9.27). Augustine 
publishes his own “chain of written words” through the dialogue to influence this intellectual 
conversation (Foley, “Cicero” 74). He is hopeful that his approach to the cultural question of 
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Christian education, which he expresses both eloquently and sincerely, will contribute a certain 
gravitas to this public discussion on teaching.  
Thus in his care for developing moral and intellectual habits for philosophy, Augustine 
attends to subtle details of Late Roman educational culture, at times in criticism of the 
predominant literary system and at times in continuity. As he establishes his own school at 
Cassiciacum, schola nostra, Augustine argues, like Cicero, that it is imperative for his 
companions to learn philosophical answers, i.e., the “what” of philosophia as well as how to 
express them in an effective and eloquent manner, i.e., the “how” of philosophia. Augustine 
demonstrates the significance of both abilities in the dialogue so that his students can imitate his 
philosophical rhetoric. Moreover, by capturing this discussion through the dialogue, Augustine 
ingeniously influences how his broader audience may discern and discuss such pedagogical 
elements for the benefit of teaching philosophia to others.  
Coordinate Three: Cultivating Philosophia  
The third coordinate, Cultivating Philosophia, demonstrates how the habits of schola 
nostra include additional elements from Roman literary education, specifically the liberal arts, 
ordered to philosophical ends. Following Cicero, Augustine directs study and use of the arts 
toward wisdom. This includes the art of rhetoric, which is essential to the expression and 
teaching of wisdom to others (ord. II.13.38). Augustine makes a critical distinction, however, 
between the common use of the arts and his goal for their study at Cassiciacum. Unlike the 
sophistic rhetoric school, schola illa, which directs its pedagogy toward the rhetorical abuses of 
vanity and false praise, Augustine’s intends for his school to use the arts toward the advantage 
and beauty of learning (ord. I.10.30). According to Augustine, the arts are both practical and 
contemplative (II.16.44), and their richness is accessible to the gifted as well as to the morally 
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upright (II.16.45). Augustine explicitly makes such arguments in the dialogue concerning the arts 
in addition to exemplifying their significance through the following interaction with Licentius. 
Furthermore, Augustine describes some political applications of his philosophical culture as he 
promotes the exercise of virtue and wisdom in social and public affairs.   
Augustine rejoices over Licentius’s new zeal for philosophy and wants him to continue 
along this path of learning. Although previously concerned about this student’s “extreme” 
attention to poetry, Augustine’s next move attends to the boy’s interest. He says to Licentius, “If 
you have a care for order…you must return to those verses” (ord. I.8.24). Augustine sees an 
interpretive value in the poem that had previously preoccupied this young man, for something 
about the story directly pertains to the question of order.  
This is a rich example of continuity between Augustine’s earlier rhetorical culture and his 
philosophical life at Cassiciacum. Augustine brings much more with him than poetry. Rather 
than rejecting “the liberal arts” (disciplinarum liberalium), Augustine appropriates “moderate 
and concise” (modesta sane ac succincta) instruction (eruditio) in all the arts to his philosophical 
culture in the dialogue (ord. I.8.24). His reasoning is explicit: instruction in the liberal arts 
“produces devotees more alert and steadfast and better equipped for embracing truth” 
(amplectendeae veritati). Moreover, this disposition toward truth is essential, “so 
that…[students] more ardently seek and more consistently pursue and in the end more lovingly 
cling to that which his called the happy life” (beata vita). In these concise yet significant 
statements, Augustine brings the arts into his philosophical culture, ordering them toward the 
wisdom that confers happiness.   
Augustine’s discussion of the arts in part reflects his understanding of the relationship 
between Roman rhetorical culture and philosophia. Following Cicero’s example, Augustine puts 
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the arts in service toward the end of humanity’s striving, the happy life (Kimball 42). His 
explanation of this relationship in the dialogue is insightful, for he presents the arts as medicinal, 
as a means to move from the limitations of sense experience to wisdom (ord. I.8.24). Augustine, 
however, also seems to anticipate his audience’s skeptical response – that while one may assume 
that the arts guide the mind toward truth and the happy life, the reality of sensual addictions 
prevents anyone from actually finding it. In such cases, men, “content with the name of the most 
high God, and with their sense faculty,” “live wretched…but they live.” Augustine here perhaps 
speaks most directly of those colleagues who were content with thinking (intellectually) like 
Christians but who failed to virtuously live (to be morally converted to) the philosophical life as 
Augustine essentially understood it. Yet, at present, Augustine’s discussion is with Licentius, a 
young man who demonstrates the desire to live the happy life.  
For students such as Licentius, the relationship between the arts and happiness seems 
more like an exercise regimen than a medicine. Learning the arts is not synonymous with living 
the happy life, no more than the act of exercise is synonymous with physical health, but rather 
the arts appear as a significant means to attaining the final goal. They prepare one for living a 
certain fullness of life: of mind, body, and soul. The arts are a means to wisdom (sapientia), and 
ultimately to the Wisdom of God, “that Spouse supremely good and beautiful,” Who seeks men 
“worthy of His abode, souls for whom it is not enough merely to live but to live a happy life” 
(ord. I.8.24). Thus while Augustine anticipates the skepticism of his audience– their assumption 
that the happy life, like truth, may be sought but cannot actually be discovered – he counters 
their conclusion while adopting their pedagogical method (Topping, Happiness 83). Augustine’s 
colleagues were well versed in the rhetoric of their time, a rhetoric that sought practical use of 
the arts, even as a means toward philosophical life (Kimball 41). Augustine, however, takes a 
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pivotal step as he puts the arts, the literary education of the day, into a deeply Christian 
philosophical context, one that puts the arts to work toward humanity’s ultimate end – an end, 
unlike Cicero’s, that one seeks and finds. 
Of great interest is not only the fact that Augustine relates poetry and the arts to wisdom 
and the happy life but also that he explains to his young student precisely how this movement 
from the arts toward truth may be accomplished, in this case how Licentius can interpret the 
poem to learn something of wisdom. Augustine’s instructions are two-fold. First, he says, “For 
the present…return to the Muses” (ord. I.8.24). Then, he says, “And yet, do you know what I 
would have you do?” Here Augustine extrapolates the relationship between the arts and the truth 
that leads to the happy life: 
At that point, where Pyramus destroyed himself…and [Thisbe] slew herself over his half-
dead body…– there, in that very anguish where it is proper that your poem should reach 
its highest flight, you have a golden opportunity: satirize (arripe) the curse of that 
unclean lust and those burning passions by which those deplorable things come to pass. 
Then soar aloft (attollere) with all your power in praise (in laude) of pure and genuine 
love (amoris)– love wherein souls endowed with knowledge (disciplinis) and adorned 
with virtue (virtute) are, through philosophy (per philosophiam), united to understanding, 
and whereby they not only escape death, but moreover enjoy a life most happy. 
Augustine’s first statement relays, as at coordinate one, that poetry may be a starting point for 
philosophy, at least “for the present.” Augustine’s second and longer statement demonstrates 
how the student may move from poetry to philosophy through an alternative interpretation of 
Ovid’s poem, by reading it satirically. Following Russell’s translation of arripere in the Latin 
literary sense of  “to ridicule,” Augustine seems to suggest that Licentius use his love of poetry 
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for literary criticism, or specifically, to move from a lower reading of the poem to a higher one 
(Hagendahl 440–441). The young student can thus evaluate the vices of the young lovers and the 
tragic end toward which these vices lead, and subsequently praise (laude) the inverse, the virtues 
and the consequent happy life toward which they lead instead.  
Augustine and Licentius previously agreed that their life at Cassiciacum was about 
conversion (converti) (ord. I.8.23). As Augustine describes it, this conversion is a turn toward 
God from “a certain uncleanness of the body and its stains,” and “from the darkness in which 
error has involved us.” Their philosophical life is about being “lifted away from the over-growth 
of vices,” and to be “uplifted toward Himself” through “virtue and temperance.” Their minds, 
bodies and souls are all engaged in this change of life, this turn from vice to virtue, from error to 
knowledge. Here Augustine continues on the theme of conversion with reference to the content 
of Roman poetry. His young student Licentius must recognize that the vices of sensual desire 
displayed by the two lovers ultimately led to their peril. From this, Licentius can turn toward a 
higher love, one “wherein souls endowed with knowledge and adorned with virtue…enjoy a life 
most happy” (I.8.24). The love displayed by this tragic couple is destructive, but it also 
represents the human longing for a “pure and genuine love,” one that is both attainable and truly 
satisfying.   
Augustine’s instructions on how Licentius may accomplish this turn include treating the 
poem rather than simply dismissing it. Augustine could have dismissed it with the entirety of 
Roman literature, as some of his Christian contemporaries did (Murphy, “Debate” 207–210; 
Kimball 40–41). Of course, by the time Augustine writes Confessiones, he has stronger words of 
criticism for the “filth” of typical Roman education (Farrell 268–69). Yet, here Augustine finds 
this Roman literature useful to bringing this promising student into the heights of philosophia. 
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Augustine has now ordered poetry toward a higher end. Rather than wholly opposing the content 
and form of rhetorical and philosophical life, they appear at this point on a vertical plane, the 
latter higher than the former. Licentius can begin with a tragic poem, but then he must “soar 
aloft” in praise of the higher love.9 Interestingly, in Augustine’s final conversion scene in 
Confessiones, he takes and reads (tolle e lege) Sacred Scripture (VIII.12.28), which literally 
moves him to alter the direction of his will. In a similar way, in De ordine Licentius takes 
(attollere) and reads this text in a way that leads his own will, and most likely his tongue, toward 
proper praise –of virtue and of rightly ordered love.  
 As the dialogue continues, however, Licentius proves that a final and deep-seated wall 
still blocks his path to philosophy. Augustine as teacher (magister) has commenced his lecture 
on the subject of order when the two present students, Licentius and Trygetius, show their 
immaturity by jostling one another “for the sole purpose of winning glory” in their debate (ord. 
I.10.29). Their demonstration of such “perverse habits,” laughing and shaming one another for 
pride of place in the discussion, signifies “their minds immersed in darkness.” Augustine exhorts 
them to “rise high” above such behaviors and “be good,” but the boys remain ignorant of their 
fault. Augustine firmly replies to them, “I used to be sorely vexed in that [rhetoric] school 
because boys were motivated, not by the advantage and beauty of learning (non utilitate atque 
decore disciplinarum), but by love of paltriest praise (sed inanissimae laudis amore)” (I.10.30). 
At present, these two are “trying to introduce and to implant the pest of enfeebling jealousy and 
empty boasting…into that philosophy which I rejoice to have made my own.” This “disease of 
vanity” is infectious to the philosophia that Augustine seeks to cultivate, and he even 
acknowledges how crippling this particular vice had been to his earlier years (I.10.29). Unless 
                                                 
9 “In laude” may also imply a literary device, specifically use of the encomium to “praise” a 
moral topic, including virtue. 
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purged, it will prevent Licentius and Trygetius from moving higher into philosophical life. 
Thankfully, however, “Wisdom extends a helping hand to the sunken,” and as signified by their 
subsequent acts of humility, they leave the vanities of the rhetoric school behind in order to 
move closer toward philosophia.  
Truth is there for the finding; happiness may be lived. Yet, Augustine seems particularly 
attentive to the reality that nothing perhaps blocks the path to philosophical life more than vanity 
and pride, prevalent vices of the rhetorical culture of his time and of his younger life. Augustine, 
perhaps anticipating that some of his audience will not be so eager to leave behind such habits, 
directs a further challenge to reluctant readers. His statement turns to the example of “proud and 
ignorant men” who prefer to remain satisfied by empty and vain elements of life (ord. I.11.31). 
These men do not care what kind (quales) of life they live but attend only to “worldly wealth.” In 
the reading of books, including one such as the dialogue that Augustine now composes, these 
men care mostly for eloquence at the cost of “the purpose of the authors or even to what is fully 
explained and proved by them.” Consequently, only a small number choose to enter “through 
decked and gilded portals to the sacred inner courts of philosophy.” Through the dialogue, 
Augustine calls into question weaknesses of the prevailing rhetorical culture and its practices, 
including the disproportionate attention given to eloquence at the cost of substantial content, a 
concern that Cicero shared in his own time.  
The teaching that Augustine provides, which includes training in the arts, directs 
Licentius to better his philosophical habits. This use of erudition highlights both pedagogical and 
cultural qualities of Augustine’s philosophy as he responds to complexities of his historical 
moment through the dialogue. Augustine’s philosophia uses rhetorical elements from the 
prevailing Roman culture even as he criticizes their abuses, and he puts them to work toward a 
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life that seeks, finds and expresses wisdom in attainment of the happy life. Augustine’s 
philosophia is one that is necessarily communicable, even if not in its entirety due to the limits of 
human speech (ord. II.7.22). For the relationship between finding and expressing truth, and 
living the happy life, is central to Augustine’s philosophia, which strives toward “accurate 
expression of truth” in word and example (Holt 53). The insights cultivated in conversation 
between Augustine and his students “generate change” as they deepen their conversion to 
philosophy (Douglass 41). Furthermore, these conversion experiences are not only personal but 
are designed to leave an impression on social institutions, including public offices and other 
human affairs (humanitatis) (ord. II.8.25).10 In other words, those who take philosophia seriously 
apply virtue “in all circumstances of life, in every place and at all times.” Through the dialogue, 
Augustine gives cultural significance to such philosophical insights as he gains them during his 
otium and encourages others to seek, find and apply them to the broader culture, exhibiting 
wisdom and virtue in their lives.  
In this coordinate, Augustine proposes a program of education using the common literary 
tradition of the arts. Yet, he embeds this program within a philosophical culture at Cassiciacum, 
directing the arts beyond their typical use (and abuse) and ordering them toward the discovery 
and expression of wisdom that leads to the happy life. As Augustine does so, he responds to 
cultural tensions and rationales over the value of Roman rhetorical education for Christian 
philosophy (Cameron, Later Roman 152; Kimball 40). While his understanding of the 
significance of this education may be predominantly propaedeutic to his philosophical culture 
(Topping, Happiness 93–94), he also broadens the spectrum of those invited into this general, 
                                                 
10 To some extent, such a community is “aloof” from the wider culture (ord. I.2.3), but this 
chapter seeks to demonstrate how Augustine’s philosophia includes dimensions designed to 
affect imbedded social institutions. 
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perhaps “pansophic” (Kimball 40), program. By sharing their discussion through the dialogue, 
Augustine seeks to persuade his audience into this way of life, learning and teaching. Augustine 
and his students are living a life in philosophy, one that embraces a discerned and rightly ordered 
use of the arts. As the next coordinate explains, the culmination of these disciplines is 
“philosophy,” a specialized means to discover the very source of order.  
Coordinate Four: Discovering Philosophia 
 In the previous coordinate, Augustine describes an interpretive method associated with 
their philosophical life at Cassiciacum. This method stands in some continuity and some contrast 
to the predominant educational culture of the Late Roman Empire, for it utilizes the arts but 
directs them with greater confidence to the finding of truth. Augustine also broadens the 
audience for such a culture beyond the boundaries of the Roman elite, including those like his 
mother who faithfully seek God (ord. II.11.31). As the dialogue continues, Augustine moves 
forward in his pedagogical discussion by addressing the role of each art in its order toward 
wisdom. Rhetoric, as the art of moving (commoveri) the emotions of an audience toward the 
pursuit of wisdom, has an essential role to play in Augustine’s program (II.13.38). Yet, he also 
argues for the high distinction of the discipline (disciplina) of philosophy (philosophia), which 
specializes in finding (invenit) the unity of all things and that affects (efficit) our knowledge of 
ourselves and of God (II.18.47). According to Augustine, philosophy ultimately persuades 
(persuasit) us to see how the individual parts of the created order fit into the whole (II.18.48). 
Thus, while Augustine’s philosophia in this coordinate has specific content, it also continues to 
actuate his larger philosophical culture, being a fundamental means by which willing participants 
move closer to possessing the happy life.  
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Early in Book II, Alypius, Augustine’s friend who had temporarily left the villa, returns, 
and the four companions return to “the all-important matter itself” that began in Book I, the 
definition of order (ord. II.1.2). Their conversation continues with the definition previously 
provided by Licentius, “that order is that by which God governs all things.” They address many 
fine distinctions of the definition, particularly the relationship between God’s order in 
temporality and eternity (II.1.3–II.2.7). This distinction is significant for their topic because they 
are seeking eternal wisdom through temporal realities, i.e., through their minds.  
Augustine uses the arts as an illustration (simile) of how temporal reality reflects 
something of eternal order (ord. II.4.12), for education in the arts (disciplinis omnibus 
erudiendos) “so thoroughly” teaches order that it becomes “clear as day” (II.5.15). Augustine 
discusses each specific arts and its relationship to reason, which initially comes through “the 
ocular,” “works of man which are seen,” and “the auricular,” “the words which are heard” 
(II.11.32). In such cases, pleasure often accompanies these “traces of reason in the senses,” i.e., 
beauty (pulchrum) for the eyes or sweetness (suavitas) of sound to the ears (II.11.33). Augustine 
discusses the measure of reason, guided by design and proportion, a quality of pleasure that 
“pervades all the arts and creations of man” (II.11.34). He then extrapolates on each individual 
art and its order toward wisdom. His list of the arts includes grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, 
geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and harmony (Kimball 42). Following Kimball, the discipline 
of philosophy is included within Augustine’s cultural project in addition to these seven arts.11  
                                                 
11 While many scholars agree to list the first three arts as described here, there is much debate 
over the last four. For various lists of the arts in De ordine, see Pacioni “Liberal Arts” 492–494; 
Hagendahl 593; Riley 132; Topping, Happiness 132; Shanzer 98–103. Within this debate is the 
question of whether or not the discipline of philosophy, which Augustine also discusses in De 
ordine, is to be included within the arts or in addition to the arts. This study follows Kimball in 
suggesting that Augustine combines the pansophic approach to the liberal arts (use of the seven 
listed above) with the propaedeutic approach (use of the seven arts plus philosophy) (40–41, 
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Although Augustine likely took his list of the arts from Varro (Pacioni, “Liberal Arts” 
492), he contextualizes them for the purpose of his own project (Topping, Happiness 227). Each 
art serves a unique purpose in the order of eternal wisdom. The first three arts are discursive: 
grammar consists of the “fixed rules” of speech; dialectic “teaches how to teach and how to 
learn;” rhetoric “[arouses students] as to their emotions” (ord. II.12.36–II.13.38). The following 
four arts are “numerical proportions” (II.14.41). As Augustine describes each art, he attends to 
how the discipline directs the student from sensory experience through intellect toward truth and 
wisdom. Augustine emphasizes the importance of following the order of the arts “or not at all” 
(II.16.46), for only together do these arts demonstrate unity, how the parts of the created order 
inform the whole. Augustine also stresses the shared practical and contemplative roles of the arts, 
each of which signifies divine reality in application and in study (ord. II.16.44). While he hopes 
that students will pursue this complete program of study, he offers less “extensive” opportunities 
for learning as well. Therefore, while Augustine promotes the usefulness of the traditional liberal 
education, he also pushes beyond its conventional applications as he accommodates it to non-
traditional groups and challenges those who typically see it as an end in itself, ordering it not 
only toward the pursuit of wisdom but toward the philosophical discovery of Truth itself.   
The final discipline, philosophy, is especially useful to this discovery, for it teaches first 
principles, which it finds (invenit)12 through treatment of the two-fold topic of self and God (ord. 
                                                                                                                                                             
emphasis added). Consequently, Augustine’s use of the term philosophia in De ordine includes 
the discipline of philosophy but moreover describes the breadth of this complete culture (the 
eight disciplines together as an order of study in addition to the exercise of moral virtue).  
 
12 Interestingly, Augustine’s discipline of philosophia includes invention (inventio), which 
Cicero listed as the first canon of rhetoric. While this has led some scholars to argue that, unlike 
Cicero, Augustine separates the substantive work of philosophy from more superficial elements 
of rhetoric (Walker 320–322; Kennedy, Classical 182), attention to Augustine’s diverse use of 
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II.18.47). Through use of both authority and reason, philosophy argues for the unity of order, a 
sense of the whole, from creation to the Creator. Study in the arts lends itself to thinking of this 
kind, but philosophy specializes in bringing this knowledge of the soul, of God and of all order 
together – philosophy teaches what unity is. Such discovery persuades (persuasit) reason to 
move from the particulars of the self to the unity of all creation, revealing a universal principle of 
order. Together “the order of wisdom’s branches of study” leads the student “to grasp the order 
of things and to discern two worlds and the very Author of the universe.” Through the discipline 
of philosophy, Augustine seeks to understand what he does, to discuss and ponder reality “from 
the lesser good to the greater, from the mortal to the immortal” (II.19.50). Thus, while 
philosophy pursues knowledge of the soul that “makes us fit for a happy life,” it finally leads us 
to knowledge of God, which “renders us happy.” This is the ultimate goal of Augustine’s 
philosophical life: to possess the eternal joy that is God.  
According to Augustine, an individual who seeks and finds the truths of philosophy has a 
responsibility to teach (docere) such wisdom to others (ord. II.5.16; II.2.7) – to teach how to find 
happiness. Augustine stresses the importance of teaching, for the wise man ought not “forsake 
his fellow men” (II.2.7). One cannot “shirk the duty of bestowing benefits on whom [one] 
can...especially…the duty of teaching them wisdom.” As did Cicero, Augustine acknowledges 
the importance of rhetorical preparation for this task, including the arrangement and 
memorization of ideas. Yet, more than this is Augustine insistence on teaching correctly through 
one’s discourse (II.12.35), on teaching true wisdom as opposed to that which is false (II.3.9). 
Augustine’s descriptions of dialectic and rhetoric together highlight how to accomplish this 
teaching, for while dialectic teaches (docere) how to teach, i.e., distinguishing knowledge from 
                                                                                                                                                             
the term philosophia suggests greater depth and nuance in the relationship between these 
disciplines. See also Sutherland 140–41.   
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error rhetoric teaches how to move (commoveri) minds. To be sure, Augustine’s discussion of 
“rhetoric” (rhetorica) in this section of the text highlights assumptions of his historical moment. 
For, as Russell translates, Augustine writes that this discipline is “more replete with lack than 
with enlightenment, its lap heaped high with charms which it would scatter to the crowd so that 
the crowd might deign to be influenced for its own good” (II.13.38).13 Yet, this limitation of a 
particular, i.e., sophistic “rhetoric” does not prevent Augustine from situating his own rhetorical 
practices differently, most predominantly by unifying his use of rhetorical charm to 
philosophical content, in imitation of Cicero.  
While the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric is relevant to discussion of 
Augustine’s assumptions about discovery and expression (Topping, Happiness 138–141; Cooper 
73–74; Blyth 75; Seigel 17), the argument here is that it is Augustine’s broader use of 
philosophia that truly unites the highest purpose of these arts and of all the disciplines. No 
discipline is sufficient in and of itself for the fullest discovery and expression of Augustine’s 
philosophical culture. Rather, through their unity, they permit one to perceive and to explain the 
relationships that unite all of creation to the Creator; together they are a means to know and to 
share the eternal wisdom of order. Augustine’s philosophia, including the arts and the discipline 
of philosophy, arranges and gives breadth to Augustine’s educational project, cultivating a way 
of learning and a way of life that views all things through a unifying lens.  
Augustine demonstrates a transition of life and mind while on retreat through which he 
evaluates his understanding of educational and cultural priorities. Yet, to do so, he does not 
simply reject the contemporary Roman way of life but rather with nuance and refinement orders 
                                                 
13 Van Deusen’s translation of this section reflects a more complimentary relationship between 
dialectic and rhetoric than Russell’s translation (726). Closer consideration of Augustine’s terms 
would be insightful to further understand the relationship(s) between the two arts.  
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all things to the final end that he finds most essential to the quest for purpose and meaning. 
“What else do friends strive for, but to be one?...Does [love] not wish to become one with what it 
is loving?” (ord. II18.48). All of creation, and in a particular way, humanity, seeks after unity. In 
and through the dialogue of De ordine, Augustine shares his understanding of this path to 
discovery with his companions and colleagues abroad, with hopes that they too will find and 
follow this philosophia. As the discussion between Augustine and his companions ends, they 
leave further contemplation and discussion of these things for another time, lest they “exceed 
moderation, the parent of order” (ord. II.19.50). Augustine closes his discussion by summarizing 
his reflections: “Prize nothing more highly than the finding of truth…wish for…think of…[and] 
love nothing else” (II.20.52). Augustine has set out a means by which his audience may find this 
truth; ever the teacher, he willingly assists all those who seek into this essential endeavor. 
 These four coordinates in De ordine – In Philosophia, Framing Philosophia, Cultivating 
Philosophia, and Discovering Philosophia – highlight rhetorical dimensions of Augustine’s 
philosophical project at Cassiciacum. While on retreat, Augustine composes a dialogue to share 
his life in philosophia with his companions and broader audience. The philosophical life that 
Augustine encourages includes traditional literary elements but brings new light to old habits, 
directing all things toward the discovery and expression of truth as informed by philosophical 
first principles. In the dialogue, Augustine engages in some disputation of philosophical topics 
but, more generally, he uses philosophical rhetoric to develop a philosophical culture, a 
philosophia, to teach and move his audience. By recording and composing this eloquent 
discussion in and through the dialogue, Augustine invites his broader audience to participate in 
the conversation of such matters with hopes of influencing the cultural practices of others, 
particularly teachers.  
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Together these uses of philosophia integrate philosophical and rhetorical elements into a 
culture that is both a way of learning and a way of life for all of those willing to discover it. 
Much of the sophistic rhetoric and education of the Late Roman Empire separated these two 
elements in favor of the latter, which also often reflected disproportionate attention to style over 
substance in thought and expression. Augustine uses the culturally authoritative example of 
Cicero, particularly his predecessor’s unity of philosophy and rhetoric, to move beyond the 
limited understanding of both disciplines held by his audience and colleagues. Cicero’s example 
provides Augustine with a means to reassess and reassert the significance of these disciplines 
united through philosophia – a culture that directs the intellectual and moral life toward the 
discovery and eloquent expression of wisdom. Augustine also moves beyond elements of Cicero, 
as is particularly apparent by his confidence in finding, not merely seeking, truth. Augustine is 
dissatisfied with only directing philosophia toward wisdom. Rather, he suggests that such a 
distinctly Christian culture, grounded on the truth of divine order, provides a means to grasp and 
to explain with certainty a fundamental reality that undergirds all of human existence, that is, the 
communication of God through creation.  
Rhetorical Implications of Augustine’s Philosophia 
At least by the time Augustine converts to Christianity, he finds sophistic rhetoric and 
education insufficient, i.e., empty (ananis), specifically its misguided aim of vanity. Augustine’s 
philosophia in De ordine brings new light to rhetorical theory and practice, situating this 
discipline within a broader educational culture and directing it toward the discovery and 
expression of eternal wisdom. Cicero’s integration of philosophy and rhetoric, which Augustine 
was exposed to as a young student but implemented on his own, provided a culturally 
authoritative means for Augustine to reassess his understanding of rhetoric and ultimately to 
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substantiate it in unity with philosophy. Augustine consequently practices and promotes a 
philosophical rhetoric in De ordine, one moderated within the arts and ordered toward the 
highest purpose that Augustine can find, happiness.  
Augustine was not the only practitioner of such philosophical rhetoric at this time. In fact, 
in De ordine, Augustine highlights another exemplar that embraced this same unifying principle 
of wisdom and eloquence, namely Theodore Manlius (ord. I.11.31). Ambrose certainly 
embodied it as well (conf. V.13.23–V.14.24). In Augustine’s quest for wisdom, his listening ears 
(his “auricular” reasoning) were tuned to those who practiced this Ciceronian principle, for they 
manifested a certain gravitas for which he longed (ord. II.11.32). The sweetness of their sounds, 
proportionately accompanied by their philosophical knowledge, delighted him in a way that 
moved him to consider the truths expressed therein (II.11.33–34). As evident in his criticism of 
the sophistic rhetoric school, Augustine’s specific concern for rhetoric is its disproportionate 
application, not its nature as an artistic discipline.  
Augustine discerns cultural elements within the context of his developing understanding 
of Christianity, the true Philosophy, and this is the framework to which he applies them. His 
otium provides him with an opportunity to engage topics of philosophical interest, such as the 
order of reality, but moreover he considers such topics in light of their cultural implications, such 
as the order of teaching. Augustine’s philosophia, which integrates philosophical and rhetorical 
elements into a culture, offers a means for individual hearers/readers to convert themselves to 
this way of thinking and living as well as suggests how broader social structures, specifically 
schools, can adopt this way of teaching and learning. Augustine embraces and employs Cicero’s 
unity of philosophy and rhetoric, both in and through the dialogue, to discuss and demonstrate 
how such a cultural transition can be accomplished. Augustine illustrates his own rhetorical 
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ingenuity by imitating Cicero’s authoritative example whilst applying it to his own persuasive 
purpose: a distinctly Christian culture.  
Augustine’s uses of philosophia theoretically embrace and practically employ the 
Ciceronian integration of philosophy and rhetoric. He does not explicitly discuss this principle in 
the dialogue, for he is not writing a rhetorical handbook. Rather, he is composing a philosophical 
dialogue for a particular audience and with a particular persuasive purpose: to cultivate 
philosophia among other teachers. Augustine criticizes certain predominant rhetorical practices 
of Late Antiquity as well as their common abuses while at Cassiciacum, but this does not mean 
that Augustine abandons “rhetoric” in toto when he retires (Sutherland 142). Instead of 
completing rejecting rhetorical culture, Augustine redirects –reorders – rhetoric (as well as, to 
some extent, his understanding of “philosophy”) in service to his philosophia. This is the kind of 
rhetoric that moves him to publish his dialogues.  
Rather than assume a competitive narrative between the disciplines of philosophy and 
rhetoric in Augustine’s early dialogues as some scholars do (Marrou 318–319; Topping, 
Happiness 28–29), Augustine’s philosophia in De ordine invites readers of the text to consider 
their interweaving relationship, particularly in discursive practice (Vickers, “Territorial 
Disputes” 259–260), at this historical moment. Certainly, a third discipline is also at play within 
Augustine’s philosophia, and that is “the very law of God…ever abiding fixed and 
unshaken…[and] transcribed…on the souls of the wise” (ord. II.8.25). Augustine situates 
Christianity as a “genuine philosophy” because its “venerated mysteries” teach a first principle, 
namely that all things have their beginning (principium) in one God omnipotent, and that He is 
tripotent, Father and Son and Holy Spirit” (II.5.16). Augustine makes subtle allusions to his 
personal conversion to Christianity in the dialogue, but his overall approach to inviting his 
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audience into closer consideration of their own conversions comes through the dialogue as a 
rhetoric of order, one that is responsive to their shared philosophical questions and concerns but 
that is foremost rooted in Christian doctrine. Consequently, Augustine seeks to cultivate moral 
and intellectual ground for his audience to engage the topic of ordo through the text but divine 







Christian Coordinates in the Rhetoric of De ordine 
In De ordine, Augustine’s approach to the topic of ordo is foremost responsive to the 
authority of Christian doctrine and pursued through philosophical reasoning. In the narrative, 
Augustine and his companions treat some categories related to this approach as they seek to 
discover and explain the order of things, but rather than systematically working them out 
Augustine eventually applies them to an order of life and study, a philosophical culture, that he 
seeks to propose to his broader audience. Augustine frames this culture for his audience to 
imitate, not only for their personal benefit, i.e., to lead to happiness but moreover to inform the 
current order of teaching of the arts. Consequently, he reappraises the arts in light of ordo, that 
is, he relates their practical and contemplative use to the discovery and expression of the whole 
of divine goodness, truth and beauty. In this way, Augustine’s text is also responsive to the 
cultural dilemma of his historical moment concerning the inadequacies of the Late Roman 
sophistic schools to meet the developing needs of Christian education. Augustine uses his 
ingenuity to offer an alternative that teaches philosophia. In doing so, he frames his solution to 
this particular dilemma in light of the whole reality of divine order.  
This chapter considers the rhetoric of the text through Augustine’s use of the term ordo, 
which, although multi-faceted, congruently points to the intelligible arrangement of creation. In 
Coordinate One: Discovering Divine Order, Augustine clarifies that the persuasive purpose of 
the dialogue is not primarily to treat the philosophical question of order, but rather to 
demonstrate and discuss a proper approach to the question. This approach is through 
philosophia, a philosophical culture that seeks to discover and express the significance of 
particular things in light of the sum of divine reality, i.e., their divine order. In Coordinate Two: 
Expressing Divine Order, Augustine seeks to cultivate this approach among his companions in 
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the narrative, encouraging their discovery and expression of “the order of things” through 
philosophical and rhetorical exercises that frame their way of thinking and speaking in light of 
divine order. In Coordinate Three: The Order of Life and Study, Augustine moves to present the 
breadth of his philosophical approach in a speech on the order of life and study, which is a two-
fold mode of procedure to reflect and reflect on divine order. In Coordinate Four: The Order of 
the Arts, Augustine accommodates study of the seven liberal arts to his philosophical approach 
by reappraising them in light of divine order, that is, by recognizing their truth and beauty as 
intelligible reflections of divine truth and beauty. Of particular interest to this study is his 
discussion of the art of rhetoric (rhetorica), which was fragmented from the other arts in the 
typical sophistic schools of the time. Although Augustine’s understanding of rhetoric continues 
to reflect some assumptions of his historical moment, such as its particular attention to moving 
the emotions, his reappraisal of the disciplines has a radical consequence for them all: the arts are 
infused with divine purpose. They lead us to discover and express what makes us truly happy.  
Augustine’s rhetoric of order in De ordine is responsive to the authority of Christian 
doctrine and pursued through philosophical reasoning. Christian doctrine teaches him that there 
is an intelligible relationship between all of creation and the Creator of all things. His rational 
mind provides him with a philosophical means to understand this relationship through study of 
the arts and the discipline of philosophy. Since Christian doctrine teaches him that “something” 
of goodness, truth and beauty is discoverable in all things (ord. II.1.3), he integrates diverse 
authorities, disciplines and practices into his approach of studying them. The most practical issue 
in De ordine then becomes how to reasonably teach, delight and persuade others to follow this 
philosophia as a way to discover and express the relationship – the order – between parts of 
reality, including evil, and the whole that is sustained by God. Augustine uses the dialogue to 
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demonstrate and discuss how his audience might imitate this “order of teaching” for the benefit 
of their own souls and for the benefit of society (I.9.27). Augustine’s exhortation to eloquently 
teach philosophia amidst a skeptical audience still speaks to educators today.  
Augustine’s Rhetoric of Divine Order  
Ordo is the stated topic of the dialogue (ord. I.1.1.). While Augustine’s audience was 
most likely familiar with some treatments of this topic (Pernot 148; Pacioni, “Order” 598), 
Augustine’s approach in the dialogue has a particular purpose: to inform the “order of teaching” 
within the developing Christian culture of the Late Roman Empire (ord. I.9.27). Augustine 
predominantly grounds his multi-faceted treatment and teaching of ordo on Christian doctrine, 
which he describes as authoritative teaching on the divine, consequently framing the question of 
order within divine providence, i.e., the relationship between God as Creator and all of creation, 
most especially humanity. While multiple authorities, disciplines and practices inform 
Augustine’s approach in De ordine, he appraises and applies such resources in light of divine 
order.  
Many principles of Christian doctrine are implicit to Augustine’s arguments in the 
dialogue rather than systematically worked out, such as God’s infinite goodness and 
consequently the goodness of creation (ord. II.7.23). Based on the particular goals of the 
dialogue (I.2.4), Augustine’s audience is most likely already receptive to such principles; 
therefore they are enthymematic to his project. The most explicitly addressed divine principle, 
however, is that of unity – that God is the one source of all goodness, truth and beauty. 
Following this premise, Augustine considers the goodness, truth and beauty of particular things 
in light of this single source, consequently discovering and expressing an intelligible relationship 
between creation and Creator (I.2.3). The focus of much of the dialogue then is understanding 
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and explaining the distinctions that fall within the unity of divine order. Augustine seeks to teach 
his audience about the relationship between particular things, including evil, and the whole of 
divine reality that is held together and governed by God, who is infinitely powerful.  
To discover and express the “order” – the unified yet distinct relationships – of divine 
reality, Augustine invites the audience to participate in philosophia, a philosophical culture that 
he seeks to enact through and propose in the dialogue. Augustine’s philosophia includes a two-
fold mode of procedure: it first morally and then intellectually orders the soul towards the divine 
(ord. II.8.25). Therefore, Augustine and his student-companions seek both moral conversion and 
intellectual conversation in the narrative as they reflect on divine order. However, a lack of 
erudition among Augustine’s companions eventually prevents them from more fully discovering 
and expressing the order of things. Like Augustine’s friend Zenobius for whom he composes the 
dialogue (I.2.4; I.7.20), they need greater cultivation. Yet, as Augustine acknowledges (I.10.30), 
the existing sophistic schools cannot adequately provide what is necessary for such a distinctly 
Christian education.  
As a response, Augustine recommends an order of life and study, grounded on the 
reasonable authority of Christian doctrine and pursued through philosophical reasoning, that 
“better” prepares students for “embracing truth” and consequently for possessing “the happy 
life” (ord. I.8.24). Augustine’s philosophia is the means by which his audience might come “full 
force” into the possession of wisdom that “confers happiness” (I.6.16; Gilson 7). This is the 
persuasive goal of the dialogue (sermo): to inform discussions of ordo among his audience in 
light of divine order and consequently to shape “the order of teaching” on the topic through a 
higher quality of instruction in “all branches of learning” (disciplinis omnibus erudiendos) (ord. 
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I.9.27; II.5.15). Thus as Augustine writes during his otium at Cassiciacum, he contributes to this 
discussion of cultural and social significance.  
Yet, while Augustine particularly attends to this cultural predicament in and through the 
dialogue, his treatment of the term ordo is multi-faceted (Pacioni, “Order” 598), including 
disputation of some categories inherent to his assumption of divine order. Augustine, however, 
integrates these different uses within the dialogue form, a dynamic literary means for him to 
engage multiple issues related to order. These different uses of ordo all inform the persuasive 
purpose of De ordine, which is to propose a philosophical culture for imitation to the audience. 
Consequently, there is an inherent relationship between his treatment of the term and its cultural 
application. The dialogue teaches a philosophical approach to ordo that moves his audience into 
a divine way of reading the world; it teaches a practical, Christian hermeneutic.   
In De ordine, Augustine demonstrates and discusses how to integrate diverse authorities, 
disciplines and practices into the order of teaching in light of divine order, including those that 
his audience may perceive as incongruent. He does this through his treatment of ordo in the text, 
perhaps most obviously in the example of the relationship between goodness and evil. He, 
however, addresses the integrity of many relationships through the text, such as that between the 
body and the soul. He speaks to the necessity of authority and reason in philosophical study. He 
insists on the significance of the arts in practice and contemplation. He uses pagan poetry, even 
its vices, to point out divine truth. He argues for true philosophy while he exposes the limitation 
of worldly philosophy, i.e., pride. He does the same for rhetoric, using it profoundly while 
denouncing its abuse, i.e., vanity. He takes in the pleasure of the senses as a means to move 
beyond the senses. He uses language, which he knows is inadequate in its capacity to speak to 
the whole of divine order, to teach others about the whole of divine order. This is all situated 
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within his understanding of divine order, for since all of creation, including all human creativity, 
has God as its source, all things reflect “something” of the divine (ord. II.1.3), even if this 
reflection is one of deprivation as in the case of evil (I.7.18; II.7.23). Augustine applies his 
ingenuity to find and express this something in everything that he says and does. The dialogue 
demonstrates and discusses these many “somethings” and their relationship to the sum and the 
source of all things.  
Augustine uses philosophical as well as rhetorical categories in the narrative as he 
engages his students in discussion of divine order. This is particularly significant for his 
historical moment since some of his contemporaries were rejecting one (particularly rhetoric or 
philosophy) or all of the disciplines associated with classical culture for the primacy of Christian 
texts (Murphy, “Debate” 207–213; Kimball 40). Among others, there was debate over which 
parts of classical culture were significant and which were not for Christian education (Topping, 
Happiness 41–65). While a number of Augustine’s works reflect the nuance of his response to 
this historical dilemma, the text of De ordine presents a particularly original contribution (1, 
128). In this text, Augustine maintains the significance and integrity of philosophy and rhetoric, 
along with six other liberal arts, in light of their necessary purpose to bolster the discovery and 
expression of divine reality within Christian culture. In and through the dialogue, Augustine’s 
philosophia seeks to understand and teach the relationship between particular things (e.g., the 
falling of leaves, the fighting of chickens, the absence of friends, even singing in the bathroom) 
and the sum of reality. Through philosophia, he seeks to teach about divine order. He uses seven 
liberal arts and the discipline of philosophy to do so. 14  
                                                 
14 Following Kimball’s assessment, the seven liberal arts discussed by Augustine in De ordine 
are grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and harmony (42). While many 
scholars agree on the first three, there is much debate over the last four. For various lists of the 
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In this way, De ordine is a philosophical dialogue that reappraises the arts in light of 
divine order (Cipriani 725). No art, no beauty exists apart from the hand of God, the true artisan, 
and human artistry is always, in some proportion, a response to the divine (ord. II.11.34). 
Furthermore, the truth of the arts is discernable in proportion to the fullness of divine truth. Each 
discipline provides a distinct doorway into truth, but moreover through their unity they signify 
the integrity of all truth. This is the contemplative element of the arts (II.16.44), that such study 
of them leads one through the soul to “Truth itself” (I.4.10). As Augustine makes clear, this is 
not the typical way of studying the arts in the current sophistic schools (I.10.30), but rather than 
rejecting them in toto as did some of his contemporaries, Augustine reappraises – reorders – 
them.  
To do so, he uses philosophy (germana philosophia), which is to say that he discerns the 
purpose of the arts in light of a philosophical first principle, a first cause. As Christian doctrine 
teaches, “This First Principle is one God omnipotent, and…He is tripotent, Father and Son and 
Holy Spirit” (ord. II.5.16). From this premise, Augustine finds the arts significant, for they both 
practically and contemplatively reflect and reflect on a certain ratio from which they derive their 
power (II.11.34). In other words, the reasonability of the arts reflects “another Reason” that 
“from on high rules over all things (I.8.25). Philosophical consideration of this ratio in each art 
leads the soul to consider the “intellect, in which all things are” and to “what, beyond all things, 
                                                                                                                                                             
arts, see Pacioni, “Liberal Arts” 492–494; Hagendahl 593; Riley 132; Topping, Happiness 132; 
Shanzer 98–103. Within this debate is the question of whether or not the discipline of 
philosophy, which Augustine also discusses in De ordine, is to be included within the arts or in 
addition to the arts. This study follows Kimball in suggesting that Augustine combines the 
pansophic approach to the liberal arts (use of the seven listed above) with the propaedeutic 
approach (use of the seven arts plus philosophy) (40–41, emphasis added). Consequently, 
Augustine’s use of the term philosophia in De ordine includes the discipline of philosophy but 
moreover describes the breadth of this complete culture (the eight disciplines together as an order 
of study in addition to the exercise of moral virtue).  
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is the source of all things” (II.9.26). The discipline of philosophy has its own “mode of learning” 
(eruditio) to find this source (II.18.48), but unified study of the arts also lends itself to such 
discovery. Through either method, ratio is the entrance into the soul through which one discerns 
how each particular good, truth and beauty is unified to a single source and consequently how it 
reflects, through its divine order, some portion of the sum. Such knowledge is wisdom, the 
possession of which is the happy life.  
Augustine thus utilizes the seven liberal arts and the discipline of philosophy within his 
philosophia to lead students to happiness. In and through the dialogue, Augustine invites his 
audience to participate in this philosophia, an invitation of personal significance for those who 
seek wisdom and one of social significance for those who are in a position to teach such wisdom 
to others (ord. II.2.7). In addition to his care for Zenobius then, Augustine anticipates that his 
readers will include others within his intellectual circle, those who able to shape “the order of 
teaching” (I.9.27). Augustine particularly hopes that his reappraisal of the arts will inform the 
way his fellow teachers teach.   
In considering the cultural consequences of Augustine’s philosophia for his historical 
moment, the teaching of rhetoric (rhetorica) seems implicated in particular. This art had rose to 
the top of Late Roman life for both practical and political reasons (Pernot 145–146). Yet, the 
typical sophistic schools had also fragmented rhetoric from the other arts and furthermore 
reduced it to imitation of rhetorical formulas. Augustine’s most obvious criticism of the sophistic 
school (schola illa) in De ordine specifically attends to the moral consequence of isolating this 
art: students are deprived of learning rhetoric in light of its full utility and beauty – its greatest 
practical and philosophical significance – because it is reduced to an empty love of praise (ord. 
I.10.30). With hopes of appearing eloquent and receiving applause, students imitate the style of 
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classical speakers without attending to what they say (I.11.31; conf. III.4.7). They separate the 
eloquence from wisdom.  
Without unified study of all the arts, philosophically ordered toward wisdom, students are 
left learning an inane rhetoric that, when practiced, mistakenly praises its own power in place of 
praising its true source (ord. I.10.30). Instead of pointing up toward the divine, it puffs up the 
self. Augustine acknowledges that this fundamental “defect” of rhetorical education easily lends 
itself to others, for even if a teacher such as Augustine criticizes this kind of rhetoric, students 
might simply abandon their learning and choose to remain uneducated since their initial 
motivation for such study – the “desire for vainglory” (famae) – has been squelched. Without 
vanity, students may become inert. Augustine’s argument is clear. Critique is not enough. Such 
rhetorical education needs reordering; it needs a new purpose. In response, Augustine reorders 
rhetoric within a philosophical culture, and he persuasively presents this approach by teaching, 
delighting and moving his audience through an eloquent rhetoric of order. If, as Leff argues, the 
time was ripe for a philosophical reconsideration of rhetoric (236), then De ordine presents 
scholars with an opportunity to examine Augustine’s contribution to this dilemma through his 
rhetoric of order as well as the example of his ordered rhetoric.  
Ordo in De ordine  
This chapter considers the rhetoric of the text through Augustine’s use of the term ordo, 
which, although multi-faceted, congruently points to the intelligible arrangement of creation. In 
Coordinate One: Discovering Divine Order, Augustine clarifies that the persuasive purpose of 
the dialogue is not primarily to treat the philosophical question of order, but rather to 
demonstrate and discuss a proper approach to the question. This approach is through 
philosophia, a philosophical culture that seeks to discover and express the significance of 
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particular things in light of the sum of divine reality, i.e., their divine order. In Coordinate Two: 
Expressing Divine Order, Augustine seeks to cultivate this approach among his companions in 
the narrative, encouraging their discovery and expression of “the order of things” through 
philosophical and rhetorical exercises that frame their way of thinking and speaking in light of 
divine order. In Coordinate Three: The Order of Life and Study, Augustine moves to present the 
breadth of his philosophical approach in a speech on the order of life and study, which is a two-
fold mode of procedure to reflect and reflect on divine order. In Coordinate Four: The Order of 
the Arts, Augustine accommodates study of the seven liberal arts to his philosophical approach 
by reappraising them in light of divine order, that is, by recognizing their truth and beauty as 
intelligible reflections of divine truth and beauty. Of particular interest to this study is his 
discussion of the art of rhetoric (rhetorica), which was fragmented from the other arts in the 
typical sophistic schools of the time. Although Augustine’s understanding of rhetoric continues 
to reflect some assumptions of his historical moment, his reappraisal of the disciplines has a 
radical consequence for them all: the arts are infused with divine purpose and lead us to discover 
and express what makes us truly happy.  
Coordinate One: Discovering Divine Order  
De ordine begins with an introduction wherein Augustine prepares the audience, 
particularly his friend Zenobius, for the narrative that follows and clarifies the particular purpose 
of the discourse. Within this introduction, Augustine frames the traditional topic of order in light 
of divine providence, which includes grounding his understanding of ordo within the authority of 
Christian doctrine, i.e., principles of the divine. Augustine enthymematically takes these 
principles for granted through most of the dialogue, as his audience is already receptive to them. 
Consequently, the main question posed in the dialogue is not whether or not God orders all of 
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creation (ord. I.1.2; I.4.11), but rather, how to perceive and explain or to understand and then 
teach the relationship between particular (proprium) things, including evil, and the whole of the 
universe designed by God (I.1.1.). Thus, Christian doctrine informs their discovery of order as it 
also finds means to deepen their understanding of it. As the introduction ends, Augustine 
identifies the purpose of the dialogue, which is to cultivate philosophia as the means to discover 
and express this relationship – this order – between the particular parts of creation and the sum of 
divine reality.   
 Augustine approaches the topic of order (ordinem rerum) in light of a question shared by 
his audience (dignum auditorem): How is it “that God has a care for human affairs (humana), 
and nevertheless perversity (perversitas) is so serious and widespread that it must seem 
unattributable not only to God’s governance but even to a hireling’s management?” (ord. I.1.1). 
Augustine begins his response by addressing common arguments: “Either…divine Providence 
(divinam providentiam) does not reach to these outer limits of things or…surely all evils (mala) 
are committed by the will of God.” Augustine immediately assumes the inaccuracy and impiety 
of the latter, but he acknowledges that some individuals may need to consider more closely the 
former. Along this line of thought, one may reasonably ask if the things of this world are beyond 
God’s power or if they are neglected and unnoticed by it. Augustine dismisses the possibility of 
either, arguing, “But who is there so dull (caecus) of mind that he will hesitate to attribute to 
divine power and government whatever there is of order (rationis) in corporeal operations, apart 
from human arrangement and will (humanam dispositionem ac voluntatem)?” (I.1.2). Only 
vanity would deny that every single thing that “we find marvelous…throughout the universe” is 
“arranged in a manner surpassing the utmost efficiency of human power (arte),” and belongs “to 
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the hidden control of divine majesty.” Humanity has a capacity for arrangement (dispositio), 15 
but only divine power establishes “the integral fittingness of things.” A dilemma, however, 
continues to present itself – how can the parts of a flea be marvelously arranged while at every 
turn human life is “made restless” (fluctuet) by innumerable disturbances?  
The question of divine providence thus turns to the complexities of human affairs, 
specifically the appearance of evil. Augustine frames his response to this dilemma in light of the 
persuasive purpose of the text. He writes,  
On this line of reasoning, if one were examining the details in an inlaid pavement, and if 
his searching eye could grasp no more than the outline of one little cube, he might 
censure the artificer for lacking skill of arrangement and order. On this account, he might 
think the uniformity of the little stones disarranged, just because the drawn lines 
harmonizing (congruentia) into one integral form of beauty could not be seen and 
examined all at once. Ord. I.1.2 
Without denying human perversity, Augustine points to the significance of perceiving the unity 
of things, of seeing the particulars – including evil – in light of the whole of reality. He then 
relates this problem of perception to the issue of culture, for “something very similar to this,” he 
says, “is found in the case of uninstructed (minus eruditis) men.” Without erudition, humanity is 
left to a “feeble mentality” (imbecilla mente) that fails “to grasp and to study the integral 
fittingness of things.” If an individual is preoccupied with any one part of reality or distracted by 
                                                 
15 As exemplified here, Augustine situates the rhetorical term dispositio in a distinctly Christian 
way in De ordine; it is informed by his understanding of divine ordo and thus substantially 
altered from its Ciceronian antecedent. However, this does not seem to stop Augustine from 
applying traditional precepts of dispositio to his own dialogue. A cursory reading of the text 
suggests that he begins with exordium (ord. I.1.1.), moves to narratio (I.3.6), includes a 
propositio just before the partitio (II.7.24), declares his confirmatio (II.9.26), considers refutatio 
(II.18.47), and closes with peroratio (II.20.52). 
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the multitude of reality, s/he loses perspective of the center that holds all things together, where 
“all sectors converge” and “by which the other parts are mutually measured” (I.2.3). This 
distorted perception (cogitationi) tends to magnify particular things in disproportion to the sum 
of reality, and it prevents one from finding (invenire) unity.  
Consequently, Augustine responds to the question of divine providence – of the 
relationship between particular things, including evil, and the whole of divine reality – with a 
proposal for examining (cognitus) the soul (ord. I.1.3). Since the audience already assumes 
God’s creative power is present in the order of creation, Augustine argues that the greatest means 
by which humanity discovers and expresses this reality – this relationship – is in and through the 
soul. For Augustine, the soul that studies itself moves from the senses, i.e., material reality to an 
inner knowledge of the unity of things, i.e., immaterial reality, for the nature of the soul “forces it 
to seek that which is one” (I.2.3). As Augustine’s student Licentius embarks on this distinct way 
of soul-searching in the dialogue, he can say, “Today perhaps I shall find (inveniar) myself” 
(I.3.9), not only as a means to self-knowledge but as a means to discover something of the divine 
through his soul (I.5.14). While Augustine acknowledges that one partially achieves this form of 
learning in solitude, e.g., soliloquizing, the dialogue primarily focuses on the correction 
(medicant) of lower erudition through study of the liberal arts, which, as Augustine suggests, 
reflect and reflect on the relationship between parts and whole.  
 Near the close of the introduction, Augustine again addresses Zenobius, the particular 
person for whom he records the dialogue. Augustine explains that he and Zenobius already agree 
on many things but that their previous discussions on divine providence had left Zenobius 
unsatisfied (ord. I.2.4; I.7.20). Augustine, however, is confident that his friend will succeed in 
his search, for he is a virtuous and ingenious man who simply lacks the cultivation necessary for 
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the proper perception of things. Zenobius’s soul must be “cleared and cultivated” for “a divine 
planting” (I.2.4). Augustine proposes a means by which this cultivation can take place, one that 
will dispose his soul to more fully discover and express divine order.  
According to Augustine, the four-fold purpose of the dialogue is to show Zenobius: 
“What is the nature of all this clearing and planting,” “What mode of procedure it demands,” 
“What it is that reason promises to those who study and are good,” and “What manner of life 
[Augustine and his companions] are now leading” (ord. I.2.4). Through the example of 
Augustine and his companions in the narrative, Zenobius can discover the “fruits” of such a 
divine planting. Moreover, Augustine assures him that his discovery of these things will be even 
greater if he participates in the process, making himself a part of the very order of which 
Augustine writes.  
 This multi-faceted purpose of the dialogue thus responds to the dilemma that Augustine 
presents at the beginning of the text, for he proposes a means by which his audience can discover 
the order of things, from the particulars of daily life to the whole of the universe, through 
philosophia. Augustine’s philosophia is foremost informed by Christian doctrine, which teaches 
the “nature” of unity and distinction in divine order, i.e., that creation participates in divine 
reality but is also distinct from God (ord. I.2.4). Augustine’s philosophia includes a two-fold 
“mode of procedure” – an order of moral life and intellectual study – through which he and his 
companions seek to discover and express, in word and action, the order of things. Augustine and 
his companions live in community, supporting and encouraging one another and sharing a 
common vision for the “right order” of things, through their mutual understanding and practices 
of philosophia (II.19.51). In doing so, they seek to demonstrate the goods, the “fruits,” that come 
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to each and all of them through this “manner of life” (I.2.4). They participate in this process 
through the narrative, and Augustine invites his broader audience to follow their lead.   
Augustine proposes a philosophical culture in De ordine that, through authority and 
reason, leads to the happy life for “those who study and are good” (ord. I.2.4). The dialogue 
demonstrates how to relate the particulars of daily life to the fullness of divine reality and to 
understand the proofs for their significance. Augustine leaves his teaching position in the 
sophistic rhetoric school to find refuge in this philosophia at Cassiciacum (I.2.5). Some of his 
students and family members come along. By recording the details of their philosophical life via 
otium in the dialogue, Augustine hopes that his broader audience will imitate their example, not 
only in their singular lives but also in the order of their teaching (I.9.27). These two groups – 
Augustine’s present companions and his audience abroad – are distinct, but the purpose of the 
dialogue unites them. They represent Augustine’s hope to have found (inveniat) an audience 
fitted for this kind of philosophia (I.1.1.). In and through the dialogue, Augustine presents his 
philosophical culture, grounded on principles of the divine, as a means for each and all of them 
to discover and express order in the universe. The goal of this philosophia is to lead them, 
through the ordering of their souls, to God, with Whom one finds lasting happiness.  
The dialogue seeks to teach, delight and persuade the audience into philosophia by 
inviting them to participate in this process of discovery, this “love of finding the truth (amore 
inveniendi veri)” (ord. I.3.6). Augustine’s philosophia includes philosophical and rhetorical 
exercises that encourage his audience to consider the divine significance of diverse authorities, 
arguments and practices. The highest of these authorities is divine and revealed through sacred 
“mysteries” and traditional teaching but many other “human” authorities inform Augustine’s 
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approach (II.9.27).16 Moreover, Augustine does not abstract his philosophia from experience. 
Once the narrative begins, he initiates the process of discovery when an unusual sound during the 
night prompts him to inquire into its cause. Through the dialogue, Augustine and his companions 
seek to discover and explain the order of such things, from the particulars surrounding them at 
villa to the whole of divine reality.  
The group records the conversations for the benefit of the audience, and the writing 
process shapes their responses to one another (ord. I.2.5). They try to avoid “intemperate 
wrangling” and seek to practice a “carefulness of expression.” Yet, the narrative frequently 
demonstrates that some of Augustine’s companions are better at expressing their understanding 
than are others. Augustine leads the way in this “school” (schola) among his companions with 
his own refined rhetoric (I.3.7). Still acting primarily as a teacher, Augustine demonstrates in De 
ordine how to enact philosophia – with its integrated philosophical and rhetorical elements – to 
discover and express divine order.  
Coordinate Two: Expressing Divine Order  
In the dialogue, Augustine dynamically expresses the philosophical means by which he 
and his companions order their souls toward the center (centrum) of reality, which is the measure 
of all things (ord. I.2.3). Particularly through conversation, which Augustine volunteers to lead 
(I.3.6), they seek to understand and explain the relationships between particular things and the 
sum. Augustine initiates their discourse, not with abstract arguments, but with the ordinary 
events surrounding them at the villa, through which they interpret intelligible signs of order. 
Moving from study of the material world into the immaterial, they apply philosophical and 
                                                 
16 In addition to sophistic, Ciceronian and Christian authorities, the Neo-Platonists are also a 
particularly significant contributor for Augustine’s thought at this time. Additional study of their 
rhetoric would further inform study of Augustine’s.  
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rhetorical categories to deepen their understanding and refine their expressions of divine reality. 
Furthermore, Augustine’s philosophical approach considers the moral disposition of his students 
in light of its consequences for their actions and speech. His students must arrange their wills, 
minds and mouths according to divine order, for the fullest expression of philosophia comes 
through the whole person and fosters a complete culture.  
Augustine and his companions share numerous expressions on ordo in the narrative, but 
the conversation extemporaneously begins when Augustine hears an unusual sound near the villa 
(ord. I.3.6). He asks himself what may be cause of it, but having no explanation, he asks his 
students if they hear it. Augustine’s companion Licentius offers a probable answer to the 
particular cause (causae) of the irregularity (inconstanter) (I.3.7), but he is overall unimpressed 
by his teacher’s consideration of the unusual sound in the first place. Augustine responds that it 
is the unusual nature of a particular thing that frequently prompts one to wonder about the order 
of causes (I.3.8). Licentius replies with the main expression of order addressed throughout the 
text: “It seems to me that nothing is done apart from order.” Augustine, acknowledging that this 
statement is of philosophical significance, sees an opportunity to pursue a more in-depth 
disputation on the topic.  
The disputation then begins when Augustine offers to debate his student’s statement on 
order with hopes that Licentius will defend it (ord. I.3.8). Although at first reluctant, Licentius 
eventually agrees. He states, “Even though some one were to worst me in this debate, I should 
attribute even that fact to the order of things, and not to reasonless change” (I.3.10). Licentius 
makes this statement of faith in the divine order of things even before the arguments begin. 
Another present companion, Trygetius, also willing joins the conversation, for he is somewhat 
skeptical about the order of things (I.4.10). In fact, this element of “indecision” (incertus) affects 
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them all, but Licentius again reveals his confidence stating, “Do not mention [skepticism] 
now…lest this cunning, captious (captatorium) something distract me…from a matter, I know 
not what – a divine thing, which begins to reveal (ostentare) itself to me.” Augustine quickly 
responds to Licentius with a recognizable expression from the Aeneid, one that they would have 
learned in the sophistic schools, but then he redirects its meaning. He says, “Indeed Apollo is not 
lofty…There is, however, another, or rather the other, lofty and truth speaking (veridicus), and – 
Ah! Why quibble with words? – Truth itself” (italics in original translation). Augustine’s use of 
Vergil’s text here as a signpost of Christian truth demonstrates early in the dialogue how the 
philosophia proposed through the text will embrace elements of classical thought in some 
relationship to Christian doctrine.    
As Licentius accepts this learning opportunity, he says, “Please question me then…to see 
whether I can explain (explicare) this something or other by your words and mine” (ord. I.4.11). 
Licentius acknowledges that while he will seek to express his understanding in his own words, 
he will also need Augustine’s – his teacher’s – assistance. He hopes that Augustine will offer the 
example for imitation. Returning to the matter of the irregular sound that initiated their 
discussion (which they concluded was the accumulation of leaves in the nearby stream that first 
stalled the flow of water and then eventually dislodged, releasing the flow), Augustine begins 
with a formative question. While one can reasonably assert that the flow of water is “in 
accordance with order,” for “men using reason” built the wooden channels to carry it into the 
villa, is it likewise within the order of things that the leaves fell and blocked the flow? 
Augustine’s question metaphorically hints at the dilemma of the dialogue – the relationship 
between divine order and the fall of things.  
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In response, Licentius argues the principle that “nothing can be done without a cause,” 
and therefore the falling of these particular leaves is a participation in the final causality of all 
things (ord. I.4.11). In other words, they fall within divine order. He offers many reasonable 
ways to consider the causality of the matter: the location of the trees and branches, the weight 
and shape of the leaves as nature has determined it, the movement and conditions of the air, but 
then he protests, “Why should I investigate? Those things are hidden, completely hidden, from 
our senses. Yet this one point at least…that nothing is done without a cause – this point is 
somehow or other not hidden to the mind; and that is enough for the problem proposed.” 
Augustine and his companions ground their philosophia on principles and then pursue the 
meaning of these principles through reason. In this way, Licentius willingly acknowledges the 
material investigations that could inform their inquiry on the irregular sound, but he furthermore 
suggests that the other types of causality are more fundamental to the question. He states, “Either 
let me be shown (docear) that something is done without a cause, or admit (credite) that nothing 
is done but by a fixed order of causes” (I.4.11). He trusts the credibility of the principle that 
“nothing is done without a cause” as it reveals itself to his soul over and above the inquiry he 
could make through his limited senses, but he is also willing for Augustine to disprove him 
through reasonable teaching.  
Augustine continues to prod his student through the exercise like a skeptical teacher, for 
even these “certain ties of questioning” have value (ord. I.5.13). Augustine prefers the interplay 
of disputation to guide the discussion, an approach that may be more likely to draw his broader 
audience into the discourse. Soon after, however, Licentius makes the following plea in 
frustration of the difficulty of their discussion, 
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Who, O Great God, can deny that Thou rulest all things in order? How conjoined are all 
things! How in fixed successions are they moved to their proper correlations! How great 
and how numerous are the facts that warrant our saying this! How great the things that 
are made, that we may find Thee! For, the fact that we were awakened, that you noticed 
this sound, that you asked yourself about its cause, that you did not find the cause of such 
a trifling thing – whence all this, unless it flows from the order of things and is derived 
from it? Ord. I.5.14 
So convinced is Licentius of the principle of order in the arrangement of causality, he joyfully 
exclaims, “Let no one question me as to why anything is done. It is enough that nothing is done, 
nothing originated, which some cause has not originated and moved” (italics in original 
translation). Why and how could such things happen apart from the order of things? The group 
agrees that even Augustine’s expressions (sermo) indicate the order of things, for as Licentius 
acknowledges, the written record speaks to a broader audience for an ordered purpose. 
Augustine then shifts the conversation to the moral dimension of ordo first alluded to in 
the introduction, that is, “whether order…[is] something good (bonum) or something bad 
(malum)” (ord. I.6.15). In response, Licentius argues that there is “a kind of middle course 
(medietatem),” for nothing can “be opposed to that which has seized and held the whole.” Not 
even error (error), which still has a cause, is opposed to order. Their companion Trygetius is not, 
however, convinced that evil (mala) things are comprised of order, for this seems to be 
inconsistent with the love of God, He Who loves order, and therefore, according to Trygetius’s 
interpretation of Licentius’s statement, must also love evil (I.7.17). Licentius attempts to respond 
to the doubts of his friend but finds it difficult to “frame” his answer (I.7.18). He eventually 
proposes that there is a “divine arrangement” (divinae dispositionis) wherein God maintains the 
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beauty and harmony of the universe by the distinction between good and evil. He grounds his 
position on the traditional teaching (traditur) of divine justice (I.7.19), by which God 
“discriminates between good and evil, and gives to each its due” (II.7.22). The principle of 
God’s justice therefore becomes a measure of their understanding of the order of things, 
particularly error and evil. In doing so, their argument maintains the unity of divine order and its 
inherent goodness (II.7.23), whilst acknowledging distinction between higher and lower goods.17  
Already exhausted by the unfolding discursive exercise, Licentius reveals his lack of 
“erudition and training” as he sits to rest and begs for Augustine’s help (ord. I.7.19–I.7.20). 
Indeed, Augustine’s intentional engagement with Licentius directly demonstrates the purpose of 
the dialogue, which is to treat the issue of education by which philosophical questions, e.g., order 
may be addressed in light of Christian doctrine. This is the persuasive goal of the dialogue. For 
this reason, Augustine says to his students: 
If you have a care for order…you must return to those [poetic] verses; for instruction in 
the liberal arts, if only it is moderate and concise, produces devotees more alert and 
steadfast and better equipped for embracing truth, so that…they more ardently seek and 
more consistently pursue and in the end more lovingly cling to that which is called the 
happy life. Ord. I.8.24.  
Augustine’s hints at the speech that he will give in Book II on the significance of the arts for his 
philosophia as he briefly acknowledges and discusses here the role that literature, such as Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses which preoccupied Licentius earlier in the dialogue, can play in cultivating an 
                                                 
17 Augustine and his companions eventually elaborate on their understanding of this distinction, 
wherein they describe evil (malus) as a “non-entity” (nihil) or, in other words, a negative 
(deprived) good rather than a positive thing (ord. II.7.23). Consequently, they acknowledge the 
congruence and unity of divine justice and goodness, of divine order, while maintaining that 
deprived goods, i.e., sins (peccata) “are still to be abhorred” (I.2.4).  
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understanding of divine order. As Augustine exemplified with his previous reference to Virgil, 
such works can be useful signposts for divine reality. Augustine describes this interpretive 
relationship between part (a piece of literature) and whole (the sum of divine reality) as a 
hermeneutic entrance through one sense of things and into another. Licentius can use Ovid’s 
poem to deepen his understanding of divine reality by moving from a lower reading of the text to 
a higher one, for the love between the two characters expresses something of a more “pure and 
genuine love,” one that if moved “through philosophy” truly leads to the happy life. The higher 
reading of the text reflects a greater proportion of the goodness, truth and beauty of divine reality 
while the lower reading reflects a lesser, more deprived condition of things. The interpretive key 
for Licentius is to properly use the poem in light of divine order, which views the good of a 
particular thing – in this case the desire for love – in light of Goodness itself. As Augustine later 
elaborates, study of the arts ought to follow this pattern as well.  
 In addition to this particular discussion of how philosophia leads one to read literature for 
signs of divine order, Augustine also demonstrates other such interpretive examples with his 
students in the narrative. Soon after Augustine makes this reference to Ovid, he and his students 
come across a cockfight near the villa. They choose to watch, for as Augustine describes, “What 
do the eyes of lovers [of truth and beauty] not encompass; where do they not search through to 
see beauteous reason signaling something thence?” (ord. I.8.25). Augustine and his companions 
can discover divine order in everything, because everything expresses something of divine 
reality – all of creation gives signs of the Creator. “Whence indeed and where can [reason] not 
give a signal...precisely because another Reason from on high rules over all things.” They can 
inquire into the natural details of this event – “Why do cocks behave this way? Why do they 
fight for the sake of supremacy of the hens subject to them?” – in a way that will lead them into 
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their own souls – “Why did the very beauty of the fight draw us aside from this higher 
study…What is there in us that searches out many things beyond the reach of the senses?” 
(I.8.26). This interpretive element of Augustine’s philosophia demonstrates how use of the arts 
(as well as the consequent art itself) leads students to discover and express something of divine 
order in all that they say and do. They can inquire about parts of creation through each distinct 
art to discover something of the truth, but moreover, the general order of the arts leads them into 
a certain breadth of this truth, which, when considered through the intellect of the soul, i.e., 
beyond the senses, is found to reflect the unity of Truth itself. 
This way of reading things applies not only to diverse events and disciplines but also to 
diverse authorities and practices. Augustine willingly uses sophistic elements from his early 
education and teaching career, such as the exercise of defining, within his philosophia; but such 
elements are reoriented. As Augustine introduces his own definition of ordo to his students, he 
says, “Why do I now, in language full and fair (copiose atque ornate), command order to you, as 
if I were still engaged in that school from which I am glad that I have in some measure (modo) 
escaped?” (ord. I.9.27). Augustine seems to anticipate that his students (and audience) may be 
surprised to hear such a typical exercise of the sophistic school (an epideictic speech) from him, 
a school from which he is clearly trying to remove himself. Yet, this move is only in some 
measure, or in other words, in moderate proportion. Like the cockfight and the poem above, 
Augustine uses this sophistic exercise to signify something more.  
Even the typical sophistic abuses of rhetoric do not prevent such a practice from 
usefulness for a more ordered, a more proportionate, purpose. In light of this, Augustine provides 
his own definition of order to his students through an epideictic speech. Augustine states, 
“Nothing…can be said more concisely in praise of it or more truly concerning it than this: Order 
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is that which will lead us to God, if we hold to it during life; and unless we do hold to it during 
life, we shall not come to God (ord. I.9.27). Augustine’s eloquent expression in praise of order 
reflects the purpose of his text. At the villa, he and his companions are seeking to discover divine 
order, an order represented through study of creation that reflects something of the Creator. By 
studying the order of things in a philosophical way, they are led through their souls to consider 
the origin and cause of these things, a process by which one moves from the reasonability of 
particular things to “the sum total of all things” (II.9.26). This kind of inquiry ultimately leads 
them “beyond all things” to God, “the source of all things.” Beginning with the principle of 
divine order, Augustine and his companions pursue understanding of that order through the order 
of things (e.g., the order of the arts) and into the intelligible order of their souls. Yet, they cannot 
fully discover and express the truth and beauty of this intelligible reality unless they first imitate 
the accompanying goodness of it in their moral lives. Augustine’s philosophia necessarily 
expresses the wisdom that it finds in word and in action. The moral disposition of their souls is 
integral to their discovery and expression of order, as the following interaction proves.  
After offering his own definition of order, Augustine appeals to Licentius to “frame” his 
own understanding of the topic, in his own words (ord. I.10.28.) Although Licentius is at first 
flustered by the task, he states, “Order is that by which are governed (aguntur) all things that 
God has constituted.” Augustine follows with a specific question, “Does God…seem…to be 
governed by order?” (I.10.29). Through Licentius’s response, the conversation moves from order 
into discussion of the relationships within the Trinity, which Licentius inadequately expresses. 
This deficient expression then leads to a lengthy but significant digression wherein Augustine 
scolds both Licentius and Trygetius for seeking their own glory in the record rather than truth.  
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Augustine’s students still practice certain vices prevalent to the dominant rhetorical 
culture of the time, specifically vanity and pride. They have forgotten to “be good” (ord. 
I.10.29). While even these lower habits fall within divine order (I.11.33; II.4.11), Augustine is 
quick to reprimand his students and redirect them toward higher habits of virtue. Augustine 
knows from his own personal experience with these vices that in order to discover “the 
advantage and beauty of learning” they must move above their love of “paltriest praise” 
(I.10.29–I.10.30). This is a pivotal moment for them to reorient their dispositions, the 
arrangement of their souls, to reflect the height – or better, a greater proportion –of their pursuit 
and overcome these defects (vitia) in expression and action. Indeed, “the lowliest of the pests, to 
be sure” is a kind of ostentatious ambition exemplified in speech, empty (inanis) expressions 
arranged solely for vainglory (fama). This is deprived rhetoric. Augustine’s students must instead 
seek what is above these “perverse habits of life,” which are tied to “obscurities of ignorance” 
(I.10.29). Augustine seeks to cultivate the souls of his students so that their habits of word and 
deed express the fullest proportion and height of divine order. 
As the dialogue continues to unfold, Augustine’s friend Alypius returns from the city to 
enter the disputation. The companions engage in several philosophical arguments concerning 
order, such as the significance of time (ord. II.2.4), the definition of wisdom (II.3.10), and the 
relationship of God’s justice to evil (II.7.23). Each of these arguments informs the broader 
discussion, as they are categories that inform their understanding of the unity and distinction of 
divine order, but they do not systematically work them out. Augustine invites consideration of a 
particular question, listens to the perspectives of his company, and then adds his own refined 
statements to the conversation. As facilitator of the discussion, Augustine raises philosophical 
categories that are imperative to the topic, but the overall narrative of the dialogue is not 
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reducible to a dialectic exercise. The dialogue is dynamic in its expressions of order through both 
the discussions and demonstrations of the participants (Douglass 41; Foley, “Cicero” 74). 
Augustine’s persuasive purpose in the text – to cultivate a particular philosophia among his 
audience – holds these dynamics of the dialogue together as a whole.  
Augustine uses the dialogue to propose his philosophia, a philosophical culture grounded 
on Christian doctrine that discovers and expresses order through a two-fold procedure of life and 
study. Augustine guides and encourages his companions as they initiate this process of discovery 
while at the villa, but over the course of their discussions, their abilities frequently fall short, 
particularly in moral exercise and clear expression. Even still, throughout the dialogue, the 
audience has a sense that order is present among these companions despite their depravities (ord. 
I.8.21; I.8.23). Divine order participates in their efforts even as they pursue order itself.  
Interacting with his present company as a teacher, Augustine demonstrates his own 
cultivation through the dialogue by his well-formulated questions and expressions. Like many in 
the rhetorical tradition before him, he seeks to teach eloquence suited to philosophical discussion 
through his example. He is not, however, preoccupied with the eloquence of his students. His 
attention is predominantly on their ability to reasonably understand and correctly articulate the 
relationships between the philosophical categories that he is introducing. This is philosophical 
rhetoric suited for teaching. The goal of the disputation in De ordine, like the goal of the overall 
dialogue (sermo), is to raise “the eyes of the mind” and broaden one’s “field of vision” to 
“survey all things as a whole” (II.4.11). Only through this way of reading things will one find 
“nothing unarranged, unclassed, or unassigned to its own place.” Like the signs of divine order in 
creation, each one of Augustine’s expressions on order is distinct but congruent. Their 
conversation, definitions, literature and disputation – moreover, every physical, moral and 
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intellectual move that they make – express something of divine order; but some are more 
deprived than others. The goal of Augustine’s teaching is to bring his students and his audience 
into a fuller understanding and expression of the whole of divine goodness, truth and beauty. His 
philosophia enacts this goal through a two-fold mode of procedure: an order of life and study. 
Thus, the cultural inadequacies of Augustine’s audience eventually move him to present his 
proposal for a means by which they can develop their bodies, minds and souls toward true 
happiness, not only to inform their personal lives but to shape the order of teaching of the arts.  
Coordinate Three: The Order of Life and Study 
In the narrative, Augustine guides the conversation through a combination of 
philosophical and rhetorical exercises on the topic of divine order. At present, however, a lack of 
erudition among his present companions prevents them from working through the intricacies of 
the questions, even with assistance from their teacher (ord. II.7.24). Augustine can see that they 
“greatly love order,” but their reasoning is impaired (imperitos). They have failed to keep “to 
that very order of which [they] were treating, and by which one comes to a knowledge of His 
ineffable majesty.” Augustine responds to their depravities by suggesting that there is an “order 
of teaching,” an arranged way of philosophizing, that ought to be followed so as to provide 
students with a more complete understanding of the relationships within divine order. While the 
extemporaneous conversations in the dialogue have played out some of the intricacies of the 
question of order between Augustine and his companions, Augustine now moves to address the 
particular purpose of the text to his audience. He gives a speech wherein he proposes a culture – 
a philosophia, grounded on the authority of divine teaching and implemented through an order of 
life and study – that discovers and expresses the fullness of divine reality through the moral and 
intellectual ordering of the soul.  
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To propose his philosophia as a fitting means to cultivate a fuller discovery and 
expression of divine order, Augustine begins from the ground up. He founds his philosophical 
culture on what he describes as disciplina ipsa (ord. II.8.25). Augustine’s description of this 
discipline echoes the prophet Jeremiah as he states (New American 31:33), “This science is the 
very law of God…ever abiding fixed and unshaken with Him, [and] transcribed…on the souls of 
the wise.” In other words, this law of God is not extrinsic to the soul but rather intrinsic to it and 
congruent with its natural desire for wisdom. Augustine’s philosophia both assumes and seeks to 
understand this law – this relationship between Creator and creation – through the soul. This 
intellectual endeavor is not arbitrary but significant to the purpose of the text, for “[the wise] 
know they live a better and more sublime life in proportion as they contemplate [this law] more 
perfectly with their understanding and observe it more diligently in their manner of living.” 
Augustine’s philosophia embraces and enacts a complete culture that leads to lasting happiness. 
To do so, followers discover and express divine order through a particular kind of moral action 
and intellectual study, particularly accomplished in the soul.  
Augustine’s introduction of this discipline at the beginning of his speech reflects the 
“trans-philosophical” nature of his project (Gilson 9), which moves from the authority of first 
principles through reason. As he previously stated, “The philosophy that is true…has no other 
function than to teach what is the First Principle of all things” (ord. II.5.16). He further specified 
that the Christian mysteries teach that this first principle is “one God, omnipotent, and that He is 
tripotent, Father and Son and Holy Spirit.” Therefore Augustine, and perhaps most of his 
audience, assumes a mutual relationship between philosophical categories and theological 
presuppositions (Brown 103–104). Philosophy starts with first principles, which relates use of 
authorities to the work of reason. For Augustine, this relationship between authority and reason 
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is such that the trustworthiness of an authority (whether divine or human) is judged by its ability 
to give proof (indicia) for its doctrines (doctrinarum), which are pursued through the intellect 
(ord. II.9.27). Without this factor, authority can be deceiving. In light of this understanding, 
Augustine utilizes both authority and reason within his “order of teaching” (docendi ordinem) 
(II.7.24), for as he argues, the “authority of the mysteries” ultimately purifies the life of good 
men over and above “the circumlocution of disputation” (II.9.27). Through reasonable and 
correct teachings, divine and human authorities are an essential part of philosophy.  
Although Augustine acknowledges that authority precedes reason (ratio) within the 
operations of learning, it is the latter that is the “more highly prized…object of desire” (ord. 
II.9.26). Ratio is fundamental to Augustine’s philosophia as the distinguishing characteristic of 
man in his relationship to God (II.11.31). Reason is the height of human expression because it is 
a reflection of the divine intellect that is communicated through all of creation and most 
especially through the rational souls of humanity. Augustine is interested not only in the 
application of reason to the study of things, but in the philosophical inquiry of what reason itself 
is, its “qualities” (II.11.30; italics in original translation). This is the kind of discovery that he 
seeks to cultivate through study of the arts, to move students from reasoning about the order of 
things in creation to considering “what, beyond all things, is the source of all things,” through 
examination of the soul (II.9.26). Particularly through the intellect, one discovers the divine 
Intellect “in which all things are” and “which is itself the sum total of all things.”18 Fundamental 
to this intellectual discovery, however, is the exercise of virtue. This is a natural consequence of 
the unity of body and soul – that through their integrity one discovers and expresses something 
                                                 
18 Russell notes the Platonic quality to this theme of “intellect” in Augustine’s work (“Appendix” 
185, note 13). Like the other rhetorical authorities, Augustine freely applies Platonic ideas to his 
project when they are congruent with his principles.  
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of order.19 Augustine repeatedly stresses the congruence of moral goods and intellectual truths, 
two distinct but unified parts within the whole of divine reality, both to be discovered and 
expressed in the happy life. 
Grounded on authority and reason, Augustine implements his philosophia through “a 
twofold order of procedure,” one part of which “pertains to the regulating of life” and the other 
of which “pertains to the directing of studies” (ord. II.8.25). In his discussion of the former, a 
well-regulated life, Augustine provides many precepts (praecepta) for exercising virtue 
(II.10.28). Such “right living” is significant because it reflects the height of their pursuit in the 
order of moral goods, knowledge and practice of which is necessary for the happy life (II.10.29; 
Topping, Happiness 229). Therefore, devotees of philosophia ought to “refrain from all 
wantonness, from the enticements of gluttony, from excessive care and adornment of the body, 
from silly practices of games…[and] from the unrestrained desire for praise” (ord. II.8.25). In 
treating these issues, Augustine highlights temptations typical of the sophistic school and its 
surrounding culture, particularly those that enticed him in his earlier years.  
Augustine also, however, goes beyond these deprived desires to invite his audience into a 
deeper appreciation of virtue as it applies to the happy life. He argues, “Let them do nothing 
half-heartedly, nothing rashly…Let them hate no one” (ord. II.8.25). He acknowledges the 
importance of good friendships. Furthermore, in politics he suggests prudence and justice. He 
encourages forgiveness, fairness and the golden rule. Augustine hopes for a kind of politician 
who is morally active and philosophically minded, one who stands in contrast to “vain” orators 
                                                 
19 Augustine assumes that the moral and intellectual orders of things discovered and expressed in 
creation congruently reflect divine order. These orders are distinct as students discern their 
particular applications – moral order signifying higher and lower goods and intellectual order 
signifying greater and smaller proportions of truth – but they are also united within the fullness 
of divine reality. The truths discovered through the intellect harmonize with the goods sought 
through the will. 
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and “proud” philosophers (I.10.30; II.5.16; Foley, “Other” 171–172). In this philosophical mode, 
individuals are to live “in a fitting and decent manner” (ord. II.8.25). Lastly, he says, “Supported 
by faith, hope, and love, let them have God as the object of their worship, their thinking, and 
their striving.” God is the measure of this way of life.  
While Augustine expresses these “rules of life…in [his] own words…and…in keeping 
with the [current] circumstances,” he acknowledges that they “are not of [his] invention 
(inventa)” (ord. II.10.28). Rather many books address them. Augustine encourages his students 
to consider these precepts not only according to his own description of them but in light of all the 
available and reasonable sources. Augustine is confident about the capacity of humanity to 
follow this way of life and thus to find happiness in God through philosophia, but he is not 
selling a formula for immediate gratification. Following these precepts of life is difficult and 
their implementation requires “divine assistance.” The group laments that more men do not 
already live in this manner so that it might be easier to imitate “by universal example.” Yet more 
often than not humanity struggles, entangled in lower desires as if they alone can satisfy the soul. 
Augustine does not reject pleasure (II.12.35), but he expects the senses to “serve [the] soul” 
(I.2.6).20 As Augustine’s companions demonstrated earlier in Book I through their “perverse 
habits” (I.10.29), one’s moral disposition either supports or distracts from the philosophical life 
(I.8.24). Virtuous desires ought to be in “tune” with the work of one’s mind (II.19.50). 
Therefore, they all have to remember to “be good,” that is, to avoid vice and to practice virtue 
(I.10.29). The moral life, however, is not only a list of precepts to be blindly followed. This life 
                                                 
20 Augustine’s understanding of the order of pleasure is captured in his statement, “Delight of the 
sense is one thing; delight through the sense is something else,” which distinguishes between 




is reasonable in the sense that the practitioner understands and has clarity about its end, its final 
purpose (II.12.35). One chooses to follow the moral life in order to be happy.  
Augustine describes their life at the villa in terms of conversion, for as he states early in 
the dialogue, “What else is all this than to be…lifted away from the over-growth of vices, and 
uplifted towards Himself…the truth for which we yearn, and for which as the object of our love 
we make ourselves clean and beautiful?” (ord. I.8.23). Yet uncleanness of the body and darkness 
of the mind block the path to wisdom, to God. In contrast, Augustine’s philosophia cultivates 
both “a good and edifying life” (II.10.29). Augustine’s two-fold order of life and study includes 
the conversion of one’s will toward God, Goodness itself, as well as the intellectual pursuit of 
God, Truth itself. As Augustine told Zenobius in the introduction, his philosophia includes an 
element of “clearing” and one of “planting” – in that order (I.2.4). Therefore, in this main speech 
on the order of teaching Augustine first encourages his audience to morally cleanse themselves 
of vice, and then he moves to describe a new way to cultivate intellectual study. 
 Moral goodness is a condition of Augustine’s philosophia because it clears the mind in its 
pursuit of truth – it “properly [adjusts and disposes]” the soul (ord. II.19.51). Once the soul is 
ordered toward goodness, and consequently “harmonious and beautiful,” then can it “venture to 
see God, the very source of all truth and the very Father of Truth.” Even in this expression, 
Augustine is always aware of human limitations. He knows that while they pursue a fuller 
discovery and expression of goodness, truth and beauty, they are still only seeing a glimpse of 
divine reality. This, however, does not impede their pursuit, for they are seeking to reflect and 
reflect on the relationships between Creator and creation. God invites this participation through 
communication of divine order in material and immaterial reality. If one follows a “right order” – 
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one that truly and appropriately accounts for the breadth of divine reality –one can find 
happiness amid the complexities and struggles of human life.  
Thus as the will clings to moral goodness, so the intellect pursues truth through reason. 
Through the “creative principle” of ordo, one discerns the intelligible through the sensible 
(Hochschild 78). Augustine’s philosophia intellectually engages the physical universe, as 
Licentius is willing to consider certain causes of the fallen leaves at the beginning of the dialogue 
(ord. I.4.11); but it does not stop there. Rather, as Licentius’s speech makes clear, Augustine’s 
philosophia assumes that there is more to be discovered concerning the significance of such 
things. Philosophical study may begin through the senses, but its discernment of things through 
the intellect is “far more profound and sublime” (II.18.47). Only through the immortal soul can 
one consider that which is immortal – that which is beyond the contingent, material and finite 
reality of things. Augustine’s philosophia invites the souls of its students to “take flight from the 
lesser good to the greater, from the mortal to the immortal” (II.19.50). Through the order of the 
intellect, students gain wisdom to “grasp the order of things” and eventually “to discern two 
worlds and the very Author of the universe” (II.18.47). Philosophical study of the created soul 
itself – an intelligible expression of the Creator – is the premier source for discerning divine 
order. As the next coordinate shows, Augustine applies this kind of study to the order of the arts 
and furthermore demonstrates how the discipline of philosophy specializes in this way of 
learning.  
In the dialogue, Augustine acknowledges that this complete culture – of moral life and 
intellectual study – is necessary for the happy life (ord. II.9.26). Although Augustine eventually 
softens this stance in Retractiones (I.3.2), the practical significance of his philosophia still 
stands. Augustine’s philosophia in De ordine responds to the deprived education of his time, 
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which practiced the lowest vice, “vanity” (I.10.30), and promoted “false judgments” and 
“fallacious arguments” (II.5.13). His philosophical culture aims high in the sense that it follows 
principles of divine order to meet the needs of a distinctly Christian education in the Late Roman 
Empire, but to a great extent he uses available authorities and practices of his historical moment 
to do so. Yet, he also stretches the significance of these resources beyond their common use as 
he infuses them with new meaning and gives them new purpose toward lasting happiness.  
Augustine also accommodates this culture to a broader spectrum of students than was 
typical for his time (ord. I.11.31; II.18.47). Augustine is willing to make several adjustments to 
his intellectual program, “lest anyone think that [his philosophia…embraces] something very 
extensive” (II.18.47). If one is currently unlearned in study of the arts, then “authority alone 
opens the door” (II.9.27). Docility becomes the bridge between knowledge through authority and 
knowledge through reason, inviting those who are willing to enter into “the sacred inner courts of 
philosophy” (I.11.31). No greater example can be given of those who lack a certain cultivation 
and yet capture the very essence of order than Augustine’s mother Monica, who grasps “the 
almost heavenly power and nature of grammar” despite her deficient education (II.17.45).21 
Informed by the authority of sacred mysteries and knowledge of divine Scripture, Monica 
practices a less formal philosophy but a philosophia nonetheless.  
Of greater cultural concern to Augustine are those who would begin to inquire into 
philosophical matters but fall short of a fuller understanding of things, particularly those who fail 
to consider the significance of the soul in light of divine reality (ord. II.5.15, II.5.17). These 
                                                 
21 Augustine describes Monica as having a certain ingenuity (ingenium) that informs her 
knowledge of the soul, but she particularly lacks an acquired “mode of expression” (ord. 
II.17.45). This, however, is less significant, for she grasps the deeper meaning of things despite 
an inability to eloquently express them. Unlike students typical of the sophistic school, she has 
not preoccupied herself with eloquence in a way that has prevented her from learning wisdom. 
See also I.11.31–32. 
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students limit themselves to a lesser form of learning, one representative of the sophistic school. 
They are curious, not studious. Rather than discern the order of things, they rush to “discredit 
everything” (II.5.17). Even their reading of literature is deprived, as demonstrated by Licentius’s 
initial use of poetry. This kind of study fails to see the integrity of particulars in light of the 
whole; it results in a curious skepticism. Augustine’s concern for this kind of semi-cultured 
person indicates his criticism of the relationship between the prevalent sophistic education, and 
its limited use of the arts, and skepticism. For this very reason, Augustine recommends an “order 
of the branches of learning” so that the philosophical complexities of life may be more 
“thoroughly understood” by those who are willing (II.15.17; II.5.15). Augustine proposes an 
order of the arts for his philosophia, but through a mode that infuses them with divine purpose. 
The arts become a premier means to bolster the intellectual discovery and expression of the 
fullness of divine truth.  
Coordinate Four: The Order of the Arts 
As Augustine continues in his speech on the order of life and study, he turns to discussion 
of the specific means by which reason is expressed in the rational soul. Humanity applies reason 
to study by “distinguishing and connecting the things that are learned” (ord. II.11.30), for 
through a “kind of inner and hidden activity,” the soul is “able to analyze and synthesize the 
things that ought to be learned” (II.18.48). This two-fold activity, of distinguishing and uniting 
things, is the “mode of learning” through reason. Augustine gives many examples of how to 
initiate this reasoning in study. One perceives that a stone has many parts but also that its 
consolidation makes it a stone. One considers that a tree has many parts but that its unity makes 
it a tree. This kind of reasoning applies to society as well. In life, do friends not strive to be one? 
Does a city not seek to be unified? Must an army not remain united? Does a lover, “not wish to 
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become one with what it is loving?” In all of these things, there is distinction and unity. Through 
the application of reason, humanity grasps (cognoscendo) the significance of this relationship, 
the significance of its order (II.18.49). As Augustine eventually argues, philosophical study of 
the liberal arts provides an imperative means to reflect and reflect on the meaning of these 
relationships. 
The reasonable goal of Augustine’s philosophia then is to understand the relationship of 
particular things to the whole of things, to discern distinction and unity. For this reason, he 
engages his present companions in the disputation on order, wherein they seek to work out the 
details of this relationship. Augustine’s approach, however, is not limited to order of the material 
world, although it is significant as his discussion of the arts demonstrates. Augustine also seeks 
to understand “reason itself” (ord. II.9.26). His students begin with the senses, with matter, but 
then they move into the soul, lest they become preoccupied with “objects of sense” (II.11.30). 
The world passes away, but immortal reason that resides in the soul does not (II.19.50). 
Humanity discovers new depths of divine reality, beyond the senses, through its capacity for 
reasoning about the relationships between things, including parts of the soul. 
The particular significance of discerning the relationship between part and whole is 
purpose. Augustine exhibits this philosophical principle through his use of final causality 
throughout the dialogue. Thus as humanity applies reason to its own endeavors, particularly its 
actions and words, it first takes in the pleasure of them through the senses, in their beauty and 
sweetness, but then it moves to consider them through the rational soul for their meaning (ord. 
II.11.32–34). One can discern meaning (sententiam) in human activity in three particular ways: 
by considering the purpose of an action, that is its end (finem); by considering the discourse of 
speakers, that is whether or not they teach correctly (recte docere); and by considering the 
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delight of a thing, that is to contemplate the beauty that comes through it (II.12.35). Since 
Augustine is still extrapolating on his order of life and study, he clarifies: “the first deals with 
right living; the other two, with those branches of learning which we are now considering.” Thus 
while the discernment of reasonable actions corresponds to the recognizable exercise of moral 
virtue that leads to happiness in Augustine’s philosophia – that is to one willing the highest 
goods for oneself and others – the reasonability of discourse and delight has something to do 
with the way one studies the arts. Augustine has already suggested that there is a more limited 
study of the arts common among his contemporaries and present in the current sophistic schools 
(I.10.30; II.5.17). Now Augustine responds to this deprived education with his own philosophia, 
his philosophical culture, which situates the significance of each art, including its expression of 
beauty and sweetness – that is, its reasonable delight – in light of divine order.   
As stated in the introduction, the purpose of De ordine is to demonstrate and discuss a 
philosophical culture that discovers and expresses divine order, that is, the distinct yet unified 
relationship between Creator and creation. Augustine began the narrative with a disputation, a 
means to discursively engage his audience in some of the philosophical categories that are 
imperative to this relationship. Yet, after his present companions struggle with this approach 
Augustine moves to propose the fullness of his philosophia to the audience in a speech on the 
order of life and study, which is grounded on the law of God and pursued through the intellect. 
Augustine argues that the exercise of reason is fundamental to this philosophia, for reason is the 
quality of the soul that most reflects the divine. Consequently, humanity ought to exercise reason 
in all three possible ways: through a life ordered toward goodness, through discourse ordered 
toward truth, and through pleasure ordered toward beauty. In this way, the significance of life, 
discourse and pleasure is reasonably discovered and expressed in proportion to – in light of – its 
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relationship to God, the source of all goodness, truth and beauty. As Augustine exemplifies in an 
earlier speech, the highest expression of order that humanity can make is the praise of things in a 
way that explicitly or implicitly points to their relationship to God – speech that signifies divine 
order, speech that adores God. Therefore, as Augustine continues to present his order of study, 
he comprises the arts but in a way that points to their divine purpose.  
Augustine moves to present the order of the arts as a necessary means to bolster the 
discovery and expression of divine order through the mind. As expressions of human reason and 
creativity, each art has a special significance, a way of discovering and expressing “something” 
of divine reality (ord. II.1.3). As each art reflects the reasonability of the created world, through 
some expression of language and numbers, so philosophical study of the arts reflects on this 
reasonability and inquires into its purpose. Thus, Augustine introduces each art not only as a 
discipline to be practiced but also as a discipline to be contemplated (II.16.44). By approaching 
the arts in this way, Augustine’s philosophia utilizes the disciplines in contrast to the approach of 
the sophistic school. Whereas students of “that school” cared little for the utility and beauty 
(decore) of the arts in light of personal vanity (I.10.30), Augustine’s “school” cares for both and 
discovers and expresses both in light of divine order. Each art has its own usefulness and beauty 
to be exercised, but it also has “something” divine to be understood (II.1.3). Without grasping 
this divine significance, this purpose, of the art, then one is not only lacking in terms of learning 
but one will inherently fail to express the fullness of its artistic beauty in practice. Without 
recognizing divine purpose, art is deprived; it is in vain.  
Each individual art – grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and 
harmony (Kimball 42) – is significant for the discovery and expression of divine order, a 
particular part of the whole of truth and beauty in language and numbers. Moreover, through 
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their unity the arts make a certain breadth of order manifest as they are brought together in the 
sum of things. As each art reflects something of the divine, so study of their unity indicates the 
integrity of truth and beauty. As Augustine has argued throughout the dialogue, goodness, truth 
and beauty are one, for God, the source of all things, “is one” (ord. I.5.16). The order of the arts, 
as an order of study, signifies the truth and beauty of distinct things, as the order of life signifies 
their goodness. Yet, study in all of the arts prepares students to move deeper into the soul 
through consideration of their unity; it invites contemplation of all facets of truth, beauty and 
goodness in relationship to the One through whom all things are made.  
After elaborating on the distinction of each discipline, Augustine discusses additional 
topics that ought to be treated once one is “learned” in all of the arts so that one may speak 
correctly and avoid error in terms of understanding and expressing divine reality (ord. I.16.44). 
Augustine argues for the necessity of studying and understanding many essential topics that 
pertain to divine things, such as “what pure nothing is, what formless matter is, what a lifeless 
informed being is, what a body is, what species in a body is, what place and time are, what in a 
place and at a time signify…” (II.16.44). These are topics that Augustine tried to treat with his 
present companions, but since they lacked the necessary erudition in the arts, they were unable to 
express themselves adequately and completely. Augustine acknowledges that this kind of study 
is demanding and may be difficult for some, but his invitation into philosophia seems to extend 
to all who are willing. His zeal is for “right order,” whether one follows his particular expression 
of it or another “more concise and appropriate” (II.19.51). However, following the “order of the 
arts” is a non-negotiable, for otherwise one will undoubtedly succumb to error (II.17.46). While 
Augustine may assume that the specific list of arts to be included within this “order” is adaptable 
to particular circumstances and capabilities of students (II.18.47; II.19.51), the philosophical 
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approach to studying them – to discern the relationship between particular truths and the whole 
of truth in light of divine reality – is essential.22 Perhaps Augustine reiterates this fact because he 
is acutely aware of the temptation to slight education in some way, either by directing it toward a 
lesser purpose or by depriving it of a fuller consideration of reality.  
While the seven liberal arts provide an encyclopedic means for engaging fundamental 
elements of reality, study of Augustine’s text is incomplete without consideration of his 
arguments for the discipline of philosophy. While Augustine previously defined philosophy in 
general terms as the “love of wisdom” (ord. I.11.32), he now goes into discussion of its profound 
and sublime treatment of essential topics (II.18.47). In doing so, Augustine here combines what 
Kimball calls the “pansophic” approach and the “propaedeutic” approach to the liberal arts (40–
41). The former reflects an encyclopedic quality of the arts as Augustine describes them, a 
complete culture that leads one to discover and express divine order and ultimately the happy 
life, assuming the congruent practice of moral virtue. The latter reflects the necessity of the arts 
as preparation for further study, here, as traditionally, the study of philosophy. As Kimball 
suggests, it is the combination of the two approaches that distinguishes the Christian contribution 
to the history of the liberal arts (41), for they are no longer studied as “an end in itself” (38), but, 
alongside philosophy and the developing field of theology informed by tradition and Sacred 
Scripture, they are viewed as parts in the whole of divine truth discoverable through creation and 
revelation. As Augustine assumes in De ordine, the arts have divine significance when studied 
for both practical content and philosophical reflection. The former mode is necessary and useful 
for life in the world, but the latter mode moves through the soul to that which is beyond the 
                                                 
22 This is not to diminish the significance of Augustine’s particular list of the arts and their 
“order” in De ordine (II.17.46). 
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world. The two modes unite in their purpose, to reflect and reflect on the fullness of divine 
reality. 
Therefore, in his discussion of the order of study Augustine also provides a rationale for 
the discipline of philosophy, in addition to the arts. He already stated that true philosophy 
teaches first principles (ord. II.5.16). He also further clarified that this teaching comes through 
both authority and reason (II.9.26–27). Now Augustine establishes the kind of learning that is 
distinctly philosophical – the kind that seeks to understand “ourselves” and “our origin” 
(II.18.47). This, states Augustine, is “the order of wisdom’s branches of study (ordo studiorum 
sapientiae) by which one becomes competent to grasp the order of things and to discern two 
worlds and the very Author of the universe.” Philosophy specializes in relating knowledge of the 
soul to knowledge of God, and it does so through consideration of distinction and unity 
(II.18.48). Distinguishable from the arts, the discipline of philosophy is essentially interior; it 
examines (inspicit) the soul, and speaking to itself (loquetur), persuades itself (persuasit) to 
“take flight from the lesser good to the greater, from the mortal to the immortal” (II.18.48; 
II.19.50). Like the philosophical use of the arts, philosophy considers the relationship between 
creation and Creator, but it specifically ponders the soul within the soul through an interior mode 
of learning. Within the soul, philosophy ventures “to see God, the very source of all truth” and to 
glimpse a “vision” of eternal beauty (II.19.51). In this way, the soul comes to understand that 
what is particularly true and beautiful exists in proportion – in relationship – to the measure of 
truth and beauty itself, God.  
Although Augustine distinguishes the discipline of philosophy (philosophia) here in the 
text, philosophia has indeed penetrated his entire project. Consequently, Augustine’s philosophia 
includes but is not limited to the discipline of philosophy itself. Consideration of the nuance 
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surrounding this term in the dialogue sheds light on the dynamic interplay of Augustine’s uses. 
Augustine’s philosophia is a complete culture, and it is a distinctly philosophical one. His 
philosophia includes moral action, both personal and political; it includes authority, both human 
and divine; it includes the arts, both practical and contemplative; and it includes philosophy, as a 
way of life and a way of learning.  
Augustine cultivates this philosophia in and through the dialogue for the specific purpose 
of shaping an “order of teaching” (ord. I.9.27; II.7.24). He hopes for his audience to imitate what 
the dialogue demonstrates and what his speeches propose. In De ordine, Augustine teaches his 
audience how to approach the topic of divine order, which treats the relationship between 
creation and Creator, in such a way that leads – persuades – them toward the happy life, and it 
does so through philosophia, the means by which one discovers and expresses a certain fullness 
of divine reality. Philosophia orders one’s life through the exercise of moral virtue and the 
formation of one’s internal and external discourse, within the soul and with others. Initiated as a 
response to divine reality as transcribed on the soul and reasonably expressed through the 
authority of Christian doctrine, Augustine invites his audience to participate in a process 
whereby they gradually discover and express the significance of things by imitating order in their 
souls. Yet, it does not stop there, for Augustine expects his philosophia not only to be exercised, 
but also taught. He wants to teach this love of wisdom to others (II.2.7), and he wants it to have 
an effect on how well the developing culture lives, prays and studies (II.19.51). The quality of 
Christian culture is at stake along with the very happiness of every soul.   
As Augustine describes the significance of the arts for this distinct purpose, he has in 
mind their present abuse in the typical sophistic schools. Indeed, his reappraisal is responsive to 
the deprived education currently offered in “that school” (ord. I.10.30). The most conspicuously 
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inane art within this prevailing system is rhetoric. Augustine had grown increasingly aware of 
the school’s inadequate approach to this art during his own early education (conf. III.4.7), 
although he continued to be susceptible to its empty promise of achieving professional success 
through eloquent expression (IX.2.4). Augustine’s personal goals were at least partially 
motivated by ambition despite his move in the direction of philosophy upon reading Cicero’s 
Hortensius at age 19. This text, however, persuaded him to follow a different method and a 
different end for learning, one in which rhetoric was united to philosophy toward wisdom.  
By the time Augustine writes at Cassiciacum, he is ready to resign from his teaching 
position, his rhetoric chair, in the Milanese sophistic school. As Augustine recounts this time in 
Confessiones, he makes a two-fold criticism of himself in light of his teaching career. He says, “I 
loved vanity, and I sought after lying” (conf. IX.4.9). His study and (ab)use of rhetoric was tied 
to both. First, he learned and practiced rhetoric in vain, that is, misdirected from its highest 
purpose, i.e., the discovery and expression of the divine. In this way, it was morally deficient, 
directed toward a lesser good rather than a greater one. Secondly, study of this rhetoric was 
separated from the other arts; it was deprived of truths that proportion its highest use.  
Augustine acknowledges the temptation of fallacious arguments dressed in eloquence 
(ord. II.5.13). They appear so well arranged that “deception through them becomes pleasant,” but 
they are not fully eloquent because, lacking the fullness of truth, their rhetoric is 
disproportionate. Lying “perverts the true purpose of speech” (Curley 192). Such speakers 
arrange their words for the purpose of falsehood, but the unity of truth inherently limits their 
persuasive effect. Particularly without dialectic, which distinctly informs rhetoric of erroneous 
thinking (ord. II.13.38), rhetoric may be susceptible to a certain sweetness applied to incorrect 
teaching. Yet even such attempts at speaking beautifully, of sounding “sweet,” are undermined 
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by a speaker’s deprived understanding (II.11.33), as exemplified by the Manichean teacher 
Faustus (conf. V.6.10–11). This kind of rhetoric fails to express the unity of goodness, truth and 
beauty, which it is designed to do; it is deprived of the fullness of its divine purpose.     
At Cassiciacum, Augustine is on retreat. He is partaking in the traditional leisure (otium) 
of a professor. He is writing dialogues of philosophical significance and cultural import. In doing 
so, Augustine composes De ordine, which particularly reconsiders the typical education of the 
time in light of his developing understanding of Christianity. He applies his knowledge of 
Christian doctrine to a pressing need of his time: an education that teaches students to think and 
speak about the fullness of divine reality, from the particulars of “everyday expressions” to the 
general question of God’s providence (ord. II.19.51). In responding to this need, Augustine does 
not begin anew but rather reappraises the existing system in light of new knowledge. He applies 
his ingenuity to discover and express the unity of traditional Roman education with the emerging 
priorities of a distinctly Christian culture. His philosophia thus comprises the arts, but they are 
changed in the process. Their new purpose – to lead us to God – orders them differently. 
Augustine’s reordering of the arts has significance for each one of them. Rhetoric in 
particular, united to the other six, discovers a certain wholesome sweetness through this 
connection (ord. II.11.33; conf. V.6.10). Balanced by the others, its application is measured in 
proportion to its purpose. This rhetoric signifies “something” beyond itself (ord. II.11.34). In 
light of divine order, it can correctly teach others by stirring (commoveri) their souls toward the 
fullness of divine truth (II.13.38); it can delight them by sweetly signifying the fullness of divine 
beauty; and it can reasonably persuade them to see something of the divine in their own souls.23 
                                                 
23 As Russell translates Augustine’s description of the art of rhetoric at ord. II.13.38, he seems to 
have Augustine’s strong criticisms of the sophistic school in mind. Van Deusen’s translation 
highlights different qualities. She writes: “Since [the unlearned] are separated from a proper turn 
 
144 
The art of rhetoric rises and falls in proportion to this purpose, to sweetly speak something of the 
whole, implicitly or explicitly recognizing “the very Author of the universe” (II.18.47). 
Augustine’s philosophia cultivates and exercises this ordered rhetoric in the dialogue. 
As with the other arts, Augustine’s understanding of rhetoric in De ordine still reflects 
some assumptions of the sophistic school, such as the importance of imitation, the role of 
rhetorical exercises, and the emphasis on eloquence to arouse emotions (Kennedy, Classical 
182). Yes, Augustine is happy to be resigning from the sophistic school for reasons discussed 
above, but in his words, his departure is only “in some measure” (ord. I.9.27). Augustine 
particularly continues to find epideictic speech useful and fitting for his new purposes. Ordered 
speech is “praise” of the good, the true and the beautiful. The intellectual knowledge and moral 
exercise of order, i.e., relationship to the divine arranges one’s epistemological and ethical use of 
rhetoric toward the fullness of truth and beauty and the highest possible expression, praise of 
God through his creation. Indeed, Augustine uses material from diverse sources, authorities and 
disciplines to inform his approach to philosophia because they all fall within divine order. 
Augustine seeks to clear away their lower uses to lift them to a higher form of discovery and 
expression. His philosophia reflects and reflects on their divine significance. 
The previous chapters of this study have attended to sophistic and Ciceronian elements 
that inform Augustine’s use and understanding of rhetoric in De ordine. Sophistic elements were 
considered through Augustine’s use of the term schola, which highlighted both unity and 
                                                                                                                                                             
of mind, as well as good mental habits, it is necessary not only to teach them the material to be 
learned itself, but often – and in as many ways as possible – to move their emotions. This is done 
according to the part of learning that consists in actually doing a given task, that is more 
produced by necessity than by its own [abstract] purity. Further, what is to be learned is noticed 
most when it is delicious, as it is, so to speak, scattered to pupils” (726). “Rhetoric then ‘adds the 
dignity of usefulness’ and the deliciousness of attraction, thus moving the desire to the discipline 
of communication. Thus the discipline of rhetoric ‘promotes the study of the liberal arts’.” 
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distinctions between “that school” and Augustine’s “school” at Cassiciacum. Ciceronian 
elements were considered through Augustine’s use of the term philosophia, which pointed to the 
integrity of philosophy and rhetoric in the text. This chapter has considered distinctly Christian 
elements, particularly those assumed and articulated in Augustine’s use of ordo, to discuss the 
significance of divine order for Augustine’s approach and purpose in De ordine.  The final 
section of this chapter reflects on the overall significance of these three authorities for 
Augustine’s rhetoric in the text  – how he uses and understands these sources in light of the 
whole dialogue.  
Augustine’s rhetoric in De ordine exhibits a responsive quality in light of his creative and 
constrained use of these three rhetorical authorities, as they interact with one another in unity and 
distinction through Augustine’s work. Yet it is particularly through his understanding of “order” 
that Augustine elucidates and explains the means by which he can apply all three authorities 
within his rhetoric. Order thus becomes an interpretive key for appreciating the breadth of 
Augustine’s rhetoric in this dialogue. Order situates his understanding and use of rhetorical 
authorities as well as diverse disciplines and practices. As discussed in the first chapter of this 
study, ordo is a kind of “metarhetoric” in De ordine that grounds and situates Augustine’s 
understanding and use of the rhetorical art, rhetorica. Through order, Augustine moves beyond 
the historically situated understanding of rhetoric that he learned and taught. His (meta)rhetoric 
of order rearranges the order of his rhetoric.   
In some measure, Augustine continues to use elements of the sophistic school in his 
teaching at Cassiciacum. He applies these elements in and through the dialogue. Yet, as evident 
from his particular criticisms of this resource, sophistic education and its associated rhetoric were 
insufficient for meeting the needs of a distinctly Christian culture. Specifically, it lacked divine 
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purpose. One could debate whether or not Augustine ultimately finds sophistic education dis-
ordered (inordinatos) (ord. II.7.24), but it seems more in line with the overall text to argue that it 
was morally deprived. The Sophistic school failed to find and express its proper end – to teach 
students how to find true and lasting happiness.     
Augustine’s reading and use of Cicero was certainly significant for his move toward 
philosophy. Pedagogically, Augustine finds a method in Cicero wherein eloquence is necessarily 
united to wisdom. Here too, however, Augustine treads carefully, adopting Cicero’s method 
while declining his skepticism, particularly in light of its cultural consequences. While Cicero’s 
understanding of the integrity of philosophy and rhetoric informs Augustine’s rhetorical 
practices in the dialogue, his philosophical skepticism is refuted for a fuller, truer philosophia. 
Cicero’s work put Augustine on a path toward wisdom, but only his Christian teachers taught 
him that the love of wisdom was in unity with the love of God.    
The nuance of Augustine’s attention to diverse authorities, disciplines and practices, 
however, is incomplete without order. Specifically, Christian teaching on divine order provided a 
rationale for how Augustine could use available elements of Late Roman education toward a new 
kind of culture. All things rise and fall within divine order. Thus knowledge of and cooperation 
with divine purpose, as inscribed on the souls of the wise, is essential to the proper use of things. 
Augustine can distinguish higher and lower, smaller and greater elements of things while 
maintaining their integrity within the fullness of divine reality. Through one’s moral exercise and 
epistemological understanding, order ultimately informs the practical and contemplative use of 
such things for culture, for education, for human flourishing, society and happiness. Augustine’s 
rhetoric of order is best described as metarhetorical because the “rhetoric” of his time was too 
small, too low for his new rhetorical purposes. Augustine needed a rhetoric that could lead others 
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to God. He articulates the “what” and the “how” of this rhetoric through his rhetoric of order in 
De ordine.  
Implications of Augustine’s Rhetoric of Order  
  Augustine’s rhetoric is responsive as he composes the text of De ordine in light of a 
context. He responds to a particular dilemma of his historical moment, the development of a 
distinctly Christian culture. He responds to the concerns of a particular audience, his fellow 
intellectuals who are contemplating the significance of divine order for their personal and 
professional lives. Finally and most fundamentally, he responds to particular teachings of 
Christian doctrine that he comes to believe and understand through intellectual and spiritual 
mentors, e.g., Theodore Manlius, Ambrose and Simplicianus (ord. I.11.31; conf. V.14.24, VI.3.4; 
Madec 151). In other words, he is writing for a particular purpose, to a particular group of 
people, about something of vital importance. In addition to its other dimensions, Augustine’s 
writing corresponds to a rhetorical situation (Bitzer 5–6). The discourse of De ordine is a 
“fitting” response to a particular, philosophical, i.e., epideictic question (9): how does divine 
order relate to our cultural understanding and expression of things? A related question in specific 
reference to rhetoric is: What are we praising?  
To develop his response to this situation, Augustine utilizes emerging and latent 
rhetorical authorities that he shares with his audience. In other words, he uses the rhetorical 
tradition available him to inform his present discourse (Bitzer 13). He incorporates sophistic 
elements from the current sophistic schools, Ciceronian elements from Roman rhetorical 
literature, and Christian topics and doctrines from the Milanese Christian community. With each 
authority, Augustine considers the usefulness of its elements for his persuasive purpose in this 
particular text – to propose an order of teaching to the audience that leads to lasting happiness, 
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which he believes is found in the enjoyment of God. Augustine applies his ingenuity to this 
particular purpose, discerning the reasonableness of each authority and its appropriateness for his 
project. In doing so, Augustine offers specific insights concerning the significance of each one to 
meet the moral and intellectual needs of the developing Christian culture.  
Augustine finds the sophistic school (schola) intellectually and morally deprived because 
its misconception of rhetoric, as the only necessary art, contributes to the misuse of rhetoric, for 
personal glory. The sophistic school fosters this kind of rhetoric for material and political gain at 
the cost of ignoring what will make students truly happy. This education leaves the souls of 
students empty. The Ciceronian elements that Augustine learned through his rhetorical reading 
were also lacking, for although the Hortensius inspired Augustine to have “different purposes 
and desires” directed toward wisdom (conf. III.4.7), they were ultimately left unsatisfied. 
Intellectually, Cicero united rhetoric to philosophy (philosophia), which was an essential step for 
Augustine’s developing understanding of the rhetorical discipline, but morally, the teaching of 
Cicero’s skepticism left students wanting and apathetic. Only upon hearing the teaching of 
Ambrose in the Milanese Cathedral is Augustine moved like never before (V.14.24; VI.3.4). For 
the first time, Augustine hears Ciceronian eloquence united to truth, and the joys of “temporary 
happiness,” which had enticed him for so long, united to that which is lasting (VI.6.9). 
Particularly in light of this encounter, Augustine evaluates his own rhetoric. He realizes that he 
has sought “only to please men, not to instruct them.” The time was ripe for a rhetorical change. 
As Augustine reconsiders his rhetoric, he does so philosophically. Having “in some 
measure” moved beyond the intellectual limitations of his early rhetorical education (ord. I.9.27), 
Augustine now reappraises Roman eruditio – and its associated rhetorics – in light of a first 
principle discovered through questions of causa (I.4.11). This principle is the order, the unity and 
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distinction, of divine reality. While the question of “cause” was also present in the Roman 
sophistic schools (Pernot 224), Augustine does not ground his treatment of it on probability as 
was taught there. In De ordine, Augustine engages in this exercise to discover the objective truth 
about reality (Pacioni, “Order” 598). In doing so, however, he relates the particular to the general 
through “the fixed order of causes” (certo causarum ordine) (ord. I.4.11). Augustine uses the 
dialogue to demonstrate and discuss how one can discover and express the principle of order but 
moreover to propose what are its implications for the commonplace of Christian education and 
the study of rhetoric in particular.  
In the dialogue, Augustine considers the ratio of culture, which he discerns through its 
purpose (finem), its discourse, and its pleasure (ord. II.12.35). The sophistic school had failed in 
its purpose because it ultimately led students to empty promises of “vanity” and “lying” (conf. 
IX.4.9). As stated above, Augustine learned to please men through his discourse but in a way that 
was separated from teaching them what is true. Like his fellow classmates, Augustine was led to 
seek pleasure in his youth but not the kind that lasts. Ciceronian philosophy gave more purpose 
and substance to Augustine’s discourse as it was directed toward wisdom, but its skepticism 
eventually disappointed him. Only through the teachings of Christian doctrine did Augustine find 
true purpose, true discourse, and true pleasure – that which leads to lasting happiness. 
Furthermore, it showed him how all things are in relationship to one another (conf. IV.11.16). All 
of creation, especially the reasonable actions of humanity, signifies the Creator. By 
understanding the relationships, the order, of things – to one another and to their first principle, 
God – one can discover and express a certain fullness of goodness, truth and beauty, and finally, 
be happy. Augustine then applies his understanding of order to Christian education.     
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Augustine utilizes these rhetorical authorities within his philosophia because he 
recognizes their “right order” (ord. II19.51), that is, he sees how their ratio relates to the Ratio 
that “from on high rules over all things” (I.8.25). Divine order unites the goodness, truth and 
beauty found through these authorities, like through the disciplines, to the source of all goodness, 
truth and beauty: God. In light of this relationship between all created things, especially 
humanity, and the Creator, Augustine recognizes this element of unity and builds his philosophia 
upon it. Order, however, also has distinctions, for the goodness of human activity varies in 
proportion to Goodness itself. Some acts are better than others, being higher or more closely 
related to the Goodness that is God. Augustine proposes the practice of certain moral goods for 
those who pursue philosophia (II.8.25). Indeed, exercise of these goods is a condition of fully 
discovering and expressing intellectual truth (I.10.29; II.20.51). Yet, the fundamental unity is 
never lost. Augustine laments the lower use of things, such as the teaching of eloquence through 
use of immoral poetry, as in his early education, (conf. I.16.26); but he also uses poetry in De 
ordine because he discovers something useful in it for teaching about goodness (ord. I.8.24).24 
Lower things still fall within order. They still reflect “something” of the divine (II.1.3), even if 
this reflection is one of deprivation, as in the case of evil. For good use, however, they need to be 
lifted up. Augustine’s understanding of divine goodness and the height of the moral order thus 
have significant ethical implications for his educational approach. Learning to “be good” is 
essential to knowing what is true and to living the happy life. 
                                                 
24 As an intellectual distinction of Augustine’s approach to poetry, he argues that, “praise of 
meter is one thing, but praise of meaning is another” (ord. II.11.34). Ideally, the eloquence of 
poetry (e.g., its form) ought to complement its wisdom (e.g., its content). Moreover, Augustine 




This is also the case with divine truth and proportionality within the intellectual order. 
Augustine finds some reasonable truth in the discourse of the sophistic school; he finds some 
reasonable truth in the work of Cicero. To a degree, they both represent acceptable human 
authorities (ord. II.9.27). Yet only through Christian teachers does Augustine discover a certain 
fullness of divine authority and reason. This is to say, not primarily in the individuals 
themselves, e.g., Ambrose, but rather in the God who speaks through them as the true Teacher 
(I.5.13). Indeed, only through Christian doctrine does he find “Truth itself” (I.4.10). In 
proportion to this measure, Augustine discovers truth through various authorities, as well as 
through the disciplines and through everyday discourse. As in the moral order, there is more 
truth found in some sources than in others (II.9.27), but they all signify truth to some degree, 
even if in their depravity, such as false arguments (II.5.13). Thus, Augustine can apply the 
principle of divine order to his evaluation of and proposal for a moral and intellectual erudition 
to meet the developing needs of the Late Roman Empire. In doing so, he discourages the lower 
use of things and seeks to cultivate the higher. Augustine tells his companions to “soar aloft” 
(attollere) – to be lifted up, over and above the fallen aspects of their selves (I.8.24). By adorning 
their souls with virtue and endowing them with knowledge, students unite themselves, through 
philosophia, to understanding whereby they can enjoy true happiness. This culture ethically and 
epistemologically grounds and forms one’s expressions.   
 Using Kennedy’s distinction between “primary” and “secondary” rhetoric (Classical 2–
3), one could thus suggest that Augustine’s (primary) rhetoric of order, which situates his 
philosophical mode of life and study in De ordine, is fundamental to the transition that he makes 
in his use and understanding of (secondary) rhetorica in the text. The art of rhetoric – that which 
is to be taught – is given new significance as it is ordered. In De ordine, Augustine distinctly 
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arranges rhetorica according to its philosophical purpose, which is to “stir” (commoveri) the 
souls of the audience toward the fullness of divine truth and beauty (ord. II.13.38). Moreover, by 
positioning rhetorica among the other liberal arts and philosophy as a complete culture, 
Augustine argues for the integrity of knowledge, both practical and contemplative, that leads to 
wisdom and happiness. Indeed, one of the goals of De ordine was to teach the order proper to 
each particular thing (e.g., each individual art) as well as the order of things together (e.g., the 
unity of the arts) (I.1.1).  The result is a philosophical rhetoric that teaches, delights and 
persuades the audience to discover and express the relationships of things – their goodness, truth 
and beauty – by moving their souls toward order. Augustine uses diverse sources and interpretive 
signs within his teaching to accomplish this goal. While such rhetoric includes and encourages 
the explicit praise of higher things in light of the fullness of divine reality, it also includes an 
implicit interpretive exercise by which all created things are seen in light of divine principles. As 
exhibited through the dynamics of the narrative, a speaker or teacher can use this kind of rhetoric 
by beginning with the shared assumptions that one has with the audience and then build upon it 
toward a fuller perception and explanation of divine reality. One can begin with anything, 
because everything expresses something of the divine. Thankfully, wisdom extends a hand to the 
sunken soul.  
 As discussed in Chapter I, rhetorical scholars generally agree that Augustine’s use and 
understanding of rhetoric is responsive to sophistic, Ciceronian and Christian elements of his 
historical moment. De ordine demonstrates this quality of responsiveness from an earlier time of 
Augustine’s life than is often studied, that is, through Confessiones and De doctrina Christiana. 
De ordine also particularly shows how Augustine applies use of these rhetorical authorities to a 
general Christian culture. As Hochschild suggests, the “cosmological framework” of De ordine 
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expresses a certain breadth of Augustine’s thought and therefore this text is extremely insightful 
to the interpretation of his other works (87). Through his rhetoric of order, which includes his 
discussion of the arts but also contains the interdisciplinary unity of his rhetorical, philosophical 
and theological expressions, Augustine gives new meaning to everything. He discovers the 
divine significance of it all and seeks to share it with others. The dialogue is not merely an 
intellectual exercise; it is a sermon that teaches how to interpret the world in a way that has 
temporal and eternal consequences for human existence. God invites this interpretation through 
the divine communication of creation. 
Because of the breadth and height of this rhetoric, or more specifically, because of its 
assumed relationship, i.e., order between the particular and the general (ord. II.19.51), this study 
describes Augustine’s rhetoric of order as metarhetorical. Augustine demands that the greatest 
ethical and epistemological use of rhetoric is inherently united to an understanding of order. A 
rhetorician “needs to know” ordo “in order to be a rhetorician” (Murphy, “Metarhetoric” 202). 
For Augustine, order is a first principle “upon which a rhetorician bases his whole activity.” In 
this way, Augustine’s rhetoric reaches beyond his historically situated rhetorica to develop a use 
and understanding of discourse united to a distinctly Christian understanding of goodness, truth 
and beauty. As Shaeffer argues, in Augustine’s appraisal “eloquence [secondary rhetoric] must 
be judged according to wisdom [primary rhetoric]” (297). Augustine presumes the ordered 
communication (the invention, dispositio, and elocutio) of the Creator – through all of creation 
and particularly through the soul – as a precursor to the discovery, arrangement and expression 
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of language by humanity.25 Human speech is always, although in varying degrees of truth and 
beauty, a response to the God who truthfully and eloquently speaks first.  
Augustine’s rhetoric of order thus includes a tension between the human desire and 
ability to discover and express something about God, which he is certain of in his soul, without 
being able to do so completely or perfectly (ord. II.7.21; II.19.51). Throughout De ordine, 
Augustine demonstrates and discusses the teaching role of discourse, which occurs through 
internal speech acts within one’s soul as well as through external speech acts that one has with 
others, to reflect and reflect on the fullness of divine reality. Both forms are necessary for the 
happy life, which has personal and social dimensions. We need to learn how to communicate 
well with ourselves as well as with others. In many ways, these two forms of discourse reflect 
the relationship between the disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric in De ordine. Augustine 
prepares orators to speak to others by showing them how to order their own souls, through a kind 
of contemplative persuasion.  
In his consideration of Augustine’s work, Auerbach asks, “What changes did the 
traditional forms of discourse incur under the stress of such [Christian] ideas, and can the new 
Christian discourse still be classified according to the system of ancient rhetoric…?” (32-33). 
Augustine’s rhetoric of order demonstrates that “the old rhetoric was not enough” (Murphy, 
“Forward” xi). In Murphy’s words, as Augustine “sets out to do his own thinking about the 
matter of ‘expressing’ what is known,” he reaches beyond the current “rules” to develop 
something new (xi, xii). In doing so, however, he is “like an efficient gardener,” who carefully 
prunes and replants elements of Late Roman thought while adapting them to the developing 
                                                 
25 As Tracy notes, “The Augustinian understanding of inventio can only be understood in his 
theological terms and not in purely philosophical terms” (268). This study adds that it is also not 
understandable in purely rhetorical terms of Augustine’s historical moment. 
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needs of a distinctly Christian culture (Topping, Happiness 6). He is a “jazz improvisionalist” 
who understands the nature of the notes so well that he can accommodate and augment them in 
the music without losing sight of the song (O’Donnell, “Authority”). Augustine applies his 
ingenuity to the particular dilemma before him. He attends to the details of his time and place. 
Yet, he grounds his rhetorical response within a bigger, more general, picture. He knows that 
whatever he teaches, delights and moves his present audience toward must be understood in light 
of “the whole of which it is a portion” (ord. II.19.51). This is also the case for how he speaks to 
his audience, so that even his sweet sounds signify something beyond themselves. Thus, he fits 
his use and understanding of rhetoric to the fullness (the sum) of divine reality. Consequently, it 
is a good, true and beautiful rhetoric, and it is one that ought to be taught.   
Augustine’s understanding of the significance of rhetoric therefore depends upon such 
additional terms as ordo that situate and order the subject for his new purposes as well as 
elucidate his criticisms and praise of other rhetorical forms, i.e., sophistic and Ciceronian. This 
project suggests that study of such metarhetorical terms, many of which are interconnected in 
Augustine’s thought, are necessary for appreciating the depth of his contribution to rhetorical 
history. He develops a metarhetoric of order that in turn permits him to propose an ordered 
rhetoric that is appropriate for use in Christian discourse and education and that is directed 
toward the final end of Christian life, the fullness of happiness found in the enjoyment of God. 
“Order is that which will lead us to God” (ord. I. 9.27). De ordine is an insightful source to 
inform scholarship on the transition in Augustine’s thought from secular to religious rhetoric. His 
metarhetoric of order from this early period of his life, between his final conversion and formal 
resignation of his teaching position in the sophistic school, could likely shed light on his later 
writings on rhetoric, including Book IV of De doctrina Christiana and Confessiones. For 
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scholars interested in this historical period and in its relevance for our own time, there is much 
more to discover and express in Augustine. This study seeks to be a means to further the 
discussion.  
Through De ordine, Augustine particularly invites contemporary scholars to consider our 
current education system through the lens of his philosophia. Most fundamentally, what is its 
purpose, and how does what we teach and how we teach it contribute to this purpose? If moral 
virtue and intellectual discovery are necessarily united in the human person, does our educational 
approach cultivate both? Also, do our current institutions demonstrate the integrity of philosophy 
and rhetoric in teaching and in practice? While such questions may seem removed from the 
every day demands of today’s teachers, Augustine argues that they are fundamental. First 
principles inform our educational system whether we intentionally apply them or not, and our 
philosophical assumptions have grave implications for the moral and intellectual development of 
our students and our society. While Augustine’s philosophia has theological roots, his approach 
is also profoundly philosophical and rhetorical. Our questions and answers concerning first 
principles have consequences for us all – practically and contemplatively, personally and 
socially.  
 Secular education has largely abandoned and neglected philosophical categories as an 
attempt to avoid disagreements and establish an environment of tolerance (Topping, Case 18). 
However, one could suggest that ignorance of the soul is ignorance of the human person. At the 
very least, Augustine invites secular education to reconsider the significance of philosophy. To 
do so, they must recognize the existing implications of having first neglected it and then decide 
how to approach it within a diverse society.  
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Rhetoric, as the art of discourse, ought to be part of the solution, for it has a way of 
“getting to the bottom of things” (Pernot 116). In Western culture, rhetoric has played a unique 
role as “one of the most consequential and serious of all academic subjects and of all human 
activities” (Ong 15), although this significance needs to be recovered. Augustine would suggest 
that this ought to be a philosophical rhetoric (as opposed to a strictly political one), in the sense 
that it finds a way to express the relationship between the particular needs of this time, place and 
audience and the general principles that necessarily teach and remind us of who we are. In this 
sense, it functions as epideictic rhetoric.  
Furthermore, this rhetoric is an ethically constrained one, a matter of considering what 
we say and how we say it in light of first principles. As an example, this approach could foster a 
means for secular education to more fully consider the human soul in its content and forms of 
instruction as well as encourage religious education to take the positions of society seriously as it 
frames the content and form of its teachings. Philosophy and rhetoric work together to engage in 
reasonable discourse, not primarily of abstract topics but of how our assumptions about essential 
things shape the futures of our students and our society. What are the implications of our current 
educational practices, not primarily for the professional success of our students but for their 
happiness? How can we reform our educational content and instruction to more fully prepare our 
students to discover and express something of the kind of happiness that lasts? 
Liberal arts schools have an opportunity to particularly facilitate this debate because they 
implicitly understand the order of things, their unity and distinction, through the arts. Perhaps by 
reminding students of this relationship, this order, between ways of knowing and speaking, we 
will equip them to resolve some of the dilemmas and depravities of the existing educational 
system. In a society preoccupied with pragmatism, this debate will be difficult. We have largely 
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lost our understanding of the significance of the arts. If we follow Augustine’s reading, however, 
it is more likely that our culture has disintegrated the arts than found them to be obsolete.26 We 
have the task before us to demonstrate and discuss their integrity and the implications that their 
unity has for a fuller discovery and expression of reality. Moreover, as we discern the purpose of 
education, Augustine invites us to see that not only knowledge, but also happiness, is at stake. De 
ordine addresses this reality “in which the tension of the whole person toward truth and 
happiness finds its complete satisfaction” (Pacioni, “Order” 598). He can teach us something of 
great value if we dispose ourselves to his wisdom and eloquence.  
In the words of Augustinian scholar James J. O’Donnell, “What we can learn from 
Augustine…is intellectual and spiritual integrity: fidelity to scripture and the church that is at 
once complete and at the same time resourceful, imaginative, and enriched” (“Authority”). In 
other words, “To read Augustine is to encounter one who has made of orthodoxy, of `thinking 
with the church', an adventure.” Study of Augustine’s work thus not only informs our 
understanding of historical dynamics of his time, but also when ingeniously considered, gives us 
much to consider for and appropriately apply to our own. In particular, Augustine invites us to 
recognize the seriousness of our own exigency: that the purpose of education – whatever 
motivates the discovery and expressions of our study and scholarship – has consequences for our 
culture and our happiness; it matters where we find our joy.  
 As a final note, one might also suggest that the educational exigency of our day relates to 
one of Christian evangelization, for we ultimately cultivate the disposition of the soul, and 
                                                 
26 For example, one could suggest that secular schools today do teach and promote a certain kind 
of rhetoric commonly described as a freedom of expression that explicitly denies any measure by 
which we are made (Topping, Case 41). If religious teachers seek to defend objective goodness, 
truth and beauty created by God then they must do so in a way that demonstrates why such 
traditional teaching is “not a shackle but…a wellspring and vital power” for the human person 
(Pernot 145). A “conative” approach is perhaps most appropriate (Scanlon 39).  
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hopefully of a given society, for a divine planting – for conversion. In the words of Pope John 
Paul II, our time requires new “ardor, methods and expressions” for sharing the Gospel. The 
Pope’s message of a “new evangelization” comes at a time of increased secularism and hostility 
toward the Christian religion, even in places of the West that have strong cultural roots in the 
Christian tradition. In some ways, the Pope’s call is a distinctly rhetorical summons, for the 
Good, the True and the Beautiful do not change. Rather, the pontiff is encouraging all Christians 
to express the good news of the Gospel in fresh ways, to re-invite participation in the fullness of 
divine reality as revealed through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  
As we consider the “what” and the “how” of this call to communion, to unity with God 
and neighbor in the divine life, for our distinct time and place, Augustine invites us to discern the 
available means of persuasion. Perhaps our effort to evangelize, like Augustine’s in De ordine, 
ought to be responsive, metarhetorical and ordered. By making our evangelical rhetoric 
responsive, we acknowledge that culture informs the way that we think and speak about reality 
as a society. To be effective we therefore must engage the culture of those that we seek to 
evangelize, particularly their assumptions and questions concerning reality and its relationship to 
the divine. This engagement can include both praise and criticism of prevailing practices in light 
of the Gospel but moreover ought to be an ingenious evaluation of what is good, true and 
beautiful within them. Diverse authorities and approaches may be useful, but in general, appeals 
to reason and revelation are privileged.  
One might describe this responsive character of evangelization as an expression of 
mercy, seeking to find and share an opening, what Pope Francis describes as a kairotic moment, 
with others (6), for “divine assistance fulfills its office of mercy in favor of all peoples, and more 
abundantly than many imagine” (ord. II.10.29). To accomplish this rhetorical task well is 
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difficult, however, for it requires that one be able to relate lower things to higher things 
(preferably through broad learning in the liberal arts) as a means to bring others toward a fuller 
appreciation for divine reality. We may begin by meeting the audience “where they are,” but this 
is not the final goal. We must attend to the gradual development of mind, body and soul (e.g., the 
corporal and spiritual works of mercy) among the diverse groups that we seek to engage.  
Such evangelical rhetoric also ought to be metarhetorical in that it uses the breadth of 
rhetorical knowledge and wisdom in union with the fullness of divine truth and beauty. In other 
words, it works with the other disciplines, such as theology, philosophy, science, and art, to 
present the “what” and the “how” of its particular message. Augustine understood the 
temptations of an isolated rhetoric, the appeal to lower or to limit one’s rhetorical practices for 
the sake of a rhetorical goal, i.e., persuasion separated from truth. By remaining in discourse with 
the other disciplines, this evangelical rhetoric is enriched by other ways of knowing and thinking. 
Eventually, the united work of these disciplines develops a dynamic discourse that teaches, 
delights and moves the audience through the good, the true and the beautiful, and ultimately 
toward Christ Himself, the divine authority that relates all things through the humility of the 
Incarnation (ord. II.9.27). We may start with a response to the particulars of a given rhetorical 
situation – drawing attention to good actions, truthful discourse and sweet speech – but we move 
toward unity, toward universals, through a metarhetoric that uses the natural to point to the 
supernatural.  
Most fundamentally, this evangelical rhetoric is ordered; it relates particular goods, truths 
and beauties to the One who is goodness, truth and beauty itself. Through reason and revelation, 
we relate the givens of a particular moment to that which is beyond the givens of a particular 
moment. In this way, our discourse is constrained by divine truth, by an objective reality that is 
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both discoverable in everything and beyond everything. We willingly ground our rhetorical 
efforts, which may be very ingenious and eloquent, on a “given” truth (Weigel 44), on that which 
is revealed to us through faith and through reason, and not solely on an invented one. Perhaps 
this quality of Christian discourse is strange to the secularist, although it ought not be. As 
Augustine has shown, this way of thinking is natural to reason, to philosophy (ord.II.5.16). From 
a Christian perspective, we foremost speak because we believe, and we believe because the 
Word of God has spoken to us. Divine mercy unites to divine justice, and our intentions and 
desires are always subject to divine authority. We measure our rhetoric in relationship to the One 
who spoke first, as a response to the divine logos.  
Amidst the difficulties of evangelism today, we must not despair of finding the right 
audience for such evangelical speech, for every heart is restless until it rests in the Lord (conf. 
I.1.1). We all long for a peace that the world cannot give. Indeed, “the Church does not have a 
mission…the Church is a mission, and everything the Church does is ordered to that mission,” 
which is the proclamation of divine truth (Weigel 85–86). As George Weigel writes in his timely 
book, Evangelical Catholicism, our expressions unite “the criterion of truth” to “the criterion of 
mission,” (93) inviting others to “holiness” in imitation of Christ (105). In Augustine’s 
philosophia, the disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric work together to inform, frame and 
bolster this evangelical effort. May we follow him in using them wisely to cultivate the ground 








Auerbach, Erich. Literary Language and Its Public: In Late Latin Antiquity and the Middle Ages.  
Trans. Ralph Manheim. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Print.  
Augustine. Against the Academicians. Trans. Peter King. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing  
Company, Inc. 1995. Print. 
--. The Confessions of Saint Augustine. Trans. John K Ryan. New York: Doubleday, 1960. Print. 
---. Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil. Trans. Robert P. Russell, O.S.A. New  
York: Cosmopolitan Science & Art Service Co., Inc. 1942. Print.  
---. On Christian Doctrine. Trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr. Upper Saddle River, NJ:  
Prentice Hall, 1997. Print. 
Ayres, Lewis and Michel R. Barnes. “God.” Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia.  
General Ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, O.S.A. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1999. 384–390. Print. 
Baldwin, Charles. “Saint Augustine on Preaching.” Enos, Richard Leo, Roger Thompson et al.,  
eds. The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo: De Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a 
Distinctly Christian Rhetoric. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008. 187–204. Print.  
Beale, Walter H. “Decorum.” Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition: Communication from  
Ancient Times to the Information Age. Ed. Theresa Enos. New York: Routledge, 1996. 
557–561. Print.  
Bender, Daniel. “Copia.” Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition: Communication from  
Ancient Times to the Information Age. Ed. Theresa Enos. New York: Routledge, 1996.  
504 –507. Print.  
Bitzer, Lloyd F. “The Rhetorical Situation.” Philosophy and Rhetoric. 25.1 (1992): 1–14. Print.  
 
163 
Blyth, Dougal. “Cicero and Philosophy as Text.” The Classical Journal. 106.1 (2010): 71–98.   
Print. 
Boyle, Marjorie O’Rourke. “A Likely Story: The Autobiographical as Epideictic.” Journal of the  
American Academy of Religion. 57.1 (1989): 23–51. Print.   
Brown, Peter. Augustine of Hippo: A Biography. 2nd Ed. Berkeley: University of California  
Press, 2000. Print.  
Cameron, Averil. The Later Roman Empire: AD 284–430. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,  
1993. Print.  
---. Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse. Berkley:  
University of California Press, 1991. Print.  
Cavadini, John C. “The Sweetness of the Word: Salvation and Rhetoric in Augustine’s De  
Doctrina Christiana.” De Doctrina Christiana: A Classic of Western Culture. Eds. Duane 
W.H. Arnold and Pamela Bright. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1995. 164–181. Print 
Cipriani, Nello. “Rhetoric.” Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia.  
General Ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, O.S.A. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1999. 724–726. Print.  
Clark, Donald Lemen. “Learning to Speak and to Write.” Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education.  
New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. 3–23. Print.  
Colish, Marcia L. “Augustine: The Expression of the Word.” The Mirror of Lanaguage: A Study  
in the Medieval Theory of Knowledge. 2nd ed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1983. 8–81. Print.  




Cooper, John M. “Plato, Isocrates, and Cicero on the Independence of Oratory from Philosophy.”  
Knowledge, Nature and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004. 65–80. Print.  
Curley, Augustine. “Marcus Tullius Cicero.” Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia.  
General Ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, O.S.A. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1999. 190–193. Print. 
De Giorgio, Jean-Pierre. “Defining Dialogue in Ancient Rome: Cicero’s De oratore, Drama and  
the Notion of Everyday Conversation.” Language and Dialogue. 2:1 (2012): 105–121. 
Print.  
DiLorenzo, Raymond. “Ciceronianism and Augustine’s Conception of Philosophy.” Augustinian  
Studies. 13 (1982): 171–176. Print. 
---. “The Critique of Socrates in Cicero’s De Oratore: Ornatus and the Nature  
of Wisdom.” Philosophy and Rhetoric. 11.4 (1978): 247–261. Print.  
---. “Divine Eloquence and the Spiritual World of the Praedicator: Book XIII of St. Augustine’s  
Confessions.” Augustinian Studies. 16 (1984): 75–88. Print. 
---. “Non Pie Quaerunt: Rhetoric, Dialectic, and the Discovery of the True in Augustine’s 
Confessions.”  Augustinian Studies. 14 (1983): 117–127. Print.  
Dodaro, Robert. “Eloquent Lies, Just Wars and the Politics of Persuasion: Reading Augustine’s  
City of God in a ‘Postmodern’ World.” Augustinian Studies. 25 (1994): 77–138. Print.   
Douglass, Laurie. “Voice Re-Cast: Augustine’s Use of Conversation in De ordine and the  
Confessions.” Augustinian Studies. 27.1 (1996): 39–54. Print.  
Drobner, Hubertus. “Studying Augustine: An Overview of Recent Research.” Augustine and His  
 
165 
Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner. Eds. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless.  
New York: Routledge, 2002. 18–34. Print.   
Duffy, Bernard K. “The Platonic Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric.” Philosophy and Rhetoric.  
16.2 (1983): 79–93. Print. 
Enos, Richard Leo, Roger Thompson et al., eds. The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo: De  
Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric. Waco: Baylor 
University Press, 2008. Print. 
Farrell, James M. “The Rhetoric(s) of St. Augustine’s Confessions.” Augustinian Studies. 39.2  
(2008): 265–291. Print.  
Foley, Michael P. “Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum  
Dialogues.” Revue des Études Augustiniennes. 45 (1999): 51–77. Print.  
---. “The Other Happy Life: The Political Dimensions to St. Augustine’s Cassiciacum  
Dialogues.” The Review of Politics. 65.2 (2003): 165–183. Print.  
Fortin, Ernest L. “Augustine and the Problem of Christian Rhetoric.” Enos, Richard Leo, Roger  
Thompson et al., eds. The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo: De Doctrina Christiana 
and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008. 
219–234. Print.  
Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine. Trans. L.E.M. Lynch. New York:  
Random House, 1960. Print. 
Hagendahl, Harald. Augustine and the Latin Classics. Göteborg: Almquist and Wiksell, 1967.  
Print. 
Hermanson, Amy K., et al. “Saint Augustine and the Creation of a Distinctly Christian  
 
166 
Rhetoric.” Enos, Richard Leo, Roger Thompson et al., eds. The Rhetoric of St. Augustine 
of Hippo: De Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric. 
Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008. 1–8. Print. 
Herrick, James A. The History and Theory of Rhetoric. 3rd Ed. Boston: Pearson Education, Inc.  
1997. Print.  
Hochschild, Paige E. “The Cassiacum Dialogues: Contra Academicos, Beata vita, and De  
ordine.” Memory in Augustine’s Theological Anthropology. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012. 69–87. Print.  
Holt, Laura. “Wisdom’s Teacher: Augustine at Cassiciacum.” Augustinian Studies. 29.2 (1998):  
47–60. Print.  
Jost, Walter and Michael J. Hyde. “Prologue.” Rhetoric and Hermeneutics in Our Time. New  
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. Xi–xxiii. Print. 
Johnson, W. R. “Isocrates flowering: The Rhetoric of Augustine.” Philosophy and Rhetoric. 9.4  
(1976): 217–231. Print  
Kennedy, George A. “Attitudes Toward Authority in the Teaching of Rhetoric Before 1050.”  
Rhetoric and Pedagogy: Its History, Philosophy, and Practice: Essays in Honor of James 
J. Murphy. Eds. Winifred Bryan Horner and Michael Leff. Manwah, N.J.: L Erlbaum, 
1995. 65–72. Print. 
---. Classical Rhetoric & Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to  
Modern Times. 2nd Ed. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999. Print. 
Kimball, Bruce A. Orators and Philosophers: A History of the Idea of Liberal Education.  
Expanded Edition. New York: College Board, 1995. Print. 
Kirby, John T. “Second Sophistic.” Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition: Communication  
 
167 
from Ancient Times to the Information Age. Ed. Theresa Enos. New York: Routledge, 
1996.  1932–1942. Print.  
Leff, Michael C. “Saint Augustine and Martianus Capella: Continuity and Change in Fifth- 
Century Latin Rhetorical Theory.” Enos, Richard Leo, Roger Thompson et al., eds. The 
Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo: De Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a 
Distinctly Christian Rhetoric. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008. 235–246. Print.  
Madec, Goulven. “Christian Influences on Augustine.” Augustine Through the Ages: An  
Encyclopedia. General Ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, O.S.A. Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999. 151–156. Print. 
Mallard, William. Language and Love: Introducing Augustine's Religious Thought through the  
Confessions Story. University Park: Penn State University Press, 1994. Print. 
Marrou, H. I. A History of Education in Antiquity. Trans. George Lamb. Madison: University of  
Wisconsin Press, 1956. Print.  
McWilliam, Joanne. “Cassiacum Dialogues.” Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia.  
General Ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, O.S.A. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1999. 135–143. Print. 
“Metarhetoric: An Editorial Forword.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly. 8.1 (1978):  
 1. Print.  
Murphy, James J. “Forward.” Enos, Richard Leo, Roger Thompson et al., eds. The Rhetoric of  
St. Augustine of Hippo: De Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a Distinctly Christian 
Rhetoric. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008. Xi–xii. Print.  
---.  “The End of the Ancient World: The Second Sophistic and Saint Augustine.”  
 
168 
Eds. Murphy, James J., Richard A. Katula, et al. A Synoptic History of Classical 
Rhetoric. Third ed. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 2003. 229–236. Print. 
---. “The Metarhetorics of Plato, Augustine and McLuhan: A Pointing Essay.” Philosophy and  
Rhetoric. 4.4 (1971): 201–214. Print.  
---. Rhetoric of the Middle Ages: A History of the Rhetorical Tradition from Saint  
Augustine to the Renaissance. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. Print.   
---. “Saint Augustine and the Christianization of Rhetoric.” Western Journal of  
Speech. 22 (1958): 24–29. Print.  
---. “Saint Augustine and the Debate about a Christian Rhetoric.” Enos, Richard Leo, Roger  
Thompson et al., eds. The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo: De Doctrina Christiana 
and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008. 
205–218. Print.  
The New American Bible. Washington, DC: United States Conference of Catholic  
Bishops, 2002. Print.  
O’Donnell, James J. “The Authority of Augustine.” St. Augustine Lecture. Villanova University.  
13 November 1991. 
http://faculty.georgetown.edu/jod/augustine/augustine/augauth.notes.html#1.  
O’Meara, John J. “Introduction.” Against the Academics. New York: Newman Press, 1951.  
3–34. Print.  
Ong, Walter J. “Forward to the 1990 Edition.” The Present State of Scholarship in the History of  
Rhetoric: A Twenty-First Century Guide. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2010. 
Google Books, https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=LLzCBpstRO0C. Accessed 7 
Jan 2018.  
 
169 
Pacioni, Virgilio. “Liberal Arts.” Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia.  
General Ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, O.S.A. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1999. 492–494. Print. 
---. “Order.” Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia. General Ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald,  
O.S.A. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999. 492–494. Print. 
Pepe, Cristina. The Genres of Rhetorical Speeches in Greek and Roman Antiquity. Leiden, The  
Netherlands: Koninkijke Brill NV, 2013. Print.  
Pernot, Laurent. Rhetoric in Antiquity. Trans. W.E. Higgins. Washington, D.C.: Catholic  
University of America Press, 2005. Print.  
Pollmann, Karla and Mark Vessey, eds. Augustine and the Disciplines: From Cassiciacum to  
Confessions. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.  
Pope Francis. The Name of God is Mercy: A Conversation with Andrea Tornielli. Trans. Oonagh  
Stransky. New York: Random House, 2016. Print.  
Pope John Paul II. “Opening Address of the Nineteenth General Assembly of CELAM.”  
Disciplines Called to Witness: The New Evangelization. www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-
teachings/how-we-teach/new-evangelization/disciples-called-to-
witness/upload/Disciples-Called-to-Witness-5-30-12.pdf. Accessed 4 June 2018.  
Press, Gerald. “The Subject and Structure of Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana.” Augustinian  
Studies. 2 (1980): 99–124. Print. 
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria. A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric. 3rd Ed. Eds. James J.  
Murphy, Richard A. Katula, et al. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
2003. 209–225. Print. 
Riley, George F. The Role of Marcus Tullius Cicero in the Educational Formation of Saint  
 
170 
Augustine of Hippo. Ann Arbor: UMI, 1980. Print. 
Russell, Robert P. “Appendix.” Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil: A Translation of  
St. Augustine’s De Ordine. New York: Cosmopolitan Science & Art Service Co. Inc.,  
1942. 180–187. Print.  
---. “Introduction.” Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil: A Translation of  
St. Augustine’s De Ordine. New York: Cosmopolitan Science & Art Service Co. Inc., 1
 942. i–iv. Print.  
Scanlon, Michael. J. “Augustine and Theology as Rhetoric.” Augustinian Studies. 25 (1994): 37– 
50. Print.  
Schaeffer, John D. “The Dialectic of Orality and Literacy: The Case of Book 4 of Augustine’s  
De Doctrina Christiana.” Enos, Richard Leo, Roger Thompson et al., eds. The Rhetoric  
of St. Augustine of Hippo: De Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a Distinctly 
Christian Rhetoric. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008. 289–307. Print. 
Schiappa, Edward. “Sophistic Rhetoric.” Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition:  
Communication from Ancient Times to the Information Age. Ed. Theresa Enos. New 
York: Routledge, 1996. 1994–2004. Print. 
Seigel, Jerrold E. “Rhetoric and Philosophy: The Ciceronian Model.” Rhetoric and Philosophy in  
Renaissance Humanism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 3–30. Print.   
Shanzer, Danuta R. “Augustine’s Disciplines: Silent diutius Musae Varronis?” Augustine and the  
Disciplines: From Cassiciacum to Confessions. Ed. Karla Pollmann and Mark Vessey. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 69–112. Print.  
Silver, Victoria. Rev. of In Defense of Rhetoric, by Brian Vickers. Renaissance Quarterly. 43.1  
(1990): 164–166. Print. 
 
171 
Sullivan, Thérèse. “Appendix: Original Front Matter to Sister Therese Sullivan’s De Doctrina  
Christiana, Liber Qvartvs (Epigraph, Preface, Select Bibliography, and Introduction.” 
Enos, Richard Leo, Roger Thompson et al., eds. The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo: 
De Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric. Waco: Baylor 
University Press, 2008. 315–363. Print.  
Sutherland, Christine. “Love as Rhetorical Principle: The Relationship Between Content and  
Style in the Rhetoric of Saint Augustine.” Grace, Politics, and Desire: Essays on 
Augustine. Ed. Hugo A. Meynall. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1990. 139–156. 
Print. 
Tell, Dave. “Augustine and the Chair of Lies: Rhetoric in the Confessions.” Rhetorica. 28.4  
(2010): 384–407. Print.  
Topping, Ryan N. S. The Case for Catholic Education: Why Parents, Teachers, and Politicians  
Should Reclaim the Principles of Catholic Pedagogy. Kettering, OH: Angelico Press, 
2015. Print.  
---. Happiness and Wisdom: Augustine’s Early Theology of Education.  
Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012. Print. 
Tracy, David W. “Charity, Obscurity, Clarity: Augustine’s Search for a True Rhetoric.” Enos,  
Richard Leo, Roger Thompson et al., eds. The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo: De 
Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric. Waco: Baylor 
University Press, 2008. 267–287. Print.  
Troup, Calvin L. Temporality, Eternity and Wisdom: The Rhetoric of Augustine’s  
Confessions. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999. Print. 
Trout, Dennis. “Otium.” Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia. General Ed. Allan D.  
 
172 
Fitzgerald, O.S.A. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999. 618–
619. Print. 
Van Deusen, Nancy. “De Rhetorica.” Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia. General  
Ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, O.S.A. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1999. 726. Print. 
Vickers, Brian. “Medieval Fragmentation.” In Defence of Rhetoric. Oxford University Press,  
1998. 214–253. Print.  
---. “Territorial Disputes.” Rhetoric Revalued: Papers from the International Society for the  
History of Rhetoric. Ed. Brian Vickers. Binghamton, N.Y.: Center for Medieval & Early 
Renaissance Studies, 1982. 247–266. Print. 
Walker, Jeffrey. Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity. Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
2000. Print.  
Weigel, George. Evangelical Catholicism: Deep Reform in the 21st Century Church. New York:  
Basic Books, 2013. Print.  
